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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study argues that Catholicism informs a major genre of African American 
literature in ways and with a significance that has gone largely unrecognized. Since their 
emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary narratives of slavery have challenged 
the traditional historiography of American slavery, radically revising how we remember 
that “peculiar institution.” These fictional works disrupt the form and content of slave 
autobiography, suggesting that the conventions of Enlightenment rationalism to which 
antebellum texts were bound could not adequately represent the experience of 
enslavement. Scholarship on the genre has thus tended to focus on the way it undermines 
the rationalizing impulse of Enlightenment discourse, which in the U.S. as well as in 
Europe was determined by the ideals of the Protestant Reformation. But while the 
scholarly attention to Protestantism has yielded valuable insights regarding the 
contemporary slave narrative’s critique of the “unreason” of slavery, it cannot account for 
the striking presence of the Catholic themes and images at the margins of these texts that 
this dissertation uncovers, nor for the way that the religion is imaginatively linked to 
radical moments of historical revision.    
 I argue that Catholicism undergirds the imaginative ways the genre expresses the 
inexpressible horror of enslavement and the legacy of those horrors in the present day. 
	  	   	   ix	  
Because of its historical association with irrationality, superstition, and an aberrant 
supernaturalism, Catholicism is thus marshaled—with justified political hesitation—in 
the contemporary slave narrative as an oppositional category of discourse through which 
African American authors break with the historiographical methods of the Enlightenment 
and, in particular, with the rationalization of slavery characterizing the period. Chapter 
One analyzes two novels by Toni Morrison, Beloved and A Mercy, and her concept of 
“rememory.” In Chapter Two, I examine the trope of spirit possession in Ernest Gaines’s 
The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman and Leon Forrest’s Two Wings to Veil My Face. 
My final two chapters address temporal disjuncture in contemporary narratives of 
slavery: Chapter Three comprises readings of Phyllis Alesia Perry’s Stigmata and Charles 
Johnson’s Oxherding Tale, while in Chapter Four I focus on Edward P. Jones’s The 
Known World. 
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Introduction 
A New Reading of the Margins of African American Literature 
 In 1992, Paul Giles published his broad and ambitious account of Roman 
Catholicism “as a residual cultural determinant” within American literature from the 
early part of the nineteenth century to the present (1). Focusing on writers who grew up 
Catholic or were exposed to Catholic practices as children, he argues that even for non-
believers and apostates, the rituals they performed and the doctrines they studied in their 
youth can affect aesthetic production “in some circuitous or unconscious fashion long 
after the forces of rationality have deconstructed and rejected” such irrational precepts 
(2). The range of Giles’s analysis is extensive, and he examines the work of authors from 
a variety of socio-economic and ethnic contexts as well as over nearly two centuries of 
U.S. history. Yet at the end of the book, he acknowledges that there remains at least one 
key aspect of contemporary Catholic culture that his inquiry barely touches upon. And he 
calls in his conclusion for a fuller consideration of how artists who have been historically 
disenfranchised by racial segregation within the church—and African Americans, 
specifically—deploy discourses of Catholicism in their fiction. Fewer than four pages of 
his 531-page-book are devoted to non-white authors, and so by way of atoning for this 
imbalance, Giles invites further consideration of a literature that reflects the 
“distinctly…oppositional cultural perspective” through which African American writers 
“filter” Catholic “themes” (518).    
 Now, almost a quarter century after Giles’s American Catholic Arts and Fictions 
highlighted the dearth of scholarship on Catholicism in African American literature, we 
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find ourselves awaiting still the start of the conversation. While a handful of articles and 
book chapters have addressed the religious content of texts by individuals with clear ties 
to Catholic culture (such as Alice Dunbar-Nelson, whose Creole heritage features 
prominently in her fiction, and Claude McKay, who wrote extensively about converting 
to Catholicism), no major study of the topic has yet been undertaken.1 My project thus 
inaugurates what I hope will become a far-reaching, multidirectional effort among critics 
to identify and contextualize how the African American literary tradition engages 
Catholic ideology, theology, and social practices. For, when we look closely, Catholicism 
appears at the margins of a significant number of significant works throughout the canon 
of African American literature—including those written by authors who were never 
practicing Catholics. From some of the earliest published texts in the tradition (fugitive 
slave narratives by Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, for example2) to some of the 
most recent (plays such as The Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World 
by Suzan-Lori Parks3), Catholicism operates in various ways, all of which warrant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On Catholicism in Dunbar-Nelson’s fiction, see Brooks as well as Haddox 41-44. A 
recent article in Callaloo traces Claude McKay’s “Road to Catholicism” (Deshmukh), 
and Giles addresses the topic briefly in the final chapter of his book (518-19). In fact, 
McKay is one of the two African American writers (along with Leon Forrest) whom 
Giles associates with Catholic culture.  
2 Douglass famously noted in his Narrative of the Life that he used the “mighty speeches 
on and in behalf of Catholic emancipation” to help define his own anti-slavery position, 
while Harriet Jacobs compared her white master to the Catholic leaders responsible for 
the Inquisition in order to emphasize his cruelty. (On Catholicism in Jacobs, see Franchot 
104-05.) The extreme divergence in how these two authors deploy Catholicism for a 
common purpose (abolition) indicates the variable nature of the Catholic margin and the 
variety of uses to which it is put in different texts. 
3 The structure of Parks’s play, she has said, was informed by the Stations of the Cross: a 
series of images depicting the Passion of Christ, which are displayed in Roman Catholic 
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extended reflection. Indeed, given the resounding lack of scholarly attention to this 
Catholic margin and its implications, an examination of the subject in virtually any 
historical period or generic categorization would contribute materially to a more 
complete portrait of African American literary history. 
 My dissertation focuses on contemporary narratives of slavery in particular 
because the genre developed at a time when there was growing interest in how religion 
and religious discourses determine our collective “memory” of the slave experience in the 
United States. Contemporary narratives of slavery (or neo-slave narratives as they are 
also called4) first emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, during the height of national 
conversations about the way we remember that “peculiar institution,” conversations 
which defined the legacy of racial oppression that persisted well past Emancipation and 
persists still.5 In the wake of the civil rights and Black Power movements, academics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
churches and often used in prayer ceremonies held during Lent and on Good Friday. (See 
Geis 58.) 
4 The term “neo-slave narrative” was coined in 1987 by Bernard Bell, who used it to refer 
to fictional accounts of slavery that take the form and assume the (first-person) narrative 
structure of the antebellum autobiographies of fugitive slaves. Ashraf Rushdy used the 
term in a similar way in his 1999 landmark study of the genre. But in 2004, Arlene 
Keizer proposed that “contemporary narratives of slavery” be used instead, as a way to 
signify the many different styles and forms of address used in fiction about slavery. She 
points out, for example, “how few contemporary narratives of slavery are written in the 
first person” (3). For the most part, in this dissertation, I follow Keizer’s preferred 
terminology, though I am not as concerned as she is with maintaining a rigid distinction 
between the two generic labels. That is because, in the years since Keizer’s book was 
published, the term “neo-slave narrative” has been more widely applied and is now used 
to refer to a greater variety of texts than Bell and Rushdy originally intended it to 
represent (see Valerie Smith’s chapter on “Neo-slave Narratives,” for example). 
Therefore, I will at times use the two terms interchangeably for the sake of convenience. 
5 Contemporary narratives of slavery began to appear in large numbers after 1966, 
following the publication of Margaret Walker’s Jubilee, which is generally regarded as 
the first “neo-slave narrative” in the U.S. However, as Rushdy and Smith note, Arna 
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from newly minted Black Studies programs across the nation were advocating for a 
revision of the traditional historiography of slavery. Their calls got echoed by African 
American artists and writers, many of them affiliated with the Blacks Arts Movement 
whose founder, Amiri Baraka, made explicit his aesthetic compulsion to expose the lies 
that sustained white America’s view of the past. As Ashraf Rushdy has contended, chief 
among those lies was the suggestion, prominent in white-authored texts like William 
Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner (1967), that slaves possessed neither the 
knowledge nor the intellectual capacity to successfully resist the conditions of their 
enslavement—that they were, in effect, largely unthinking victims of the abuses 
perpetrated against them. In part to dispel these erroneous claims, historians and other 
academics invested in revising the historical record aimed to demonstrate the 
extraordinary lengths to which slaves often went to challenge the ideology of the system 
that made them chattel. 
 With regard to religion specifically, important studies by Eugene Genovese, 
Lawrence Levine, and Albert Raboteau revealed how slaves manipulated the 
fundamentalist Protestant ideals imposed on them by Southern slaveowners seeking to 
cultivate an atmosphere of obedience. Their scholarship charted multiple courses of 
resistance, making the case that even the most apparently devout—and obedient—
Christians were subtly defying their masters’ power by using church meetings and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bontemp’s Black Thunder was published three decades before Walker’s novel, in 1936, 
and it “anticipates much of the cultural work that later texts in the genre perform” (Smith 
“Neo-slave” 170). With the exception of Bontemp’s novel, though, fictional accounts of 
slavery were not being produced until the late-1960s, and they really exploded after the 
mid-1970s. 
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religious gatherings for their own (sometimes revolutionary) purposes. Along similar 
lines, literary scholars began during this period to consider the canny ways that slave 
autobiographers negotiated Christianity in their writing, showing how they appealed to 
the abolitionist sympathies of an evangelical readership in the North by condemning the 
“ungodly” behavior of white Protestants in the South. But while this criticism brought 
awareness to the strategic use of religion in autobiographies by fugitive slave authors and 
helped to establish their autobiographies as “legitimate” works of literature, it also 
confirmed the tenuousness of their theological positions. In other words: by emphasizing 
the thoughtfulness and purpose with which the antebellum autobiographers wrote about 
Christian theology, studies such as John Blassingame’s The Slave Community 
simultaneously drew attention to the religious conventions they were forced to uphold in 
the quest to gain Northern sympathizers. For the first time, then, it became clear just how 
much the political strategy of the fugitive slave authors depended on their ability to 
market themselves as spiritually saved and God-fearing Christians, whom white 
evangelicals in the North would deem “worthy” of liberation. 
 As a result of this burgeoning field of scholarship, which outlined both the 
advantages and the limitations of religious discourses of resistance for slaves, there was 
intense scrutiny in the post-Civil Rights period on the way that antebellum narratives of 
slavery were shaped by Christianity—and specifically on what the autobiographers had to 
withhold from their testimonies for fear of offending their readers or otherwise 
jeopardizing the abolitionist cause. Thus, at almost the same moment when academics 
were establishing the historical legitimacy and literary value of these first-person 
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accounts of enslavement, new questions surfaced about the silences and obfuscations that 
pervade them.6 If fugitive slave authors knew their political aims were contingent upon 
“proof” of Christian salvation, then what might they have chosen to leave out or to forget 
about their past? How could they possibly be expected to communicate the full truth of 
their experience to an audience who was looking for any reason to condemn them? The 
frustration implicit in entertaining such questions is, of course, that no satisfactory 
answers can ever be given, since—as Toni Morrison reminds us in her 1987 essay “The 
Site of Memory”—it would be impossible to separate the texts from the “milieu” in 
which they were written. According to Morrison, “whatever the level of eloquence” of a 
slave’s autobiography, “popular taste” determined its “style” and its content, forcing the 
excision of any detail that might appear “sordid” or “excessive” (69). Morrison’s analysis 
reflects the rising tide of skepticism that tempered early claims about the authenticity or 
truth-value of fugitive slave narratives from historians eager to legitimize their version of 
events. Rather than joining the chorus of those who celebrated unequivocally the 
autobiographers’ capacity for accurately representing history from the slave’s point of 
view, she sought to understand the social, political—and, yes, religious—forces which 
“dictated” what they wrote and the way they wrote it. 
 While skepticism of the kind that Morrison expresses might be thought to lessen 
interest in the form, what most critics argue is that it actually had the exact opposite 
effect: that the explosion of novels about slavery in the second half of the twentieth 
century was driven—not dampened—by studies exposing how dramatically the fugitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For further discussion of the historical context in which these questions surfaced, see 
Dubey, “Neo-Slave Narratives.” 
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slave narratives were influenced by the values of their white readership. To put this in 
other terms: the criticism tends to correlate the genre’s emergence in the decades 
following the movements for racial equality in the U.S. with a widespread imaginary 
effort on the part of contemporary African American authors to “fill the gaps” in the 
historical record of slavery—gaps that were left by antebellum autobiographers who had 
no choice but to relate their memories according to discursive conventions that would 
appeal to a white, evangelical audience in the North. And, in many respects, the 
correlation these critics are making is based on the same premise that Morrison herself 
used to describe her “job” as a writer working in a “very different” historical context, 
“more than a hundred years after Emancipation.” To her, “any person who is black, or 
who belongs to any marginalized category” has a responsibility to imaginatively recover 
that which the fugitive slaves could not remember, as a consequence of the “climate in 
which they wrote.” Thus Morrison regards her own fiction about slavery as a concerted 
attempt “to rip that veil aside” that was drawn over their autobiographies by a set of 
discourses they “were seldom invited to participate in…even when [they] were its topic” 
(“Site” 70).  
 As Madhu Dubey has demonstrated, the particular set of discourses that 
contemporary narratives of slavery sought to undermine were informed by 
“Enlightenment modernity” as well as the realist and rationalist imperatives that 
characterized writing produced “during an era when slaves were relegated to subhuman 
status because they were believed to be innately incapable of reason” (340). With that in 
mind, Dubey and other literary scholars working on the genre have stressed the range of 
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techniques that authors deploy to confound the rationalizing impulse of antebellum texts, 
arguing that by disrupting realism in their narratives, they are effectively “reclaiming” 
those portions of the slave experience that were “suppressed by the modern legacy” and 
consequently excised from the traditional historiography of slavery (“Neo-Slave” 342).7 
The more unrealistic or supernatural aspects of the genre that proliferate especially in 
contemporary slave narratives written after 1970 have therefore been interpreted as a 
reaction against Enlightenment rationalism—and the values of the Protestant 
Reformation with which, in the U.S. as in Europe, the Age of Enlightenment was 
inexorably connected. Following Paul Gilroy’s brilliant and hugely influential study The 
Black Atlantic, the vast majority of criticism on these novels links their radical breaks 
with realism to a “counterculture” of modernity that “defiantly reconstructs its own 
critical, intellectual, and moral genealogy” in terms categorically opposed to the Western 
model (37-8). This is how critics have explained, for example, the frequent appearance of 
alternative belief structures and non-Western religions in contemporary narratives of 
slavery: as a tool for destabilizing the religious strictures placed on the antebellum slave 
autobiographers by the evangelical Protestant audiences who constituted their primary 
readership.  
  There can be no doubt that the African and African-derived spiritual practices 
found in so many contemporary narratives of slavery promote radically different ways of 
remembering the slave experience that challenge the conventions of the form—
conventions determined by the autobiographers’ need to proclaim their own clear and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Spaulding makes a very similar case in the introduction to his study, which focuses on 
the postmodern aspects of contemporary slave narratives.  
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rational faith in a Christian God and to disaffiliate completely from what were perceived 
as the irrational beliefs of Africa. (Think of the famous footnote from Frederick 
Douglass’s Narrative, in which he characterizes Sandy’s rootwork as ignorant 
superstition.) And so, through the textual reclamation of these suppressed and disparaged 
spiritualities, post-Civil Rights novels about slavery engage in what Gilroy has called “a 
politics of transfiguration”: a striving towards new modes of representation “that are 
consequent on the overcoming of the racial oppression on which modernity and its 
antinomy of rational, western progress as excessive barbarity relied” (38). In other words, 
the disruptions in formal structure and narrative content that such non-Western belief 
systems enact in the texts are political—as a well narratological—acts of revision. Thus 
the genre’s overwhelming antirealist (alternately termed “speculative” or “postmodern”) 
orientation is almost always associated in the critical press with a push away from the 
constraints imposed by “Western Christianity” on the fugitive slave writers. 
 While I agree in a general sense with arguments linking antirealism to a politics of 
historical revision, my dissertation will complicate the prevailing understanding of the 
mechanisms by which contemporary slave narratives disrupt the antebellum discourse of 
slavery. For, as I argue, non-Western belief systems alone do not account for all the ways 
that the novels considered here “transfigure” the conventions of Enlightenment 
rationalism. More to the point, they do not account for the striking presence of 
Catholicism at the margins of these texts, nor for how the Catholic margin imaginatively 
intervenes in—and shapes—their revisionist aims. Indeed, by teasing out the moments 
where the authors in this study critically engage Catholicism as part of the effort to revise 
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the traditional historiography of slavery, I propose a new framework for reading the 
alternative spiritualities emergent in their novels, suggesting that along with the African 
and African-derived practices they are consciously reclaiming, they also marshal Catholic 
themes and images in the service of the radical “counterculture” the writing sustains. On 
the one hand, their recourse to Catholicism makes sense, since historically the religion 
has been associated with the very irrationality and aberrant supernaturalism that the 
Enlightenment endeavored to stamp out. Therefore it seems logical to assume that the 
anti-Enlightenment resonances of Catholic theology contribute to the contemporary slave 
narrative’s critique of rationalist modernity. On the other hand, however, Catholicism and 
the institutions of the American Catholic church have been complicit not only in slavery 
itself, but also in the systemic racial segregation and oppression that persisted in the U.S. 
well into the civil rights period. So what would incline African American authors to 
imaginatively deploy Catholicism in their attempts to change how slavery is 
remembered—especially during a time characterized by a deep suspicion of the cultural 
traditions that supported the rise of slave societies in the West? 
 Answering this question brings to light a host of startling inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that are, in a way, the subject of my inquiry. That is because to acknowledge 
how contemporary narratives of slavery use Catholicism to challenge the realist and 
rationalist imperatives of fugitive slave autobiographies is to acknowledge—
simultaneously—the profound ambivalence with which these novels are engaging the 
religion’s disruptive potential. The Catholic margin thus constitutes a territory of deep 
internal conflict, wherein the texts negotiate their imaginative attraction to the “irrational” 
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language of sacraments and saints with their very real concerns about the historical and 
social policies of the church. One representative instance occurs in Leon Forrest’s Two 
Wings to Veil My Face (1984), when just as that novel’s protagonist, Nathaniel 
Witherspoon, starts to imagine the story his grandmother tells him as a Eucharistic 
celebration through which he might actually commune with the spirits of his slave 
ancestors, he finds himself remembering a disturbing event from his childhood: the 
burning down of his local Catholic church by its white congregants, who destroyed the 
building “rather than see it be turned over to the coloreds; starting the fire with the cloth 
that lined the Communion rail; and seven [black] children perished” (65). Nathaniel’s 
memory of this horrific act of racism (as well as his memories of other atrocities 
committed in the name of Catholicism, such as Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia8) 
effectively interrupts his desire to associate his family in any way with the religion—even 
in imaginary terms. The hesitation Nathaniel experiences at this moment in the novel, as 
he seeks a mode of representation that will adequately represent the past, is indicative, I 
argue, of how the authors in my study approach Catholic discourse. For although they 
were not all raised in Catholicism as Nathaniel (and his creator, Leon Forrest) was, their 
works display an intimate awareness of the racist history that undergirds institutions run 
and supported by church hierarchy—an awareness gained either through their education 
in Catholic schools (Ernest Gaines, Edward P. Jones, Phyllis Alesia Perry); through their 
conversion to Catholicism (Toni Morrison); or through their academic study of the 
religion (Charles Johnson).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nathaniel remembers, specifically, how the “Pope blessed” Mussolini’s actions, 
anointing the heads of his soldiers “as a fire-worshiping idolator [sic]” (65). 
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+++ 
 My dissertation traces the ambivalence with which these authors deploy the anti-
Enlightenment orientation of Catholicism to disrupt the conventional historiography of 
American slavery and to imagine radically different means of remembering the past. 
Chapter One, “Toni Morrison’s Sacramental Rememory,” discovers this ambivalence in 
the margins of two novels which are widely celebrated for undermining Enlightenment 
rationalism: Beloved (1987) and A Mercy (2008). As critics often note, Morrison’s 
concept of rememory—an antirealist trope, premised on the supernatural irruption of the 
past in the present—achieves this by imagining an alternative history of slavery. Thus, 
rememory promotes a kind of redemption: a means of redressing the formulaic way that 
the antebellum slave autobiographers were forced to remember their personal history. But 
because the criticism has not yet acknowledged how thoroughly the concept is informed 
by Catholic theology and, in particular, by a Catholic conception of grace, it tends to 
overlook its redemptive potential. A complete picture of these novels requires an account 
of the way that Morrison structures rememory—quite remarkably and with palpable 
historical reservations—as a Catholic sacrament. The chapter therefore addresses a 
significant gap in scholarship on Morrison (who identifies as Catholic), but never does it 
imply that her religious vision is uncritical or pure. Rather, throughout my analysis, I 
suggest that the sacramental aspects of rememory are in constant tension with the sharp 
critique of Catholicism evident in both novels. That critique, I contend, builds upon the 
sociological study of slave religion that Orlando Patterson developed in Slavery and 
Social Death, particularly his pioneering claim that “the special version of Protestantism” 
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which arose in the American slave South was, in key respects, theologically “identical” to 
Catholicism. 
 Chapter Two, “A Sacred Communion,” considers another trope that upsets the 
realist and rationalist discourse of slavery: spirit possession. In contemporary narratives 
of slavery, spirit possession signals a connection between the text’s present and slave 
history, as the ancestral spirit communicates the trauma of enslavement through a living 
mediator who, in turn, embodies the experience. Whereas existing scholarship has 
stressed the postmodernist resonances of this trope, I argue that the two novels I consider 
each depict their radical breaks with realism through the discourse of Catholicism. In 
other words, the Catholic margin of these two texts serves to frame—and even to 
facilitate—the antirealist effect that the trope of spirit possession has on their narratives. I 
turn first to Ernest Gaines’s The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman (1971), which is 
one of the earliest examples of the genre and a novel never associated with either spirit 
possession or Catholicism. By highlighting where Jane’s narrative voice is possessed by 
other speakers, I document how the Catholic characters in the novel enable it to engage 
radically antirealist views about history without ultimately endorsing them. The second 
part of the chapter focuses on Leon Forrest’s critically acclaimed but insufficiently 
studied novel, Two Wings to Veil My Face (1984), which also figures storytelling as a 
kind of spirit possession. In contrast to Gaines’s text, Forrest foregrounds the 
supernatural, as his narrator learns about his family’s past from a community of long-
dead slaves, who inhabit the body of his grandmother. Despite its obvious skepticism 
towards organized religion, the novel depicts these spiritual intercessions as Catholic 
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sacraments: rituals of eating and drinking that recall the Eucharistic. Thus, Catholicism is 
implicated in the way the narrator remembers slavery and in the parts of his history that 
are “beyond understanding.”  
 The third and fourth chapters both consider the trope of temporal disjuncture, or 
the abrupt and often inexplicable ways that texts destabilize conventions of linear time. In 
Chapter Three, I argue that Phyllis Alesia Perry’s Stigmata (1998) and Charles Johnson’s 
Oxherding Tale (1982) manipulate past and present modalities (respectively), to 
contradict the Enlightenment-era principle that history moves forward progressively and 
linearly. Chapter Four examines the flash-forward technique in Edward P. Jones’s The 
Known World (2003), showing how that novel uses conceptions of future time to 
similarly disrupt the linearity of the narrative. In all three cases, temporal disjunction 
serves as the means by which these contemporary narratives of slavery contend with the 
persistent trauma of the slave experience because it creates an imaginative space outside 
the limits of Western temporality, suggesting a way to transcend the cycle of racial 
suffering and oppression. As these texts demonstrate, art that self-consciously interrupts 
standard chronologies of time has the advantage not only of upsetting the traditional 
historiography of slavery but also of promoting non-Western approaches to time, which 
have been de-legitimized in the West since the Age of Enlightenment. Yet what is 
striking about the non-Western temporal modes that each of the novels privileges is how 
dramatically they are informed by Catholicism. Specifically, as I suggest, the alternative 
temporalities they imagine reveal a strange and often disconcerting faithfulness to the 
theology of time that Augustine of Hippo laid out in some of his most canonical works. 
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Since Augustinian theology has had such formative, lasting consequences for Western 
Christianity, and Catholicism in particular, it might appear contradictory to insist upon its 
relevance here, in both novels I consider, which very plainly reject Western conceptions 
of chronological progress. However, I endeavor to suggest that theological contradictions 
of this sort in the Catholic margin of these three novels actually sustain the way they 
revise the historiography of slavery. 
+++ 
 In focusing on the contradictions and tensions that Catholicism enjoins in the 
novels under consideration, my approach throughout the dissertation does not rely on—or 
offer—a static definition of the religion, nor indeed a rigid formula for how it operates in 
these works of fiction. Although I highlight in individual chapters the various means by 
which the Catholic margin disrupts Enlightenment rationality, I resist aligning it with a 
single discursive strategy or way of looking at the world. That is because, quite simply, 
Catholicism functions differently in each of the texts examined here. For some, it refers 
to a set of ritualistic practices and beliefs that fall outside the bounds of rational thought; 
for others, it signifies a social history fraught with racial segregation and oppression; for 
others still, it indicates a potentially enabling theology of salvation. And to make matters 
even more complicated, Catholicism often encompasses multiple—and conflicting—
modes of articulation within the same work of literature. Therefore, by bringing attention 
to the multiplicity inherent in the various ways that these novels deploy Catholicism, my 
dissertation draws methodologically on the vital work of scholars such as Thomas J. 
Ferraro, Susan L. Mizruchi, Robert A. Orsi and Jonathan Z. Smith, all of whom have 
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stressed the importance of viewing religion as dynamic and perpetually shifting category 
of discourse, through which it is possible to negotiate a variety of other (non-religious) 
aspects of culture.9 More specifically, following Jenny Franchot, I regard the Catholic 
margin of these novels as a contested imaginative space that simultaneously “serve[s] 
many masters” (xxii). In other words, depending on the context, Catholicism in the 
novels I consider might be deployed in what Franchot calls “strategically confused” 
terms—to both legitimize and condemn the salvific meaning of suffering, for instance—
and the efforts of my analysis are directed towards teasing out “the cultural and literary 
power of such taxonomic confusions,” according to their functionality in the text (xxii, 
xxiii). 
 To that end, my methodology in the following chapters involves placing each 
contemporary slave narrative in conversation with the set of ideas, ideologies, and rituals 
it encompasses that are coded “Catholic.” Attendant to the uniquely dynamic constitution 
and operation of Catholicism in every novel, I utilize a disciplinarily diverse range of 
germane texts—from doctrinal Catholic theology to recent poststructuralist theory—in 
order to frame the genre’s complex engagement with the religion. My reading of Beloved 
and A Mercy in Chapter One, for example, turns to a work of social history, Patterson’s 
Slavery and Social Death, that underpins Morrison’s own literary and historical 
scholarship on antebellum texts to argue that the excessiveness of her fiction often evokes 
Catholicism’s anti-Enlightenment orientation. I show how her critique of Enlightenment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  On religion as a “dynamically constituted” category of discourse, see also Eytan 
Bercovitch’s “The Altar of Sin,” along with Ferraro’s Feeling Italian; Mizruchi’s The 
Science of Sacrifice and the introduction to Religion and Cultural Studies, which she 
edited; Orsi’s The Madonna of 115th Street; and Smith’s Imagining Religion. 
	  	   	  
17	  
rationality in both novels depends, in fact, on reinserting “irrational” expressions of fear 
and anger into the historiography of slavery through the language of a Catholic 
sacramentality. In Chapter Two, I put cultural studies of religious syncretism (by Colin 
[Joan] Dayan and Leslie Desmangles) in dialogue with a Thomist theology of 
atemporality to demonstrate how the trope of spirit possession in novels by Ernest Gaines 
and Leon Forrest is linked to Catholicism. My third and fourth chapters—which connect 
the temporal disjuncture of Stigmata, Oxherding Tale, and The Known World to 
Augustine’s famous theological musings on time—apply a deconstructionist reading of 
presence (via Cixous and Derrida) to account for the strange appearance of Catholic 
characters and iconography at the margins of these texts. 
 By uncovering the multiple and conflicting—and, to this point, unexamined—
ways Catholicism functions in contemporary narratives of slavery, this dissertation 
contributes to the recent push to rethink how religion operates in African American 
literature. Along with studies by Katherine Clay Bassard, Joanna Brooks, and Tuire 
Valkeakari that reveal the ingenious means by which so-called “minority writers” 
manipulate religious forms and idioms to suit their purposes, my project aims ultimately 
to offer a new perspective on the relationship between Christianity and representations of 
the slave experience. 
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Chapter One  
 
Toni Morrison’s Sacramental Rememory  
 
 Near the start of Toni Morrison’s Beloved, in the quiet that follows Paul D’s 
violent expulsion of the baby ghost from 124 Bluestone Road, the narrative rests briefly 
on Denver and her curious reaction to what has just occurred. Four short paragraphs 
describe the girl’s motions as she wanders “through the silence” of her upturned house, 
unhurriedly collecting food for a mid-day meal that she will eat alone (22). By contrast to 
the confusion of the preceding moments, her actions appear rehearsed, even ritualistic—a 
sense that is communicated by the spare and staccato nature of the prose, as well as by 
the particularization of every gesture:  
She ashed over the fire and pulled the pan of biscuits from the oven. The 
jelly cupboard was on its back, its contents lying in a heap in the corner of 
the bottom shelf. She took out a jar, and, looking around for a plate, found 
the half of one by the door. These things she carried out to the porch steps, 
where she sat down. […] She pried the wire from the top of the jar and 
then the lid. Under it was cloth and under that a thin cake of wax. She 
removed it all and coaxed the jelly onto one half of the half a plate. She 
took a biscuit and pulled off its black top. Smoke curled from the soft 
white insides. […] Denver dipped a bit of bread into the jelly. Slowly, 
methodically, miserably she ate it. (22-3) 
 
 In response to losing “the only other company she had”—the spirit of her dead sister, 
who haunted the house she lived in with her mother and drove everyone else away—
Denver resorts to the familiar act of preparing and eating her meal as a means of coping 
with the loss (23).  
 In fact, there is a significant body of criticism on Beloved that associates 
consumption, both in this passage and elsewhere, with the desire to repress an 
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unspeakable trauma.1 Critics making this claim point out that Morrison regularly 
conflates eating and forgetting. They tend to read much of her food-related imagery, such 
as the “chewing laughter” that “swallow[s]” Beloved “all away” at the end of the novel, 
as exemplary of this theme (323).2 But, with respect to the passage quoted above, I want 
to shift the focus from what Denver’s meal allows her to forget—because it seems to me 
that the language of the scene is actually cultivating a way to remember. Specifically, I 
contend that by describing in such exacting terms how Denver prepares and consumes 
her food, Morrison’s writing takes a sacramental turn, effectively transforming the paltry 
snack of biscuits and jelly into a rite of remembrance that recalls the Catholic Eucharist.  
 The simple, subject-predicate construction of the sentences and succession of 
dynamic verbs places particular emphasis on Denver’s physical movements, what she 
does instead of what she tries to avoid (“She took”; “She pried”; “She removed”). With 
our attention drawn to Denver in this way, the Eucharistic resonances of her actions 
become apparent. Not only does the bread itself have clear associations with the 
Communion host, but also the way that Denver presides over it—“slowly” and 
“methodically”—follows the distinctive structure of the Roman Mass. First, there is the 
preparation of the gifts: the part of the Mass during which the priest transfers the 
offerings from tabernacle (jelly cupboard) to altar (porch steps) and arranges them 
deliberately before him. Then, there is the fraction of the bread, wherein the priest breaks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Wyatt for an argument that relates Denver’s insatiable hunger to a primal desire to 
speak words which cannot be spoken (i.e. the words that would describe her mother’s 
infanticidal act). 
2 For example, Valerie Smith claims that Beloved “dissolves when [her community] 
forgets and swallow[s] her all away” (352).  
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apart the Eucharist in a gesture reminiscent of Christ’s at the Last Supper. (Denver’s 
version even includes smoke curling heavenward, like that of the incense which some 
priests burn over the gifts to signify the church’s prayer.) Finally, there is the act of 
intinction: the ceremonial dipping of broken bread in wine (jelly) that immediately 
precedes its consumption.3 All of this means that by the time Denver eats the biscuit in 
the last sentence of the scene, she has virtually performed the complete celebration of the 
Liturgy of the Eucharist just as it has been done for centuries by Catholic priests. 
 Of course, Denver is not a priest. Nor does the novel give any indication that she 
is Catholic or that she has ever witnessed a Roman Mass. Like the vast majority of 
African Americans born in the United States after the Second Great Awakening, 
Denver’s experience of Christianity is overwhelmingly Protestant. The ex-slaves she 
lives among in Cincinnati are “AME’s and Baptists, Holinesses and Sanctifieds, 
[members of] the Church of the Redeemer and the Redeemed” (102). It is, therefore, the 
sacred practices of these sects that would be most familiar to Denver. Apart from the 
“unchurched” woodland sermons of her grandmother that she attended as a child and the 
occasional Africanist rituals she observed while growing up, Protestantism constitutes the 
extent of her religious knowledge and, by extension, everything she could possibly know 
about the Communion rite. But, as I have been arguing, the ritualistic overtones in 
Morrison’s depiction of Denver align more closely with Catholicism than either of the 
Protestant variations practiced in her hometown. (Both the tabernacle and incense, for 
example, are exclusive to the Roman Mass; they are not present in Baptist or Methodist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See General Instruction of the Roman Missal, especially Chapter 2, Section III, Part C.  
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services.) Moreover, this scene does not mark the only time in the novel where Denver 
appears to demonstrate an uncanny predilection for Catholic ceremonials. Whenever she 
visits the “emerald closet” (123)—a circle of boxwood trees described as her private 
“temple” (60)—Denver anoints herself and the space with a “Christmas cologne” (34) in 
the same way that a Catholic priest would administer the holy oils while bestowing a 
sacrament. Notably, her character’s response to the anointing is properly sacramental as 
well: Morrison writes that in the perfumed chamber, “closed off from the hurt of a hurt 
world…[Denver] felt ripe and clear, and salvation was as easy as a wish” (35). 
 So what is it that drives Denver to turn during these moments of profound sorrow 
and isolation to Catholicism? How do we explain why a character with no known 
exposure to that religion performs its sacraments with such ritualistic precision? What, if 
anything, can she gain from the performance? And are we meant to take the performance 
seriously? In other words, to what extent is Morrison’s representation of Catholic 
sacramentality in Beloved ironic or intentionally subversive? To what extent does it differ 
from her representation of other (i.e. Protestant) kinds of Christianity? These are 
questions worth asking, I contend, because of their implications for one of the most 
widely considered and vexed areas of scholarship on the novel: its use of Christian 
scripture and conspicuous Pauline orientation. Beyond that, they also promote a fuller 
understanding of the way religion informs Morrison’s revision of the classic slave 
narrative form and, in particular, her original concept of rememory. 
 Almost from the moment Beloved appeared in 1987, critics have been locked in a 
contentious debate over how to interpret the frequent allusions to the New Testament, 
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especially the epistles of Saint Paul. On one hand, Morrison’s narrative reflects a deep 
suspicion of Christianity and the support it provided for race-based slavery in the United 
States. She routinely characterizes the cruelest slaveholders as the most devout Christians 
and suggests that Pauline theology was responsible, at least in part, for accommodating 
slaves to their mistreatment. For example, the woodland sermons of Baby Suggs—whose 
religious perspective scholars tend to align with the author’s own—plainly reject the 
portions of Saint Paul’s teachings which venerate suffering and divine enslavement. This 
sort of pointed critique has been taken by some, such as Ann-Janine Morey, as a “latter 
day judgment upon Christianity” that discloses “the failure of Christian promise” (499). 
On the other hand, the novel stops short of a wholesale rejection of Christianity, and there 
are many instances in which its religious allusiveness is more difficult to characterize. 
The fact that the novel’s epigraph as well as its title come from Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans and that three of its most sympathetic characters (brothers Paul D, Paul A and 
Paul F) share a first name with the Apostle imply its Pauline subtext is not purely 
subversive. These things, along with other aspects of Baby Suggs’s sermons that are less 
openly hostile to the epistles, have inclined critics such as Ágnes Surányi to argue 
something else entirely. Surányi sees “the ideology of St. Paul’s letters” as the inspiration 
not only for “Morrison’s concept of Christianity” but also “the generous love that [she] 
advocates” in her novels (127). 
 That Beloved supports two such diametrically opposed interpretations of Christian 
scripture is, by now, a well-recognized feature of Morrison’s work. For this reason, a 
recent study of religious idiom in African American literature places the author firmly 
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within a long “history of African Americans” who present “Christianity as a double-
edged sword” in their fiction (Valkeakari 15). But even that study, which accounts for the 
presence of a Catholic sacramentality in Morrison’s other novels, does not consider how 
Catholicism informs the way Christianity is depicted in Beloved.4 Indeed, until this point, 
there has been virtually no critical interest in the Catholic thematics of Beloved, nor in 
Morrison’s subsequent slave narrative, A Mercy, published twenty-one years later. When 
it comes to the topic of slavery in her writing, critics prove reluctant to acknowledge any 
serious engagement with Catholicism. To a certain extent, the reluctance makes sense: 
unlike slave societies elsewhere in the Americas, slavery in the United States has been 
perceived historically as a Protestant institution without significant influence from 
Catholic theology or culture.5 Accordingly, the critical literature takes for granted that in 
reconstructing the world of the antebellum American South in her fiction, Morrison 
likewise minimizes the significance of Catholicism for its slaves. As this chapter 
demonstrates, however, that critical trend obscures the relevance of Catholicism to 
Morrison’s imaginative retelling of slave history in both novels.  
 The lack of attention to Catholic themes in Beloved and A Mercy is surprising, 
given Morrison’s biography. Her mother, whom she describes as “highly religious,” 
brought her up in the Protestant tradition with a thoroughgoing education in Protestantism 
(int. by Jones and Vinson 179). Outside of the home, however, she attended Catholic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Specifically, Valkeakari’s study briefly considers how the Catholic sacrament of 
confession “resonates” in The Bluest Eye (96).   
5 See, for example, Raboteau’s often-cited study of slave religion, wherein the author 
claims that slaves “in the British colonies of North American were not likely to be 
exposed to [Catholicism] unless they lived in Maryland, the only colony with a sizable 
Catholic presence” (112).  
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schools where she studied the catechism in detail and became “fascinated by the rituals” 
that bolster it (int. by Monda 117). This fascination ran so deep that at the age of twelve 
she converted from Protestantism and continues to this day to identify as Catholic.6 While 
Morrison’s church affiliation should not be taken as a statement of belief or—even less 
so—an endorsement of orthodox Catholicism (in some interviews she has implied that 
belief for her is inimical to organized religion [see int. by Monda 117-19]), her 
conversion does indicate a profound, personal awareness of what distinguishes one 
denomination of Christianity from the other. For that reason, in contrast to the prevailing 
scholarship on Morrison’s contemporary slave narratives, whose tendency is to conflate 
any specifically Catholic reference with references to Christianity (a decidedly Protestant 
Christianity) more generally, my reading places the denominational distinction between 
Protestantism and Catholicism at the center of her fictional project.  
 More to the point, I argue that this distinction informs the way her novels 
remember slavery, both in terms of what they remember (i.e. their representation of the 
historical experience of slaves) and how they remember it (their distinctive narrative style 
and form). The first part of the chapter makes the case that Morrison uses the 
groundbreaking analysis of sociologist Orlando Patterson to challenge conventional 
accounts of slave religion. Patterson remains one of the only scholars of U.S. slavery to 
recognize the extent to which Catholicism helped shape its religious culture. And, taken 
together, Beloved and A Mercy constitute an extended, imaginative amplification of his 
claim that the “special version of Protestantism that triumphed” in the slaveholding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As recently as May 11, 2012, Morrison referred to herself as Catholic during an 
interview. (See int. by Ashbrook.)  
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American South (what he calls fundamentalist Christianity) was far more Catholic than 
ever previously acknowledged (ix). Catholicism thus emerges in these novels as a crucial 
but often overlooked feature of the history of slavery in the U.S.—one with insidious and 
lasting consequences for generations of African Americans who were enslaved by 
nominally Protestant masters. Acknowledging this feature is vital, I suggest, if we hope to 
make sense of the ambivalence with which Morrison approaches New Testament 
scripture. For, as I will demonstrate, it is a specifically Catholic interpretation of the 
Pauline epistles that her novels associate with the development of institutionalized racism 
in the American South and the legacy of racial suffering that endured in its wake. 
 At the margins of Beloved and A Mercy, then, we find subtle yet persistent 
references to Catholicism which undermine the idea of the U.S. slave system as a 
fundamentally Protestant institution. The Catholic margin of these two novels therefore 
contributes in important ways to Morrison’s widely documented compulsion to disrupt 
how slavery was rationalized in the antebellum South—as well as the Enlightenment-era 
discourses that supported such rationalization. Specifically, it has been shown that 
Morrison “deliberately confounds” the Enlightenment period’s “[p]seudo-scientific 
claims about the biological inferiority of peoples of African descent [which] served to 
disqualify them from human status and thereby…sanction their enslavement” (Dubey, 
“Neo-Slave” 343). Her work subverts not only these racist ideologies themselves but also 
the consequences they had for the slaves who escaped bondage and wrote about their 
experiences to promote abolition. Morrison has been especially critical of the formulaic 
way that slave autobiographers were forced to remember their past as well as the 
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sentiments they had to excise. The distinctive narrative style and form of her novels are 
the means she developed to redress these strictures, and her concept of rememory informs 
them both. As I will argue in the second part of my chapter, these narratological 
features—rememory, in particular—also reveal the influence of Catholicism. Indeed, I 
will demonstrate that she structures memory in Beloved and A Mercy like a Catholic 
sacrament. 
I. Towards a Catholic History of Slavery in the United States 
 In Playing in the Dark, her highly acclaimed book of literary criticism from 1992, 
Morrison makes a passing reference to the work of Orlando Patterson. The reference 
comes in the middle of a chapter on canonical early American literature, where she 
developed her now-famous argument about “a dark and abiding presence” that lurks at 
the margins of these works (33). Specifically, Morrison is trying to show that white 
writers such as Poe and Melville deployed images of suffering, enslaved black people to 
highlight their own freedom and the freedom of the New World from “Europe’s moral 
and social disorder.” But rather than dissociating the burgeoning American style from an 
Old World aesthetic, she argues that the “gothic” quality of these images paradoxically 
reproduced “the typology of diabolism it wanted to leave behind,” exposing how 
inexorably the concept of liberty was yoked to racial slavery in the United States (36). 
For this reason, Morrison implicates the literature of young America in the critique of 
Enlightenment rationalism that Patterson and other scholars of the Black Atlantic were 
proposing around the same time. She recognizes a profound, generative link between 
Enlightenment-era ideologies about “the rights of man” and the “conveniently bound and 
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violently silenced black bodies” that sustained them. Her reference to Patterson lays bare 
the connection: “As the sociologist Orlando Patterson has noted,” she writes, “we should 
not be surprised that the Enlightenment could accommodate slavery; we should be 
surprised if it had not” (38). 
 Although she does not provide a source text for the citation, Morrison is almost 
certainly referring to Patterson’s masterwork, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative 
Study, which was published ten years earlier. There, in the original preface to his book, 
Patterson makes exactly the point that Morrison ascribes to him: that the “joint rise of 
slavery and the cultivation of freedom was no accident. It was…a sociohistorical 
necessity” (ix). This premise is borne out consistently in the study and especially in its 
analysis of modern slaveholding societies emerging during the Age of Enlightenment. 
With regard to the antebellum U.S. South in particular, Patterson documents how the 
master class rationalized the system by way of an elaborate and self-contradictory 
discourse of liberation and enslavement that perversely confirmed the slaves’ submission. 
The discourse that concerns him is fundamentalist Christianity, that “special version of 
Protestantism that triumphed in the South” following the Second Great Awakening (71). 
According to Patterson, it was the large-scale expansion of fundamentalist Christianity 
that provided the “reform” needed to institutionalize plantation slavery and to make it 
“function effectively” for generations of U.S. farmers. He describes the religion itself as a 
“major development” in modern slaveholding practice because—for the first time since 
the Reformation—a Protestant form of Christianity came to be “used by the master class 
as an agent of social control” (73-4).  
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 Prior to the Second Great Awakening in the U.S., Protestantism was generally 
deemed incompatible with slavery. Its classical form emphasized values (like individual 
liberty and antiauthoritarianism) that masters did not want to promote in their chattel, and 
so Protestant slaveholders in the New World tended either to curtail religious expression 
or forbid it altogether.7 In this way, they differed markedly from their Catholic 
counterparts, who not only continued to worship as they always had but also mandated 
the conversion of their slaves. Patterson attributes the falloff in religious practice among 
Protestant slaveholders to a fundamental theological divergence from the traditional, 
Catholic interpretation of the epistles of Saint Paul.  
 As Patterson points out, the Pauline epistles regularly exploit the language of 
slavery “as a metaphoric source” for the crucifixion. Historically, Catholics have stressed 
the “profoundly conservative spiritual and social implications” of Paul’s metaphor, 
claiming that in dying for their sins, Jesus did not “emancipate” the spiritually enslaved 
sinner but rather re-enslaved him in Christ, who “became his new master.” Because 
Catholicism perceived “Christianity as a transmutation of the order of slavery,” it was 
therefore possible for “faithful” slaveholders to reconcile their religious beliefs with the 
suppression of their slaves’ freedom. The Protestant reformers, on the other hand, took a 
more liberating view of Pauline theology, maintaining that Jesus’s death ultimately 
“annulled the condition of slavery” so that all believers “may live and be free” (71). With 
its “emphasis on personal choice and freedom,” this interpretation underscores the well-
documented affinity between Protestantism and Enlightenment conceptions of liberty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Patterson 72. 
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(73). However, as Patterson explains further, it also suggests how problematic it was for 
Protestants of this period to justify their slaveholding interests. Not until the emergence 
of fundamentalist Christianity in the American South, he says, were they able to discover 
a means for doing so. Once the master class recognized the extent to which this new 
version of Protestantism would bolster their authority, they converted by the thousands 
and, in a move without precedent in other Protestant slaveholding societies, also 
encouraged (and, in some cases, required) the conversion of their slaves.8  
 Patterson’s analysis of fundamentalist Christianity represents a significant 
departure from the way that historians of slavery had previously understood the impact of 
the Second Great Awakening on its converts. Before the publication of Slavery and 
Social Death, Protestant conversion was generally thought enabling for the slaves, since 
it afforded them the opportunity to practice religion on their own terms. Earlier studies in 
the field, such as Eugene Genovese’s, focus on the way that slaves “reshaped the 
Christianity they embraced” to fit their specific needs and, ultimately, “turned” the 
slaveholders’ Protestantism “into a weapon of personal and community survival” (212).  
But Patterson was unwilling to accept this assessment. While his study acknowledges that 
fundamentalist Christianity did offer the enslaved masses some “relief from the agonies 
of thralldom, and…some room for a sense of dignity before God and before each other,” 
he regards even these spiritual rewards as a form of accommodation to the system (74). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The precise number of conversions among the slave population is impossible to 
determine, given that the majority of them occurred en masse during tent revivals. 
Raboteau cites church records of African American membership as “one index—a rather 
stringent one—to the influence of Christianity upon the life of the slave.” He goes on to 
note that “Du Bois quoted a figure of 468,000 black church members in the South in 
1859” (209). 
	  	   	  
30	  
a move that definitively separates his analysis from the prevailing scholarship on slave 
religion, Patterson argues that the slaves’ exposure to the “liberating” aspects of 
Protestantism perversely rendered them better servants and more reliable field hands by 
defining freedom in terms of total submission to their masters. 
 This bleak appraisal of fundamentalist Christianity conforms to Patterson’s 
broader argument about Enlightenment-era discourses, particularly the idea which 
Morrison cites in Playing in the Dark: that in the modern Western imagination 
conceptions of slavery and freedom “are intimately connected” (Patterson ix). In fact, we 
might say that Patterson’s claims have become something of a mainstay for Morrison. As 
early as 1987, in a critical essay called “The Site of Memory,” she was already indicating 
the ways that the Enlightenment determined how early American authors represented the 
slave experience. In that essay, though, the authors that concern her are black, not white; 
they are the fugitive and ex-slave autobiographers, whose narratives portray the struggle 
to escape from enslavement. However, as Morrison explains, the racial orientation of 
these authors made them no less susceptible than Melville or Poe to the ideologies of the 
period. “One has to remember,” she cautions, that the original narratives of slavery 
“reflected not only the Age of Enlightenment but its twin, born at the same time, the Age 
of Scientific Racism” (69). What she is suggesting is that despite impressive efforts to 
expose the horrors of their situation, the slave narrators were as “conveniently bound” 
and “silenced” as the “black bodies” depicted elsewhere in antebellum U.S. literature. For 
these authors, this meant they had to excise the “more sordid details of their experience” 
for fear that “dwelling too long or too carefully” on the horror would indelibly link them 
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in the minds of the audience to the very diabolism they hoped to eradicate (69). Thus, as 
opposed to the literature of their white contemporaries, it is in the silences that occupy 
their writing—in the resolute unwillingness of the slave narrators “to offend the reader by 
being too angry, or by showing too much outrage” (67)—that Morrison locates the 
impact of Enlightenment ideals of freedom on the black author. She points out that unlike 
Melville and Poe who used gothic depictions of suffering and enslavement to define their 
own liberty, those writers who actually suffered and were enslaved could not do the 
same. Rather, in order to convey rationality, they had to expunge from their narratives 
any detail that might be perceived as gruesome or impassioned. 
 Part of Morrison’s objective in “The Site of Memory” for documenting the way 
ideologies of the Enlightenment “dictated the purpose and style” of slave autobiography 
is to account for her own approach to writing about slavery (69). The essay was published 
the same year as Beloved—Morrison’s first attempt at the neo-slave narrative form—and 
it provides valuable context for many of the distinctive features of that novel, particularly 
for those which undermine the rationalist imperative of Enlightenment ideals. Morrison 
explains that in re-imagining the true story of escaped slave Margaret Garner from a 
twentieth-century perspective, she felt compelled to answer for what had to go unwritten 
in the original discourse of slavery: that she was “trying to fill in the blanks that the slave 
narratives left—to part the veil that was so frequently drawn” over their less palatable, 
less rational articulations. This, she understands, exposes her work to charges of stylistic 
excessiveness—acceding that, yes, “it may be excessive” (72). But given how attuned she 
is to the strictures placed on antebellum black authors by the milieu in which they wrote, 
	  	   	  
32	  
Morrison makes clear that all the “excess” in her novel has a purpose. Namely, it enables 
her to expose and ultimately to disrupt the modern ideologies of freedom, which—via 
Patterson—she correlates to the rise of racialized slavery in the United States. 
 The excessiveness of Morrison’s fiction has received a great deal of attention in 
the critical press. And, as she anticipated, there were early reviewers of Beloved who 
objected to her impassioned depiction of slavery. Stanley Crouch is the most notorious 
example. Seemingly unaware that he was reiterating the rationalist imperative that kept 
the original slave autobiographers from fully articulating the horror of their experience, 
Crouch accuses Morrison of reveling in “portentous melodrama” and thereby “los[ing] 
control” of her narrative (29). In particular, he chides her for “[t]oo many…attempts at 
biblical grandeur, run through Negro folk rhythms,” which he says, “stymie a book that 
might have been important” (30). The complaint is a hollow one to be sure, indicative of 
Crouch’s failure to comprehend the relationship between Beloved’s excessive style and 
its critique of Enlightenment rationalism.9 If we look beyond the hollowness, though, his 
remark does imply something significant about the way the novel structures that critique. 
By underscoring how frequently Morrison alludes in these moments of stylistic excess to 
the Bible, Crouch reveals (albeit inadvertently) the extent to which New Testament 
scripture is itself implicated in the Enlightenment-era discourses that Beloved disrupts. In 
this regard, his review gestures towards a fuller understanding of the influence that 
Patterson’s analysis has had on her fiction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A number of critics have taken Crouch to task for precisely this failure. See, for 
example, Paul Gilroy’s famous response to Crouch’s review in the concluding pages of 
The Black Atlantic.  
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 To demonstrate what I mean, we can examine one of those “attempts at biblical 
grandeur” to which Crouch objects. In this passage, presented as a flashback, Sethe is 
remembering the famous woodland sermons of her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, an ex-
slave who preached for a short time to a community of her peers: 
 She told [her fellow ex-slaves] that the only grace they could have 
was the grace they could imagine. That if they could not see it, they 
would not have it. 
 “Here,” she said, “in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, 
laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. 
Yonder they do not love your flesh. They despise it. They don’t love 
your eyes; they’d just as soon pick em out. No more do they love the 
skin on your back. Yonder they flay it. And O my people they do not 
love your hands. Those they only use, tie, bind, chop off and leave 
empty. Love your hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them. 
Touch others with them, pat them together, stroke them on your face 
‘cause they don’t love that either. […] You got to love it. This is flesh 
I’m talking about here. Flesh that needs to be loved. […] And O my 
people, out yonder, hear me, they do not love your neck unnoosed and 
straight. So love your neck; put a hand on it, grace it, stroke it and hold it 
up. And all your inside parts that they’d just as soon slop for hogs, you 
got to love them.” (103-4) 
 
Here we find examples of the gothic or excessive elements that Morrison claims were 
excised from the original narratives of slavery: graphic descriptions of horror (flayed 
skin, picked out eyes, tied up and chopped off hands) as well as an unapologetic sense of 
outrage (“This is flesh I’m talking about here. Flesh that needs to be loved.”). Notably, 
both the horror and the outrage are filtered through Baby Suggs’s idiosyncratic preaching 
style, which draws heavily from the language of the Bible. There are familiar 
constructions (“O my people”; “out yonder”; “Raise them up”) peppered throughout that 
lend her speech the general tenor of scripture. And there are also explicit allusions to the 
New Testament, particularly to the eighth chapter of the Letter to the Romans, where 
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Paul explores what it means to “live according to the flesh” (8.5).10 These biblical 
components do undoubtedly, as Crouch suggests, contribute to the “grandeur” of Baby 
Suggs’s message. But to regard them as mere decoration or stylized rhetoric is to neglect 
how purposefully their content is disrupted. 
 For example, in telling her congregants “that the only grace they could have was 
the grace they could imagine [and] if they could not see it, they would not have it,” Baby 
Suggs does not just invoke verse from Romans 8; she inverts its meaning. Specifically, 
her words allude to Paul’s proclamation that “hope which is seen is not hope” and to the 
rhetorical question he asks just after: “For who hopes for what he sees?” (8.24). The point 
Paul endeavors to make is that true followers of Christ will set their sights on the unseen, 
spiritual reward made possible by the crucifixion—not the fleshly rewards of material 
existence. Living under God’s law, he explains, requires man to accept subjugation and 
pain “with patience” in this world, so that he might be glorified after death (8.25). Baby 
Suggs rejects this premise outright, imploring her fellow ex-slaves to discover (“see”) 
redemption in the flesh, through the way their bodies interact with and take pleasure from 
the living world. Her entire speech, in fact, should be understood as a denunciation of the 
image of the suffering servant that is celebrated in Romans. She does not buy into Paul’s 
claim that physical agony brings one closer to Christ, nor that humans suffer in slavery 
because God loves them. As she perceives it, slaveholding always indicates hate 
(“Yonder they do not love your flesh. They despise it.”), and her sermon underscores the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This and all subsequent biblical quotations from English Standard Version. 
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peril of believing otherwise—the peril of believing, as Paul intones, that enslavement is 
theologically justified and divine. 
 Implicit in Baby Suggs’s allusions to Romans 8, then, is her awareness of its 
complicity with the experience of slavery that she and her community had recently 
endured. What’s more, she maintains that they must abandon the Pauline concept of 
divine enslavement if they want to be truly free from bondage. This is important for two 
reasons. First, it suggests that despite spending most of their lives on U.S. plantations 
where Protestantism was the rule, the ex-slaves in Baby Suggs’s audience were exposed 
to a traditionally Catholic interpretation of Paul’s epistles, one that sanctified their 
suffering and demanded their obedience to God’s law. Second, it suggests that this 
exposure to Catholic doctrine contributed to their subjugation in ways that even they 
were not aware of, rendering them less likely to challenge the slaveholders’ authority. 
These are, of course, the very same arguments that Patterson develops in Slavery and 
Social Death. Indeed, his analysis of slaveholding culture in the U.S. rests on the 
groundbreaking idea that fundamentalist Christianity was actually, with regard to Pauline 
theology at least, “identical” to Catholicism—and that this was what transformed the 
nominally Protestant religion into an efficient means of social control.11 
 To be exact, Patterson argues that fundamentalist Christianity supported the aims 
of slaveholders in the American South by restoring the conservative ethic of “law, 
judgment and obedience” that classic Protestantism had eliminated from its teachings on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Patterson regards the brand of Protestantism that developed in the slaveholding 
American South as “Rome’s closest counterpart in the modern world,” arguing that it 
played “the identical role…in the slave system” that Catholicism had for the ancient 
Romans, “eighteen hundred years” earlier (76). 
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Paul (76). Therefore, all those who converted (or were forcibly converted) during the 
Second Great Awakening studied a version of the epistles that was historically aligned 
with Catholicism. Slaves were taught to accept their suffering “with patience” and to 
obey the rightful law of their Master/masters according to the same theological rationale 
that Catholic slave owners had been using for centuries. But, significantly, this did not 
mean that fundamentalist Christianity abandoned the other, more liberating pole of 
Pauline theology. Rather, as Patterson goes on to say, what distinguished the religion and 
helped it create the “most perfectly articulated slave culture since the fall of the Roman 
empire” was its doctrinal dualism: the “contextual shifting” it permitted from a Catholic 
interpretation of Paul’s letters to a Protestant one (74).  
 As Patterson describes it, 
Both masters and slaves adhered to Pauline ethical dualism, with its 
sustained ‘eschatological dissonance.’ And in exactly the same way that 
Paul and the early Christians shifted from one pole of their doctrinal 
dualism to another as occasion and context demanded, so did the masters 
and their slaves. Thus the masters, among themselves, could find both 
spiritual and personal dignity and salvation in the ethic of the justified 
and redeemed sinner. The crucified Jesus as redeemer and liberator from 
enslavement to sin supported a proud, free group of people with a highly 
developed sense of their own dignity and worth. Similarly, the slaves in 
the silence of their souls and among themselves with their own 
preachers, could find salvation and dignity in this same interpretation of 
the crucified Lord. (75) 
 
The result of this doctrinal dualism was that for the first time in the history of Protestant 
slaveholding societies in the Americas, enslaved blacks in the U.S. South had the 
“freedom” to gather together outside the boundaries of their master’s plantation and to 
listen to the Word of God. But, as with other Enlightenment-era discourses, Patterson 
insists that the freedom associated with fundamentalist Christianity was deeply perilous 
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for the slaves, since it served primarily to accommodate them to enslavement. In other 
words, the “salvation and dignity” inspired by the liberating pole of Pauline theology 
only made them more susceptible to the other, Catholic pole which effectively confirmed 
their subjugation. 
 By describing fundamentalist Christianity in these doctrinally dualistic terms, 
Patterson explains that it “provided the slave South with the perfect creed, one…with a 
built-in flexibility that made it possible for emperor and slave to worship the same god 
without threatening the system, but also without denying all dignity to the oppressed” 
(72). His study identified the specter of Catholicism in a culture historically perceived to 
be dominated by Protestantism—a culture that rationalized its own slaveholding interests 
according to its difference from an old, un-enlightened European system of slavery. I am 
suggesting that Morrison makes an analogous move in Beloved. Not only does her 
excessive style underscore the “gothic” nature of the U.S. system, but the subtle 
references she makes to Catholicism throughout the novel affirm the ways an Old World 
religion came to define slave experience in a definitively New World context. Thus a 
character like Denver, who was raised firmly within a Protestant tradition and without a 
Catholic church in site, displays an uncanny knowledge of the Roman Mass. Her 
otherwise inexplicable ability to ape the movements of a priest reveals how pervasive 
Morrison imagined Catholicism to be.  
 Along similar lines, there is the following scene, which also insinuates the 
pervasive—yet unacknowledged—presence of Catholicism in the antebellum American 
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South. In it, Sethe recounts one of her only memories of her mother from the plantation 
where they both were enslaved:  
She picked me up and carried me behind the smokehouse. Back there 
she opened up her dress front and lifted her breast and pointed under it. 
Right on her rib was a circle and a cross burnt right in the skin. She said, 
‘This is your ma’am. This,’ and she pointed. ‘I am the only one got this 
mark now. The rest dead. If something happens to me and you can’t tell 
me by my face, you can know me by this mark.’ Scared me so. All I 
could think of was how important this was and how I needed to have 
something to say back, but I couldn’t think of anything so I just said 
what I thought. ‘Yes, Ma’am,’ I said. ‘But how will you know me? How 
will you know me? Mark me, too,’ I said. ‘Mark the mark on me too.’ 
[…] She slapped my face. […] I didn’t understand it then. Not till I had 
a mark of my own. (72-3) 
 
Most readers of Beloved will quickly understand what Sethe could not as a child: that the 
mark on her mother’s skin came from a slaveowner’s branding iron and was burned 
there—into the flesh—to designate his property. Here again, Morrison’s narrative takes a 
gothic turn, when the image of another suffering black body emerges from the margins of 
the story (and the recesses of Sethe’s memory) to reveal the horrors of slavery. And as 
with the graphic descriptions of fleshy torment that Baby Suggs offers up in her sermon, 
this image reveals a specifically Catholic understanding of the relationship between 
master and slave.  
 The cross, an archetypal symbol of Christ’s sacrifice, not only signifies the pain 
that Sethe’s mother endured and confirms her enslavement but it also implies (as the 
slaveowner who placed it there undoubtedly intended it to imply) that she suffers 
righteously, like Jesus did and in his name. This reflects an interpretation of the 
crucifixion that aligns with the way that Catholics have traditionally understood it—as a 
“transmutation of the order of slavery” (Patterson 71). Moreover, the fact that this 
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particular cross is depicted inside of a circle12 suggests a visual link between the wound 
and Catholic iconography. In Catholicism, the encircled cross represents the body of 
Jesus in the community; it is a symbolic depiction of sacrament of Holy Communion, in 
which the faithful believe they become Christ by consuming him. For that reason, the 
icon is commonly found on the wafers and host distributed during the Catholic Eucharist 
as well as on the pendants worn around the neck of Eucharistic ministers. It is a much 
less prevalent symbol in Protestantism, however, where the doctrine of transubstantiation 
is minimized if not abandoned altogether.13 Therefore, the image appears noticeably out 
of place on the skin of a slave owned by a Protestant master. Since we never learn the 
precise origins of Sethe’s mother or anything about her previous owners, it is possible 
that the burn was made by a Catholic owner who came into possession of her prior to her 
arrival on the Southern plantation where Sethe was raised. Just as likely, it might have 
been branded on her by a Protestant who was either ignorant of or unconcerned with its 
Catholic resonances. In either case, whichever way Morrison intended readers to 
understand its genesis, the wound—and Sethe’s reaction to it—hints at the insidious role 
that Patterson claims Catholicism played in the religious culture of the slaveholding 
South.  
 Even as a child, Sethe seems to understand the awesome power conveyed by the 
religious symbol. Yet because she was still fairly well insulated from the devastating 
physical and emotional traumas of slavery at the time the mark was revealed to her, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A few lines later in the novel, the mark on Sethe’s mother is referred to as a “circled 
cross” (73).  
13 For an explanation of the way that Protestants have historically minimized the doctrine 
of transubstantiation as well as other “mysteries” of the Mass, see Berger 111-3.  
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does not view it in the context of her mother’s agony. Instead, her little-girl eyes perceive 
the wound reverentially, enviously: how one might look upon stigmata or another sign of 
divine selection. Years later, when remembering the interaction after having experienced 
the torment of slavery herself (including a brutal whipping that left her with stigmatic 
markings of her own14), Sethe feels “something privately shameful” for failing to 
empathize with her mother’s pain (73). But in the moment she could not help being 
impressed by—and covetous of—the circle and cross that represents such suffering. The 
reverence Sethe shows for this most Catholic symbol is therefore indicative of the way 
that fundamentalist Christianity helped to psychologically accommodate slaves to the 
system. It reveals how the embodied horror of slavery could be re-branded as “salvation 
and dignity” in the image of the crucified Lord. 
  Again and again, Beloved underscores the devastating impact that this kind of 
psychological accommodation had on the slaves. In fact, the novel’s ultimate tragedy—
Sethe’s gruesome act of infanticide—is cast as a theologically appropriate response to 
Pauline dualism. Sethe justifies the murder by telling Paul D that rather than resigning 
her children to a life of slavery, she “’took and put my babies where they’d be safe’” 
(193). The emphasis she places on personal choice and freedom is consistent with the 
Protestant interpretation of the crucifixion. She believes that by turning her children over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The scars on Sethe’s back, a consequence of the slavemasters’ whip, resemble those 
from scourging, which Jesus endured during the Passion. Although not a cross itself, a 
number of critics have also seen the image of the chokecherry tree as an embodied link to 
Jesus, specifically the abrasions he endured while carrying the wooden cross to the site of 
his crucifixion at Calvary. See Atlas, especially 55; Griesinger, especially 690; Terry 
Otten, The Crime of Innocence in the Novels of Toni Morrison (Columbia: U of Missouri 
P,1989), 94.  
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to God, she effectively guarantees their salvation and sets them free. But, at the same 
time, the freedom to which she delivers them is decidedly not of this world; they must die 
in order to realize it. Moreover, as Morrison’s vivid description of the scene in the 
woodshed makes clear, those deaths are neither easy nor painless. Their bodies suffer 
violently in order to be redeemed, as Sethe sacrifices her own flesh and blood for the 
promise of a spiritual reward. So, in this sense, the murderous act also fulfills the 
Catholic pole of Pauline theology—particularly the passage from Romans 8 that Baby 
Suggs denounced in her sermon. By setting her sights on an unseen, heavenly idea of 
freedom, Sethe does exactly what her mother-in-law had warned against: she places her 
faith in something she cannot see. Thus, Morrison writes that while cutting up her 
children’s bodies, she “looked like she didn’t have any [eyes]…she looked blind” (177). 
This description not only confirms how thoroughly Sethe has defied Baby Suggs but it 
also alludes yet again to the conservative teachings of Saint Paul—teachings that 
repeatedly equate blindness with spiritual glory.15 
 As the novel suggests, everything that Baby Suggs represents—“her authority in 
the pulpit, her dance in the Clearing, her powerful Call”—was “mocked and rebuked by 
the bloodspill in her backyard” (208). She was, then, finally unsuccessful in her attempt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In addition to the passages from Romans in which Paul commands his followers to live 
according to “what we do not see,” the Apostle is himself famously associated with 
blindness. As told in Acts 9, his conversion to Christianity happened as a direct result of 
being temporarily blinded by God on the road to Damascus. There it is written of Paul 
that “although his eyes were opened, he saw nothing…And for three days he was without 
sight” (Acts 9.8-9). This resonates quite clearly with the way that Morrison describes 
Sethe’s eyes in the woodshed—eyes which I’ve argued are likewise turned towards God. 
As we shall soon see, it also resonates with her description of another set of eyes: those of 
the slavewomen depicted in A Mercy.   
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to dispel the Catholic interpretation of suffering from her community. Even on the 
Northern side of the Ohio River, ex-slaves remain bound by what Patterson calls the 
“theologically dualistic” religion that said they must suffer in order to be free. It is this 
self-destructive theology—derived from Catholicism—which Beloved blames for “the 
Misery” that took place in the woodshed as well as for the circumstances that precipitated 
it. Significantly, Sethe was not the only member of Baby Suggs’s congregation who 
believed her family should suffer. A group of congregants also tacitly affirmed Sethe’s 
sacrifice when they failed to warn her about the slavecatchers’ approach. This detail, 
which proves to be the principle devastation of Baby Suggs’s life, implies just how subtle 
and invasive the Catholic ethic could be. Morrison explains that the ex-slaves collectively 
turned their backs on Sethe because “they were angry” about the feast at her home the 
night before, a feast whose biblical proportions proved “too much” for them (163). In 
other words, the community cannot accept that one of their own possesses the power to 
create such a meal, nor that they themselves had taken pleasure in such “reckless 
generosity” (162). Their experience of slavery, and specifically the conservative pole of 
Pauline theology to which they were exposed, had conditioned them to reject this sort of 
fleshly indulgence; it has conditioned them to be “offended…by excess” (163). And so 
they respond in a way that bears out the fundamentally Catholic idea that God’s slaves 
are simply “sheep to be slaughtered” (Romans 8.36). 
 Read in these terms, Sethe’s infanticidal act and her community’s complicity with 
it indicate that Morrison perceives Catholicism to be even more invasive in the American 
South than Patterson’s analysis contends. Where Slavery and Social Death stops short of 
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considering the legacy of the theologically dualistic religion that it describes, Beloved 
implies that the Catholic pole of Pauline theology continued to determine the behavior of 
slaves long after they became free. This is what ultimately silences Baby Suggs and 
resigns her to “quit the Word” (209). She comes to believe that she will never be 
successful in convincing the ex-slaves to renounce suffering. Furthermore, the novel hints 
that she too succumbs at the end of her life to the conservative interpretation of Saint Paul 
that she had previously condemned. When Stamp Paid accuses her of punishing the Lord 
for the Misery her family has endured, Baby Suggs replies, “‘Not like He punish me’” 
(211). The response recalls the Pauline concept of divine enslavement to which her 
sermon also referred. Except that now, after witnessing the murder of her granddaughter 
and the callousness of her own people, she no longer denies that the pain she feels has 
been mandated by God. Rather, she appears to accept the traditionally Catholic view that 
sorrow and subjugation are the slave’s crosses to bear, adding that she has abandoned all 
plans to challenge her condition. For the rest of her life, she will be “‘looking for what I 
was put here to look for: the back door,’” which insinuates her total resignation to 
servitude (211). 
 By way of the tragic conclusion to the story of Baby Suggs, then, the novel 
articulates the enduring consequences of slavery for those who have managed to outlive 
it. And, as I have been suggesting, Morrison consistently imagines those consequences as 
a theological capitulation to Catholicism. Not only does Baby Suggs stop preaching the 
sermons which represent her opposition to a Catholic ethic, but she also sends herself to 
bed to “‘fix on something harmless in this world’” (211). What she means is that she will 
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spend her remaining days and “the little energy [she has] left…pondering color”—instead 
of railing against the injustice of her family’s isolation or trying to keep her grandsons 
from running away (4). This decision might seem to indicate a loss of faith on her part 
(and at first that is how Stamp Paid perceives it), but it becomes clear that Baby Suggs is 
actually atoning. In the aftermath of the murder, she does not reject God. She asks Him 
for forgiveness: “’I beg your pardon. Lord, I beg your pardon. I sure do’” (180). As she 
sees it, her “sin” had been to believe that she and the other former slaves in her 
community could be truly free—that they could escape suffering and find redemption in 
this world. The scene in the woodshed proved her wrong; it proved that her sermons 
“didn’t count” because whitefolks “came in her yard anyway” to remind her that, 
following divine law, her people would always be enslaved. Accordingly, the choice to 
give up preaching and confine herself to bed must be read as an act of penance in the 
Catholic sense, as a final submission to the conservative theology which said that the 
slavecatchers were doing God’s work. It is therefore worth noting that the colors she asks 
for just before she dies—lavender “if you got any” and pink “if you don’t”—are used 
twice a year in the Roman Catholic Mass to signify periods of solemnity and atonement 
that precede the coming of the Lord.16 The fact that these are the colors Baby Suggs 
ponders while preparing for death—a death she knows will mean “anything but 
forgetfulness”—underscores how completely Catholicism has revised her views of 
redemption (4). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Priests wear vestments of purple and rose and light candles of the same color 
specifically during the last days of Lent and Advent, when the church emphasizes the 
need to atone for one’s sins in preparation for meeting the Lord (at Easter and Christmas, 
respectively). See Glazier and Hellwig 174; Broderick 123. 
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 Even after the slaves’ manumission and on the free side of the Ohio River where 
they reside during the years the novel takes place, Beloved thus suggests that Catholicism 
remained a pervasive, if marginal, presence in the lives of its characters. This is the way 
Morrison characterizes the legacy of Patterson’s analysis. In A Mercy she takes 
Patterson’s analysis a step further. Rather than considering the legacy of U.S. slavery as 
Beloved does, Morrison’s more recent novel considers the origins of the colonial slave 
system at a time prior to its racialization. Set in the late seventeenth century, A Mercy 
predates the historical period that Patterson analyzed by over a hundred years, well before 
the theologically dualistic religion he calls fundamentalist Christianity transformed the 
religious culture of the slaveholding South. And yet, despite its earlier setting, I will show 
that in this novel Morrison still relies on the basic tenets of Patterson’s study—
specifically, the way he attributes the insidious power of slave religion to a “contextual 
shifting” between classical Protestantism and Catholicism (74). In this fashion, she once 
again exposes the inherently irrational and gothic nature of New World slavery. 
Moreover, as we shall see, by remapping Patterson’s argument onto a narrative about the 
beginning of institutionalized racism in the U.S., Morrison imaginatively aligns the 
racialization of the American slave system with Catholic slaveholding practice. 
+++ 
 A Mercy tracks the rise of race-based slavery in the U.S. through the experience of 
some of its earliest participants: the Vaark family and the ad hoc, racially diverse 
collection of unpaid laborers who work on their farm. It recounts the transformation of 
the Vaark property from a relatively equitable system of labor, in which work and 
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benefits are dispensed equally regardless of race, to a fledgling slave economy premised 
on strict racial hierarchies. I argue that, through a canny recontextualization of 
Patterson’s analysis, Morrison attributes the Vaark family’s descent into institutionalized 
racism to Catholicism—or, more specifically, to the Catholic ethic of slavery which 
Patterson describes in his study. She accomplishes this through her portrayal of the Vaark 
patriarch’s seminal trip to Maryland, where he makes the financial arrangements that turn 
him from a landowner with a few well-cared for—if monetarily uncompensated—
laborers into an active participant in the slave system. As I will show, Morrison depicts 
the way Jacob rationalizes his decision as a theological struggle between the liberal 
Protestant beliefs he was brought up with and the Catholic ethic of slaveholding that he 
encounters for the first time on his trip to the D’Ortega plantation in Maryland.  
 Everything we know about Jacob Vaark prior to the deal he makes to purchase 
Florens suggests a fundamental opposition to slavery and the set of principles on which 
the institution depends. In the few pages that precede the scene of his arrival at the 
D’Ortega plantation, Morrison takes an unusually heavy-handed approach to establish 
Jacob as a moral character. First, there is the description of his views on Bacon’s 
Rebellion and its aftermath. Upon crossing over into Virginia on his way to Maryland, 
Jacob braces himself for the possibility of attack by “a family of runaways…or an armed 
felon” (11). He attributes the increased risk of violence to the “mess” that followed the 
war waged by “an army of blacks, natives, whites, mulatoes—freedmen, slaves and 
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indentured” against the “local gentry”—presumably Bacon’s Rebellion.17 But rather than 
blaming the rebels for the aggression, Jacob cites “a thicket of new laws” spawned in the 
wake of the conflict for “authorizing chaos in defense of order.” He is referring, of 
course, to the set of regulations designed by the ruling class to solidify the racial caste of 
slavery, thereby diminishing the likelihood that poor whites would ever again unite with 
blacks and Native Americans in opposition to the gentry. Historians often associate these 
regulations, which eliminated “manumission, gatherings, travel and bearing arms for 
black people…[and gave] license to any white to kill any black for any reason,” with the 
rise of the race-based slave system in the United States (10).18 Morrison plainly seeks to 
dissociate her character from this kind of institutionalized racism: “In Jacob Vaark’s 
view,” she writes, “these were lawless laws encouraging cruelty in exchange for common 
cause, if not common virtue” (10-1).  Jacob takes no pleasure in the “relative safety” that 
his skin color provides him; instead, his brand of morality causes him to sympathize with 
the racial other, whose basic freedoms he recognizes as increasingly being in peril.  
 In fact, the sympathy that Jacob feels for the disenfranchised runs so deep that it 
extends to animals as well as humans. Twice in this chapter, Morrison highlights his 
natural tendency to protect the vulnerable from excessive pain or subjugation. She notes 
that in the midst of his arduous journey, Jacob takes the time to dismount in order to 
gently “free the bloody hindleg of a young raccooon stuck in a tree break” (11). Later on, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Although neither Nathaniel Bacon nor Bacon’s Rebellion are explicitly named in the 
text, in a series of discussion she had while promoting the novel, Morrison has been 
forthright about her interest in the conflict and the way it influenced her depiction of this 
period of American history.  See, for example, her interview with National Public 
Radio’s Lynn Neary. 
18 See Foner 100; Cooper 9.  
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after he decides to accept D’Ortega’s offer and profit from the slave trade, the “faint trace 
of coon’s blood” that remains on Jacob’s hand from this encounter will take on new 
meaning and come to suggest the myriad ways he compromises his morality (35), but 
here Morrison uses the interaction to communicate his unwillingness to abide the 
suffering of any sentient being. That same aversion to cruelty is again on display just a 
few hours later, when he observes a man beating a horse to its knees on his way home 
from the plantation. Although a group of sailors come to the animal’s aid before Jacob 
has a chance to get involved, the moment affords yet another opportunity for Morrison to 
emphasize his compassionate nature:  
Few things angered Jacob more than the brutal handling of domesticated 
animals. He did not know what the sailors were objecting to, but his own 
fury was not only because of the pain it inflicted on the horse, but 
because of the mute, unprotesting surrender glazing its eyes. (28) 
 
This passage pointedly recalls an earlier one that occurred on the D’Ortega property, as 
Jacob inspected for purchase—“at his host’s insistence”—an assemblage of slaves.  
The [slave]women’s eyes looked shockproof, grazing beyond place and 
time as though they were not actually there. The [slave]men looked at 
the ground. […] Suddenly Jacob felt his stomach seize. […] [H]e 
couldn’t stay there surrounded by a passel of slaves whose silence made 
him imagine an avalanche seen from a great distance. No sound, just the 
knowledge or a roar he could not hear. (22) 
 
In both of these instances, the eyes of the tormented, subjugated creature cause Jacob the 
greatest distress: he cannot bear to witness, to be complicit in, their wordless acceptance 
of domination.  
 As Morrison makes clear, the antiauthoritarian streak in Jacob flows strong. 
Despite being of European extraction himself and having profited from a variety of 
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British and Dutch colonial ventures, his allegiances frequently align with the colonized 
instead of the colonizer. For example, when riding through the contested coastal 
territories on his way to Maryland, Jacob refuses to refer to these areas according to the 
names ascribed to them by the most recent conqueror. Rather than adhere to the titles 
bestowed on them by a constantly changing cast of brutal white colonizers (“Fort Orange; 
Cape Henry; Nieuw Amsterdam; Wiltwyck” [13]), Jacob prefers to think of the land in 
terms of the Native American tribes who first inhabited it and “to whom it all [still] 
belonged,” in his opinion (12). Though the force of his defiance is mitigated to a great 
extent by the relative passivity of its expression (spoken only in the solitude of Jacob’s 
own thoughts, the censure remains private, discreet), it is remarkable for how resolutely it 
undermines the European theory of divine right. For Jacob, “there had never been much 
point in knowing who claimed this or that terrain,” since as he sees it, the Indians possess 
the sole legimate rights to the land (12). He rejects as absurd the notion that God 
somehow sanctioned the authority of the Christian colonizers to declare the American 
territories their own and to subject the native peoples to tyranny and enslavement. 
 Although in an early nineteenth-century context, these plainly democratic 
leanings—predispositions against institutionalized racism, oppression, cruelty, and 
European claims of divine authority—would associate Jacob with an Abolitionist agenda, 
here in Morrison’s representation of colonial America, they are not incompatible with a 
generalized acceptance of slavery. Conspicuously, despite all his internal musings on 
man’s treatment of man during his travels to the D’Ortega plantation, Jacob never once 
thinks to question the morality of his own slaveholding practices. Throughout he 
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maintains “his good opinion of himself” and the particular brand of slavery his farm 
participates in, believing that he treats his unpaid “labor” justly and does not discriminate 
among them based on race or any other characteristic beyond their control (27). The fact 
that Jacob can legitimize his possession of slaves on the grounds that they are neither 
abused nor oppressed (he prefers to think of the young ones as “rescues,” for whom 
enslavement denotes protection, comfort even [34]) means that it is not the ownership of 
another human being that makes his stomach seize, but rather how that ownership is 
managed. As long as he is able to discriminate between moral and immoral approaches to 
slaveholding, he can justify the small collection of slaves who work on the Vaark 
property. Fortunately for him, his travels provide ample opportunity to observe and 
critique alternative kinds of enslavement. Jacob’s principle means of comparison and the 
measure by which he assesses his own righteousness is the Catholic version of slavery he 
beholds in the “Romish” palatinate of Maryland. He notes that he feels “offended by the 
lax, flashy cunning of the Papists” (14); for him, Roman Catholics represent the worst of 
slaveholders because of the way they disguise their cruelty behind extravagant displays of 
wealth and sanctimonious religious expression. 
 It is significant that Morrison associates Jacob’s reviling of Catholics with his 
Protestant upbringing. The revulsion he experiences at their expense is a direct 
consequence of the lasting power of the religious education he received as a boy “in the 
children’s quarter of the poorhouse” in England where he was raised. There, he 
memorized the lines from a Protestant primer which run through his head as he travels 
through the streets of Maryland, disparaging its Papist excesses: “‘Abhor that arrant 
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whore of Rome…And all her blasphemies/Drink not of her cursed cup/Obey not her 
decrees’” (14).19 These lines constitute the foundation of his attitude towards Catholics in 
general and the D’Ortegas in particular.20 Not only do they explain the reluctance he 
shows about sharing an afternoon meal with a family “of the Roman faith” (everything 
about the “heavily seasoned dishes” and sweet wine served at the D’Ortega table is 
“intolerable” to Jacob), but they also provide context for his denunciation of Senhor 
D’Ortega’s business practices and perspective on slaveholding. Jacob has been 
conditioned from a young age to regard the Catholics as brutal enforcers of a strict 
hierarchical order that places immoral limits on personal freedom and dignity. The anti-
Catholic rhetoric he recited by rote as a child taught him to view “[l]aw, courts and trade 
[as] their exclusive domain” (13). Brought up in a culture of Protestantism, which would 
have certainly privileged the liberating pole of Pauline theology that Patterson describes 
in Slavery and Social Death, Jacob is predisposed by this religious training towards a 
total rejection of the principles on which D’Ortega’s livelihood is based. Therefore, he 
“sneer[s] at wealth [such as the Senhor’s, which is] dependent on a captured workforce 
that required more work to maintain. Thin as they were, the dregs of [Jacob’s] kind of 
Protestantism recoiled at whips, chains and armed overseers” (28).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Tessa Roynon points out that these lines originate in an anti-Catholic poem, 
“Exhortation to his Child,” by the Protestant martyr John Rogers.  The poem, Roynon 
goes on to note, was included in a number of English-language primers published in both 
London and Boston during the second half of the seventeenth century. (596). 
20 This is not the first time that Morrison has employed the trope of an elementary school 
primer to highlight the extent to which pedagogical tools can inculcate children to 
particular attitudes and prejudices. Almost four decades before A Mercy, in The Bluest 
Eye, she includes excerpts from a Dick-and-Jane-style storybook to suggest the ways that 
young African American girls are taught to regard themselves as ugly and unworthy of 
love. 
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 As the reference to Protestant morality in the above passage indicates, Jacob’s 
critique of D’Ortega is rooted in the historic theological dispute between Christian 
denominations over Paul’s contrasting interpretations of Christ’s crucifixion. Toeing the 
line of classical Protestantism, Jacob uses the “ethic of the justified person” to condemn 
the Catholic planter’s more conservative—and hence, as he sees it, more systematic and 
oppressive—version of slavery (Patterson 74). Notably, however, the condemnation is 
not generalized to include all forms of slaveholding. Like the majority of Protestants in 
the New World who owned slaves, Jacob’s religious orientation does not preclude him 
from buying and selling human beings; it simply inclines him towards viewing Christian 
morality as distinct from the practice of slavery. This perspective aligns exactly with that 
of other Protestant masters in the Americas that Patterson documents in his study; as 
opposed to Catholics who tended to apply their theological beliefs as a means of 
justifying their harsh treatment of the slaves, Protestants that subscribed to an 
emancipatory interpretation of Pauline theology sought to separate their religion and their 
slaveholding because of the inconsistency it implied.21 Thus, Morrison portrays Jacob as 
particularly troubled by the way that the D’Ortegas employ the Catholic “ethic of 
judgment and obedience” to sanctify their actions. Listening to the Senhor and Senhorita 
speak of the organization of their plantation,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 As an example of the lengths to which Protestant masters would go to address the 
inherent contradiction that the liberating conception of Pauline theology posed for 
slaveholders, Patterson points to the case of Anglican masters in the Caribbean who 
“avoided the problem altogether by abandoing religion or making a mockery of it, both 
for themselves and their slaves” (72).  One might argue that Jacob Vaark’s disinclination 
to practice formal aspects of Protestantism and his decision to promote an “unchurched” 
existence on his farm (among his family and his slaves) would suggest that he too 
recognizes the incompatibility of his slaveholding with his religion. 
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it occurred to Jacob that nothing transpired in the conversation that had 
footing in the real world. They both spoke of the gravity, the unique 
responsibility, this untamed world offered them; its unbreakable 
connection to God’s work and the difficulties they endured on His 
behalf. Caring for ill or recalcitrant labor was enough, they said for 
canonization. (19) 
 
The idea that a Christian God would consecrate slaveholding is preposterous to Jacob 
because his liberating conception of Pauline theology could never accommodate such a 
position. 
 In a novel as invested in the religious topology of colonial America as A Mercy, it 
comes as no surprise that Morrison would want to articulate so clear a theological 
distinction between the Catholic and Protestant justifications of slavery. But, since her 
narrative’s main focus is the Vaark property’s decent into institutionalized racism, 
perhaps the most significant aspect of the distinction she draws is the way it disintegrates 
throughout the work. The flashback to Jacob’s experience on the D’Ortega plantation 
establishes more than just his theological resistance to the principles that supported the 
institutionalization of a race-based slave system in the United States; it also anticipates 
how that resistance will ultimately collapse under the burden of increasing his wealth and 
gaining a foothold in the burgeoning economy of the New World. It is, after all, during 
his visit to the D’Ortegas that Jacob makes two decisions which indicate his assimilation 
of his host’s attitudes toward racialized slavery: first, to avoid financial loss, he agrees to 
accept Florens, an African slave, as partial payment for a debt; second, he initiates a plan 
to invest in the sugar trade, an industry that, like D’Ortega’s, contributes to the 
degradation of thousands of enslaved Africans in the Caribbean. Together these actions 
set in motion a chain of events that results in his farm’s abandonment of the egalitarian 
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values on which it was founded. What’s more, because they were both made for the 
express purpose of “amass[ing] the fortune, the station that D’Ortega claimed,” Jacob’s 
decisions also signify the extent to which he is willing to compromise “his kind of 
Protestantism” in order to achieve the level of prosperity that he comes to believe a 
Catholic ethic can beget (28). Despite a healthy dose of native anti-Catholicism22 and a 
characteristic inclination towards kindness, Jacob chooses to pursue the path that gives 
him the best chance of realizing his dream of “a grand house of many rooms rising on a 
hill above the fog,” a path carved out for him by Senhor D’Ortega (35). 
 In depicting the way that Jacob, an “honest free-thinking” Protestant, comes to 
relinquish the theologically inscribed principles that had most clearly distinguish his 
method of slaveholding from the Catholics’, Morrison is effectively retracing Orlando 
Patterson’s argument about the religious transformation of American slave society—but 
doing so in a seventeenth-century context (58). Jacob’s journey to and from the Catholic 
enclave of Maryland offers a geographical interpretation of Patterson’s original claim that 
the “theology of slavery” which developed in the United States was premised upon a 
restoration of the conservative pole of Pauline theology. His trip literally maps out the 
theological accommodations that Southern masters made in order to simultaneously 
justify their own freedom and the oppression of their slaves, the way they “shifted from 
one pole of their doctrinal dualism to another as occasion and context demanded” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Although Jacob does not take the anti-Catholic sentiment as far as do his brethren in 
England who sought to expunge all Catholics from the land, he does understand why 
“they had been excluded from Parliament back home” and makes it clear that “other than 
on business he would never choose to mingle or socialize with the lowest or highest of 
them” (23).  
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(Patterson 75). As Jacob travels through the Romish palatinate, his perspective on 
slaveholding shifts in a similar fashion; whereas he began the expedition in fervent denial 
of the possibility of sanctioning the horrible conditions under which slaves on tobacco 
and sugar plantations live, the new desire for luxury inspired by his experience with the 
D’Ortegas encourages him to accept the deplorable situation of “a remote labor force in 
Barbados” because of the prosperity it is certain to bring him (35).  
 Like the American slaveholders whom Patterson describes in his study, Jacob 
modifies his liberating theology just enough to rationalize the suffering of thousands of 
Caribbean slaves. For instance, on his last night of his journey, when considering the 
slaves’ plight and what they will have to endure in order to help him turn a profit, he calls 
upon a recognizably Catholic ethic of judgment and obedience to declare the arrangement 
“[c]lear and right.” Morrison shows him gazing up to the heavens at this moment, 
towards a “sky vulgar with stars,” as if discovering justification for his “sweet” plan in 
righteous design of the universe (35). Doing exactly what he had previously condemned 
the Catholics for, Jacob regards the promise of his own fortune—and the dignity that he 
believes his future wealth will provide him—as God’s way of consecrating his decision 
to invest in the Barbadian sugar (and, by extension, slave) trade.  
 Therefore, in the time it took to pass through Maryland and settle his debts with 
D’Ortega, Jacob has—in a manner of speaking—been converted. Though he continues to 
perceive himself as a Protestant and would undoubtedly recoil at any implication to the 
contrary, the flashback directly correlates Jacob’s revised stance on slavery to his brush 
with Catholicism. After witnessing the riches that an enterprise like D’Ortega’s can bring, 
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Jacob adopts a theologically dualistic attitude towards the practice of slaveholding: the 
liberating Protestant ethic still justifies his dignity and redeems him from sin while the 
adoption of a conservative Catholic ethic sanctifies the suffering of his slaves and 
rewards his righteous authority. The oscillation between the two poles of Pauline dualism 
that his rationalization of slavery requires represents a radically new theology for Jacob, 
but one that he feels compelled to embrace if he wishes to achieve a level of success 
comparable to D’Ortega’s. The fact that this theology is identical to the description of 
fundamentalist Christianity that Patterson puts forth in his study signals how thoroughly 
Morrison has recontextualized the argument for her purposes. She transposes his ideas 
about the Catholic influence on Protestant slaveholders from the period of the Second 
Great Awakening to a time in American history when the racialized approach to slavery 
was first developing. This move, as I will explain, enables her to establish an imaginative 
link between the racialization of the American slave system and Catholic attitudes 
towards slaveholding. 
 What I am suggesting is that by rearticulating Patterson’s claims from a 
seventeenth-century context, Morrison endeavors to undermine traditional narratives 
about the rise of race-based slavery in colonial America—narratives developed during the 
Age of Enlightenment as a means of rationalizing institutionalized racism. As she makes 
clear in her essay “The Site of Memory,” Morrison is attuned to the way that the 
Enlightenment’s prioritization of human reason and scientific objectivity was used to 
excuse the enslavement of African peoples, who were deemed incapable of rational 
thought. Critic Madhu Dubey has shown how this critique of “the dehumanizing racial 
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logic” of the Enlightenment translates to A Mercy. Rather than “demonstrating the slave’s 
possession of reason,” Dubey argues that the novel “indicts” the prevailing discourses of 
the day by exposing their very irrationality. She cites, in particular, the way Morrison 
uses “the simple and powerful” testimony of slaves to underscore the “Unreason” of 
slavery; by depicting the absurdity of the auction block or the language of the bill of sale 
from their point of view, Dubey contends that Morrison is able to destabilize the 
legitimacy of the logic that supported these enterprises (“Neo-Slave” 341).  
 I am proposing that the depiction of Jacob in the opening scenes of the novel 
promotes a similar effect. Instead of launching her critique from the slaves’ perspective, 
though, Morrison uses Jacob’s own words to indicate the extent to which the 
rationalization of slavery relied upon a categorically irrational premise—namely the 
irrationality of Catholic theology as it was perceived during the Age of Enlightenment. In 
other words, by aligning Jacob’s descent into institutionalized racism with his theological 
assimilation of a Catholic ethic, Morrison insinuates a fundamental affinity between 
Catholicism and the racialized logic of the Enlightenment. Undoubtedly, any suggestion 
of an affinity of this sort would have been antithetical to the foundational precepts of 
Enlightenment rationality, which were diametrically opposed to Catholicism and its 
superstitious associations. But, as her portrayal of Jacob implies, Morrison means to 
demonstrate that these apparently competing discourses were not nearly as hostile to one 
another as the Enlightenment thinkers would have liked to believe. In her fictional 
reconstruction of colonial America, it is the Protestant’s encounter with his “irrational” 
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Catholic other that supplies the theological rationale for the enslavement of Africans and 
ultimately facilitates the transition to a race-based slave economy.  
 Although the racialization of slave labor on the Vaark property happens some 
time after Jacob’s visit with the D’Ortegas and only following his death, Morrison 
establishes a clear connection between the theological transformation he experienced 
while in Maryland and the final outcome for his slaves. The earliest manifestation of this 
connection is the new house he starts building immediately upon returning from his trip: 
a massive residence his wife views as “[s]omething befitting not a farmer, not even a 
trader, but a squire” (88). It is an undertaking that no one except Jacob endorses and, as 
the feudal overtones of Rebekka’s description of the project imply, the construction will 
dramatically revise the relatively equitable division of labor that the farmworkers had 
previously enjoyed.23 Lina, a Native American slave who helped Jacob build the first two 
homes on the property, believes her master’s third house, his “profane monument to 
himself,” courts “misfortune” because of the unnecessary killing of trees that its erection 
requires (44). Her criticism calls attention to how completely Jacob’s values were 
affected by the time he spent with Senhor D’Ortega. Whereas his exposure to the 
Catholic slaveowner’s mansion provided the impetus for the plans “to build a house that 
size on his own property,” initially Jacob had intended to make his version “[n]ot as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In referring to the house as “[s]omething befitting a squire,” Rebekka’s words imply an 
association between the new construction and medieval feudalism. This association 
evokes a popular portrayal of American slavery that proliferated among Northern 
abolitionists and proslavery Southerners alike, both of whom equated the plantation 
system with anti-modern, feudalistic ideals. Thomas F. Haddox has emphasized the ways 
that this “’medievalist’ ideology ultimately required a religious grounding,” arguing that 
it implicitly correlates plantation slavery with Catholicism (48). 
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ornate as D’Ortega’s. None of that pagan excess…but fair. And pure, noble even, 
because it would not be compromised” (27).  However, as Lina notes, those intentions 
quickly fall away. In addition to the excessive number of trees he fells during the 
construction, Jacob surprises everyone by hiring a blacksmith to fashion an ironwork 
masterpiece out front that glitters “like a gate to heaven” (89). The biblical imagery 
carved into the gate baldly contradicts his Protestant predisposition towards iconoclasm; 
its “gilded vines [that] were actually serpents, scales and all” make the house into a kind 
of American Eden, rivaling even a Catholic’s taste for “graven idols” (150, 16).24  
 For the workers on the Vaark farm, though, what is more upsetting than Jacob’s 
sudden appreciation for religious iconography is that the new house destabilizes the 
balanced way he had always managed his labor force. Before the construction began, 
farmwork was divided fairly among the laborers, regardless of race or status. Rebekka 
and he worked side-by-side with their racially diverse collection of slaves and indentured 
servants, sharing with them both the hardships and rewards of farming in the harsh 
wilderness. While not entirely without hierarchical designations, the community they 
formed did not regard race as the principle designator of social worth. Rather, what 
mattered was one’s ability to contribute productively to the enterprise of the land. As a 
result of the Vaarks’ equitable management of farmwork, Morrison portrays the 
relationship that developed between the unpaid laborers and their owners as mutually 
beneficial and nurturing. Throughout the novel, the workers repeatedly characterize their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Numerous critics have commented on the biblical imagery on display in Jacob’s gate, 
including Valerie Babb, who regards the serpents as symbolic of Vaark’s desire to create 
an American Eden and his eventual “fall from grace” that she links to his participation in 
the sugar trade, “his deal with the devil”( “E Pluribus Unum?” 155).  
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arrangement as “a kind of family” (155). Willard and Scully, white indentured servants 
whose time Jacob rents from a neighbor, go so far as to describe the community in terms 
that completely elide racial distinctions. For them, the interaction among the farm’s 
inhabitants suggested bonds of real kinship; instead of as a labor collective, they chose to 
regard the group as a “good hearted couple (parents), and three female servants (sisters, 
say) and them helpful sons” (144). But with the transformation inspired by Jacob’s trip 
Maryland, the familial quality of their arrangement cannot be sustained, as differences of 
race and class become increasingly difficult to ignore. 
 The white servants are among the first to recognize how the construction of the 
new house affects the social order of the farm. At first, the changes do not appear to be in 
their favor: Willard and Scully feel scandalized by Jacob’s decision to pay a free black 
man for his labor on the gate, while they continue to be forced to work without financial 
compensation. Though they had never previously objected to performing the same duties 
as African and Native American slaves and indentured laborers, once Willard and Scully 
learn that “the blacksmith was being paid for his work, like the [white] men who 
delivered building materials,” their racial pride is piqued and they suddenly refuse to 
accept an inferior status (150). Fortunately for them, the canny blacksmith identifies the 
source of their discomfort and compensates by treating them with excessive reverence. 
He even starts referring to Willard as “Mr. Bond”—a “courtesy” that however comic in 
its misappropriation nonetheless serves to restore the white man’s sense of innate 
superiority: “Although [Willard] was still rankled by the status of a free African versus 
himself, there was nothing he could do about it. No law existed to defend indentured 
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labor against them. Yet the smithy had charm and he did so enjoy being called mister” 
(151).  Therefore, the blacksmith’s humbling gesture, though inconsequential with regard 
to the white man’s actual legal standing, does lay the groundwork for the imminent 
reorganization of the farm’s labor force along racial lines. Beyond the psychological 
“lift” it gives to Willard, it anticipates how in the matter of just a few months, all of the 
Vaarks’ white laborers will be granted official advantage over their African and Native 
American slaves. 
 Jacob does not live long enough to witness the racialization of his farm. And, 
perhaps, if he had not died before the construction of his house finished, he might have 
successfully staved off the practice for a while longer. As it was never his objective to 
institute a slave system on the order of D’Ortega’s (he simply intended to make his 
property appear like a feudal manner, not necessarily to function like one), Morrison 
gives no indication that Jacob would have approved of the changes that ultimately occur 
to his labor force. But because her novel is poised right at the moment in American 
colonial history when slavery was about to be institutionalized and legally coupled with 
racism, there is a strong sense of historical inevitability at play. Morrison’s unique take 
on the progress of history, then, is how intimately she associates the development of a 
race-based slave system with Jacob’s plans for the new house—plans initiated and funded 
as a direct result of the theological “conversion” he underwent in Maryland. Not only are 
the materials and labor financed by the investments he made in the Barbadian sugar and 
rum trade, but also his death is presented as a consequence of its construction. Rebekka 
blames the “fever of building” for killing him, or at least for masking the signs of his 
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sickness from her until it was too late to find a cure (89); Lina correlates the onset of his 
disease with “the malefortune” stirred up by the indiscriminate murder of trees (44). 
Since Jacob’s demise serves as the immediate catalyst for the farm’s descent into 
racialized slavery, its connection to his house relates all that follows to his irrational 
attempts to replicate the Catholic standard of wealth on his own property. 
 The “ravages of Vaark’s death” are carried out by his widow, whose grief and 
anxiety over the prospects of the farm result in her increasingly cruel treatment of the 
slaves (155). She beats Sorrow for even minor infractions; forces Lina to sleep in the 
toolshed, a modified slave quarters; and puts Florens up for sale. These changes not only 
put an abrupt end to the principle of shared and equitable labor that all of the group had 
taken pride in, but they also signal the community’s new racial hierarchy. The only 
characters whose status improves in the wake of Jacob’s passing are white. After her 
husband’s death, Rebekka, who had once labored alongside the other women, “laundered 
nothing, planted nothing, weeded never. She cooked and mended. Otherwise her time 
was spent reading a Bible or entertaining one or two people from the village” (145). The 
domestication of her daily tasks reifies her privileged position on the property; having 
fully assumed the role of a slaveholding mistress, she relegates the field labor to her 
racially designated servants. And although the white indentured servants continue to “fell 
sixty-foot trees, build pens, repair saddles, slaughter or butcher beef, shoe a horse or 
hunt” (155), Rebekka’s re-ordering of the labor structure now provides Willard and 
Scully payment for their work. The final pages of the novel anticipate a not-too-distant 
“future” in which the two men will have earned enough wages from the Mistress to 
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purchase their own freedom, leaving only non-white slaves to work the land (at least until 
the time they are sold into the open slave market) and thus completing the farm’s 
capitulation to a race-based system of enslavement (156).  
 It turns out, then, that the house “befitting a squire” which Jacob constructs on his 
property more than just resembles the plantation mansion he saw and envied in Catholic 
Maryland; it effectively recreates its social order. Jacob’s encounter with Catholicism 
spawned the transformations that take his farm from a diverse collective of workers into a 
traditional slave economy in which whites alone profit from the degradation of a racially 
determined, unpaid labor force. In order to secure her financial prospects, Rebekka 
realizes almost immediately after the passing of her husband that she must accede to a 
racialized approach to slavery if she hopes to retain the property and protect herself from 
ruin. Once again, the realization gets figured in the novel as a kind of religious 
conversion. This time, though, instead of Catholicism, it is Rebekka’s association with a 
separatist branch of Protestantism that triggers the modification of slaveholding practices. 
She understands that that the only way to maintain the land she labored so painstakingly 
to cultivate is to marry one of the men from the neighboring Anabaptist community who 
would be able to provide her with legal rights to it. Triggered by practical concerns, 
Rebekka’s sudden desire to “seek refuge” among the Separatists leads her to fully 
accommodate their religious values—including the racist belief that redemption was a 
possibility “open to most…except the children of Ham” (58, 92). For these reasons, 
Rebekka’s swift assumption of another faith could be interpreted as the principle 
motivation for the racial divisions she draws on the farm. However, even though Rebekka 
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adopts the racialized approach to slavery that “she believes her piety demands,” as one of 
the victims of the Mistress’s conversion suspects, the cruelty she shows them exceeds 
what she learns in the church services. “Her church-going alters her,” Florens concedes, 
“but I don’t believe they tell her to behave that way. These rules are her own and she is 
not the same” (159). The way that Florens qualifies the Anabaptists’ influence on 
Rebekka emphasizes the personal rather than the theological motivations for restructuring 
her relationship with the slaves. By dissociating herself from her African and Native 
servants through a series of arbitrary “rules” whose purpose seems only to flaunt their 
subjugation (she “requires [Lina’s] company on the way to church but sits her by the road 
in all weather because she cannot enter” [160], and she forbids the slaves from entering 
the grand house for any reason other than to clean it), Rebekka could no longer be 
accused of sharing an affinity with her racial other. In line with the new standard of living 
that Jacob brought to the farm, she re-makes herself in the image of a plantation mistress 
so as to attract the kind of husband who would be able to support one. Whether or not she 
succeeds is beyond the scope—and the concerns—of the novel; Morrison has already 
established the link between Jacob’s exposure to Catholicism and the racialization of his 
labor force. 
II. Redeeming History and Sacramentalizing Memory 
Between Beloved and A Mercy, Morrison imagines the historical implications of 
Catholic theology as devastating for American slaves and their descendants. As with so 
much of her work, however, this damning portrait of Catholicism is not the whole story. 
In the final part of the chapter, I aim to show how Morrison’s engagement with the 
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religion exceeds its dangerously conservative repercussions. Specifically, I contend that 
Catholicism also informs the way these two novels remember slavery as well as 
Morrison’s original concept of “rememory” that determines their narrative style and 
form. In my reading, Morrison uses a definitively Catholic idea of sacramentality to 
create a new approach for remembering the traumatic past. Somewhat paradoxically, 
even as this approach recalls the destructive consequences of Catholicism for American 
slaves, it also opens up the possibility of—in Morrison’s view—redeeming this legacy. 
The term “rememory” appears for the first time in Beloved, when Sethe invents it 
to describe how she experiences the past: 
Someday you be walking down the road and you hear something or see 
something going on. So clear. And you think it’s you thinking it up. A 
thought picture. But no. It’s when you bump into a rememory that belongs 
to somebody else. Where I was before I came here, that place is real. It’s 
never going away. Even if the whole farm—every tree and grass blade of 
it dies.  The picture is still there and what’s more, if you go there—you 
who never was there—if you go there and stand in the place where it was, 
it will happen again; it will be there for you, waiting for you. (43) 
 
What emerges here is a way of remembering which is simultaneously phenomenal, 
atemporal, and communal. At any point and without warning, Sethe explains that 
someone else’s memories will erupt in the present moment with a force that is perceptible 
to her senses. She will see, hear, smell—or “bump into”—the past before knowing what 
she has encountered. Sethe’s sensory experience in fact determines the extent to which 
knowledge is even possible, since it is all that remains of the person to whom that 
memory “belongs.” 
 Critics have long recognized a connection between Sethe’s description of 
rememory and the way Morrison herself remembers slavery—the way she imaginatively 
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represents a lost or inaccessible slave history in her fiction. Consider, for example, the 
following account of the opening lines of Beloved, where Morrison expresses a desire to 
confound, rather than to explicate:  
The reader is snatched, yanked, thrown into an environment completely 
foreign, and I want it as the first stroke of the shared experience that might 
be possible between the reader and the novel’s population. Snatched just 
as the slaves were from one place to another, from any place to another, 
without preparation and without defense. No lobby, no door, no 
entrance—a gang-plank, perhaps (but a very short one). And the house 
into which the snatching—this kidnapping—propels one, changes from 
spiteful to loud to quiet, as the sounds in the body of the ship itself may 
have changed. (“Unspeakable” 32) 
 
Like Sethe, Morrison’s reader will be plunged “without preparation and without defense” 
into the past. There is no narrative exposition, no written record of where we are or how 
we got there—only the sensation of being lost and unmoored, as slaves “in the body of 
the ship” may have felt. And it is important to note that Morrison intends this “shared 
experience” of feeling “snatched, yanked, thrown” to extend beyond the first few lines of 
the novel. Because even after the basic elements of the story become clear (that readers 
have entered a house, not a slave ship, occupied by free women who survived both 
slavery and Emancipation), Beloved still shifts relentlessly among temporal modes and 
types of focalization. The result is a narratological strategy that foregrounds disruption 
and privileges sense impression over other, more conventional means of narrative 
progression, such as chronological time. 
 For example, in an early scene in the novel, when Paul D and Sethe lie silently 
together in bed, Morrison’s narration weaves almost imperceptibly in and out of each 
character’s consciousness, as they grapple with what has just happened between them. 
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Their thoughts move, in turn, to moments from the past—their life together on the Garner 
plantation, when Sethe was married to Halle and, out of respect for them both, Paul D 
stifled his desire for her. These recollections, however, do not manifest in chronological 
order or with any clear designation of narrative time. Rather they appear in pieces, 
triggered by one character’s physical encounter with the other. The “touch of cloth” of 
Paul D’s shirt on Sethe’s skin reminds her of the “clean sheeting” she used to wrap the 
slaves’ food in (26-7); when Sethe uncrosses her ankles, Paul D is reminded of watching 
her with Halle in the fields. For readers, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate 
one character’s memory from the other’s. The focalization changes from sentence to 
sentence—sometimes even within a sentence—and we can be confused about whose 
view of the past we are reading. By the end of the scene, in fact, Sethe and Paul D are 
recalling the very same thing: the sensation of ripping open a young ear of corn at Sweet 
Home, on the night Sethe consummated her marriage to Halle. The final sentence of the 
chapter (“How loose the silk. How fine and loose and free” [33]) represents 
simultaneously their individual and shared experience of that meal. In this way they 
communicate—without ever speaking a word—the significance of being together again 
after all these years apart and their mutual longing for Halle.  
 Morrison stages a similar sort of unspoken communication between characters in 
A Mercy, as well. The closing section of that novel constitutes a response from Florens’s 
mother to a memory her daughter has already shared with the reader—a correction or 
addendum to how Florens had previously recounted the moment of their separation in 
Maryland. “Hear a tua mãe,” she pleads, explaining that she did not offer the girl to Jacob 
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out of convenience, but rather “[b]ecause I saw the tall man see you as a human child, not 
pieces of eight. I knelt before him. Hoping for a miracle. He said yes” (166-7). This 
section—like those narrated by Florens—is written in the second person present, so its 
mode is immediate and conversational. Indeed, it implies that Florens’s mother has 
somehow been exposed to her daughter’s version of the story and wants now to affect her 
memory of the event. Given the distances of space and time which divide these two 
characters (not to mention, the circumstances of their enslavement), this would be, of 
course, an impossible “conversation” to have. And yet, as in the scene described above 
from Beloved, Morrison again imagines a way they might share with one another their 
individual experiences of the past. Here, it is another physical encounter—with the 
burning, flying fragments of Florens’s narrative which “fall like ash over acres of 
primrose and mallow” (161)—that makes the communication possible, triggering an 
unspoken and unspeakable memory. 
  Quite significantly, this way of remembering slavery departs from how authors of 
the original slave narratives were compelled to describe their experience. According to 
James Olney, a fundamental premise of these antebellum works was that “there is nothing 
doubtful or mysterious about memory: on the contrary, it is assumed to be a clear, 
unfailing record of events sharp and distinct that need only be transformed into 
descriptive language to become the sequential narrative of a life in slavery” (151). The 
slave authors understood that in order to make their accounts appear credible to an 
audience who was not necessarily inclined to believe them, they had to represent the past 
as they actually experienced it. Based on the conventions of the time, this meant that their 
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autobiographies adhered rigorously to a structure we now associate with literary realism: 
they were unvaryingly first-person, univocal, linear recollections of slavery, beginning 
with birth and ending with the author’s escape and/or manumission.25 
 As a narratological strategy, then, Morrison’s concept of rememory 
constitutionally opposes each of the “rules” to which the antebellum slave authors were 
beholden, for all of the reasons I have described. With their multiple narrators and points 
of view, and for the way they imaginatively link past and present on the same narrative 
plane, Beloved and A Mercy flout the realist structure of slave autobiography at just about 
every turn. And, if this seems too conspicuous to be anything other than strategic, 
Morrison would be the first to agree. In the same essay where she explains that her 
excessive style was cultivated—at least in part—to challenge the rationalist imperative of 
the original narratives of slavery, she makes a similar claim about her approach to 
memory. Specifically, she says that the situation she finds herself in as “a writer in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century” implores her to use her imagination to remember 
slavery in a way that was expressly forbidden the antebellum authors, due to the milieu in 
which they wrote (“Site of Memory” 71). The comparative “freedom” this affords her 
makes it possible to “dispense with ‘what really happened,’ or where it really happened, 
or when it really happened” in favor of a less realistic, less factual account of the slave 
experience. This is, she accedes, what causes her work to “frequently” fall “in the minds 
of most people, into that realm of fiction called fantastic, or mythic, or magical, or 
unbelievable”—labels that she does not covet (72). But it is also what enables her to defy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 On the structure of slave narratives, see Olney, especially 152-3. On literary realism 
and the slave narrative, see Andrews. 
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the limits imposed on the original narratives of slavery by an audience who demanded 
their credibility. 
  The tenor of defiance is so strong in Morrison’s construction of rememory, in 
fact, that literary critics often link the concept to other modes of writing which similarly 
reject realism for a non-mimetic representation of the past. Most commonly, they align it 
with one of two distinct traditions: either African spirituality or literary postmodernism.  
The type of expression associated with both of these traditions clearly resonates with 
Morrison’s distinctive approach to the slave narrative form. This has led scholars to 
argue, on the one hand, that rememory “works in consonance” with African forms of 
belief that were suppressed by Western modernity (Zauditu-Selassie 145). Critics in this 
camp maintain that these “alternate” belief structures inform how Morrison uses 
rememory to put the present in conjunction with the past. They also demonstrate that an 
Africanist perspective on ancestral return can help to explain the more supernatural 
elements of Morrison’s novels, including the resurrection of Beloved and the haunting of 
Jacob’s house in A Mercy.26 On the other hand, scholars such Rafael Pérez-Torres who 
relate the narratological disruptions in her work to a postmodern aesthetic underscore the 
fragmentary quality of rememory, pointing out that the concept—like other 
postmodernist tropes—challenges the idea of “history as a master narrative.” Pérez-
Torres and others like him contextualize Morrison’s breaks with realism within the 
postmodern author’s generalized distrust of verisimilitude.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Zauditu-Selassie’s chapter on Beloved is a good example, 145-67. 
27 See Pérez Torres, “Between Presence and Absence” and also Spaulding 61-76. 
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 Both of these arguments are useful for the focus they bring to the relationship 
between memory and narrative in Morrison’s fiction. Each in its own way emphasizes 
how dramatically the concept of rememory restructures the original narrative of slavery, 
stripping the classic form of its obligation to literary realism. This line of argument 
implies that the creative act itself (i.e. Morrison’s imaginative subversion of realist 
conventions) promotes a kind of redemption: a means of redressing the formulaic way 
that slave autobiographers were forced to remember their experience.  But while I agree 
that the Africanist and postmodernist readings do indeed have merit, what they do not—
what they categorically cannot—do is account for the way Morrison imagines that 
redemption. In other words, they fail to acknowledge how thoroughly her concept of 
rememory is, like her excessive style, informed by Catholicism.28 This oversight, I argue, 
jeopardizes our understanding of the redemptive quality of Morrison’s concept, or what 
she means when she says (as she did in an interview with Marsha Darling about Beloved) 
that rememory “heals the individual—and the collective” from the legacy of enslavement 
(248). 
 To argue for a Catholic interpretation of rememory might appear incompatible 
with what I have been claiming thus far about the portrayal of Catholicism in Beloved 
and A Mercy. It is Catholic theology, after all, to which Morrison attributes by way of 
stylistic excess the debilitating psychological consequences of enslavement on African 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Postmodernism and African spirituality are both typically perceived to be antithetical 
to Western religious belief in general and Christianity in particular. Accordingly, critics 
who align Morrison’s novels with either tradition tend to argue against any Christian 
interpretation of her work.  This has contributed to the widespread critical reluctance to 
concede how Catholicism shapes her concept of rememory.   
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Americans. So how could the same religion be said to provide healing from that horror? 
The contention makes sense only when we consider how Morrison describes her “job” as 
a contemporary novelist of slavery: the reasons she gives, in “The Site of Memory” and 
elsewhere, for wanting to redeem the classic form of the slave narrative. For her, the 
“problem” comes down to the fact that all of the original narratives of slavery  “were 
written to say principally two things. One: ‘This is my historical life—my singular, 
special example that is personal, but that also represents the race.’ Two: ‘I write this text 
to persuade other people—you, the reader, who is probably not black—that we are 
human beings worthy of God’s grace and the immediate abandonment of slavery’” (66). 
In her critique, Morrison correlates the prescribed structure of slave autobiography to the 
theological orientation of its antebellum readership and, specifically, to the way that 
readership imagined God’s grace to be conferred. What this means is that Morrison 
understood as well as anyone that the religious sensibilities of their audience determined 
how the original narratives of slavery were written. 
 Those religious sensibilities were, of course, Protestant. Out of necessity, the 
authors of antebellum slave narratives appealed to the population most likely to 
sympathize with their abolitionist agenda. And, in the United States at least, Philip Gould 
has shown that population was overwhelmingly white, northern and “evangelical”—
followers of the classic strain of Protestantism, who were inclined to disapprove of 
Southern fundamentalists precisely because of the way they manipulated their theology to 
advance slavery (16). The slave authors knew that they could (that they had to) capitalize 
on the evangelicals’ disapproval in order to advance abolition, thus ensuring their 
	  	   	  
73	  
personal narratives reflected the theological principles which their readers held dear. 29 
As a result, Gould demonstrates that evangelical Protestantism “provided many of the 
categories and tropes through which [the slaves]—whether they were speaking or 
writing—fashioned ‘civilized’ identities for public consumption” (16). Foremost among 
these “categories and tropes” was the spiritual autobiography, a literary form that 
emphasizes the author’s morality and genuine religious faith in the face of ungodly 
circumstances.30 Not surprisingly, then, as Morrison’s critique of them indicates, the 
antebellum slave narratives turned on the question of grace: on whether, in the minds of 
an evangelical Protestant readership, their authors could be deemed “worthy” of Christian 
salvation.  
 It is by way of this conception of grace that we begin to see why Morrison would 
deploy Catholicism to remember slavery differently than the antebellum slave narrators 
were forced to by their evangelical readership. Grace has been called “the watershed that 
divides Roman Catholicism from Protestantism” (Ryrie 10). Disputes over its definition 
and revelation have raged since the time of the Reformation. Catholics always held that 
the world and its inhabitants exist in a permanent state of grace, meaning that they see all 
reality—every part of creation—as sanctified by the divine presence of God.31 
Protestants, in contrast, generally regard grace as a singular gift, bestowed by God only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On the ways that slave autobiographies “portrayed religion in the slave South as a 
perversion of true Christianity,” see Bruce 30-1. 
30 Yolanda Pierce defines spiritual autobiography as “a written document in which a 
convert to Christianity details his or her experience in recognizing the true light of 
Christian doctrine.” She goes on to say that the antebellum slave autobiographers 
“overwhelmingly adopt[ed] the spiritual autobiography form in their accounts of 
bondage” in order to justify their own pursuit of freedom (92). 
31 See McBrien, 9-10. 
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on the faith of the true believer.  Therefore, for them, the salvific power of grace is 
radically removed from nature.32 Sociologist Peter Berger explains that this distinction 
undergirds the Protestant worldview and, especially, how Protestants tend to think about 
reality: 
Protestantism may be described in terms of an immense shrinkage in the 
scope of the sacred in reality, as compared with its Catholic adversary.  
The sacramental apparatus is reduced to a minimum and, even there, 
divested of its more numinous qualities.  The miracle of the mass 
disappears altogether.  Less routine miracles, if not denied altogether, lose 
all significance for religious life.  The immense network of intercession 
that unites the Catholic in this world with the saints and, indeed, with all 
departed souls disappears as well.  Protestantism ceased praying for the 
dead.  At the risk of some simplification, it can be said that Protestantism 
divested itself as much as possible from the three most ancient and most 
powerful concomitants of the sacred—mystery, miracle, and magic. (111) 
 
Here, despite “some simplification,” Berger convincingly relates Protestantism’s 
divestment from “mystery, miracle, and magic” to doctrinal teachings about grace.  He 
shows that the Protestant idea of grace actually depends on a realistic view of the 
universe.   
 Berger’s explanation clarifies why the slave autobiographers who wrote for an 
evangelical Protestant audience needed to adhere so rigorously to the tenets of literary 
realism. They understood that, for their readers, God’s grace was not universally granted; 
rather it was something they had to earn—or, as Morrison says, something they had to 
make themselves appear “worthy of”—through a prescribed set of literary conventions 
that emphasized their credibility and, thus, their capacity for being saved. Therefore, the 
way they remembered slavery, just like what they remembered about it, was determined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Berger, 112. 
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by an Enlightenment-era ideology, which made liberty contingent on rationality. In order 
to justify their personal freedom as well as the freedom of their race, the antebellum slave 
narrators expunged all traces of irrationality from their accounts of slavery. As I argued 
in the previous section of this chapter, this resulted in a conspicuous “silence” about the 
true horrors of their experience, a silence which Morrison has tried to “fill” with her 
“excessive” style. But also—and perhaps even more importantly, for her—the rationalist 
imperative divested these narratives of the very things that Catholicism aligns with 
redemption: “mystery, miracle, and magic.” It is significant, then, that in describing how 
she imaginatively recovers those memories of slavery for which there is no record, 
Morrison has this to say: “If writing is thinking and discovery and selection and order and 
meaning, it is also awe and reverence and mystery and magic. I suppose I could dispense 
with the last four if I were not so deadly serious about fidelity to the milieu out of which I 
write and in which my ancestors actually lived” (“Site” 71). This statement suggests that 
Morrison associates the way she honors her ancestors with the supernatural and 
unrealistic elements of her narrative—elements that I will, in what follows, be relating 
directly to Catholicism.  
 According to the Catholic sociologist Andrew Greeley, Catholics “find our houses 
and our world haunted by a sense that the objects, events and persons of daily life are 
revelations of grace” (1). This worldview, which is really just another way of describing 
what Berger calls the “sacramental apparatus” in the passage above, derives from one of 
the foundational doctrines of Catholicism: Aquinas’s analogical entis.  Aquinas argued 
that because God created all earthly matter, all earthly matter bears God’s image and is 
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therefore graced by his divine presence.  Accordingly, humans can come to experience 
the “mystery, miracle, and magic” of God through the analogy of creation. Analogical 
entis, Greeley and others have claimed, determines how Catholics envision grace to 
reveal itself in the world and provides the foundation for what has been called their 
“analogical imagination.”33 As opposed to Protestantism, whose more dialectical way of 
thinking about creation imagines a radical break of the supernatural from the natural, 
Catholicism accepts—indeed celebrates—substantive links between these two realms. 34 
The seven sacraments of the church are the most obvious expression of those links. But, 
as Greeley puts it, the Catholic analogical imagination perceives the universe and all 
worldly phenomena “as a ‘sacrament,’ that is, a revelation of the presence of God” (1).   
 Ever since the “analogical imagination” was first coined in the early 1980s, critics 
have been using the term to illustrate the great variety of ways that works produced by 
Catholic artists depart from the mainstream Protestant tradition in the United States.  No 
one has done this more thoroughly than or as well as Paul Giles, whose American 
Catholic Arts and Fictions endeavors to document the presence of “competing 
antiromantic ‘Catholic’ tradition,” which undermines the aesthetic trends conventionally 
associated with Protestantism (25). Giles’s study makes the compelling case that artists 
raised in the Catholic faith demonstrate a strong tendency toward the analogical mode in 
their productions. Because they were indoctrinated into a belief system that portrays the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The term “analogical imagination” comes from theologian David Tracy’s book of the 
same name. Greeley’s analysis of the Catholic worldview draws heavily upon Tracy’s 
claims and, in fact, his 2000 sociological study, The Catholic Imagination, is dedicated to 
Tracy, whom he calls “theologian of the Enchanted Imagination.” 
34 For an explanation of the Protestant dialectical imagination, see Tracy 405-8. 
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world as a vast sacramental network of being, Catholics (even those who have since left 
the church or chosen not to believe its teachings—“cultural Catholics,” he calls them35) 
are much more likely than Protestants to stress “ontological similarity, expressed within 
the trope of materialized analogy” (392). To say it another way: where Protestantism 
emphasizes difference—between spirit and matter, God and man, heaven and earth—
Catholicism deploys an analogical approach to emphasize an essential sameness in the 
chain of being. What this means for literary expression, in particular, is that the Catholic 
author places “more faith in the phenomenal world, whose ultimate validity it sees as 
guaranteed by the Incarnation” (202). It is along these lines that I am arguing Morrison 
develops her concept of rememory and the narratological strategy which that concept 
informs. 
 As an author who converted from Protestantism to Catholicism during her 
childhood, Morrison certainly conforms to Giles’s (purposefully nebulous) designation of 
a “cultural Catholic”: she was raised in the church from a young age and considers it a 
primary influence in her development as a writer.36 Moreover, the process she went 
through in order to convert indicates that she is well versed in what distinguishes one 
denomination from the other, especially with regard to such a major point of departure as 
analogia entis. And yet, in his sweeping characterization of American Catholic writers, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In fact, one of the most refreshing aspects of Giles’s argument is that he does not limit 
his survey to practicing Catholics; instead, he considers the way “cultural Catholicism” 
has shaped the aesthetics of even those writers who have attempted to distance 
themselves from the Church into which they were born.  This approach broadens the 
discussion of the Catholic counter-tradition in American literature to include texts that are 
ambivalent about or even explicitly antagonistic towards Catholicism.     
36 See Morrison’s interview with Schappell (87). 
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Giles fails to concede Morrison’s place in this “oppositional” tradition. 37 The oversight is 
striking—and not only because she has said how “important” Catholicism is to her work 
(int. by Schappel 87). More explicitly than perhaps any other contemporary author in his 
study, Morrison undertakes to disrupt the aesthetic sensibility that Giles associates with 
Protestantism: a sensibility that regards “divine grace [a]s an uncertain phenomenon 
whose presence cannot be relied upon” (55). Indeed, this is the same idea of grace which 
Morrison problematizes in “The Site of Memory” and which her version of the slave 
narrative seeks to redress. Despite these facts—and despite the many critics who have 
highlighted Morrison’s imaginative use of analogy—there has been some real resistance 
to addressing her engagement with Catholicism. 
 For example, in her well known essay on Beloved, Valerie Smith goes so far as to 
suggest that the novel’s “dominant mode of articulation is analogical” (350). She’s 
referring here to rememory and how rememory facilitates the more supernatural moments 
in the text—including the resurrection of its title character. Still, even though she calls 
Beloved an “incarnation,” Smith does not recognize the theological stakes of her claim 
nor that her reading aligns almost exactly with what Giles and others have argued about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Giles’s oversight is especially significant, given his recurrent references to Morrison’s 
work. Yet none of these references accounts for Morrison’s longstanding personal 
relationship to Catholicism. At one point, Giles even invokes Morrison in support of a 
tenuous claim for a fundamental divergence in the way that “blacks” and Catholics 
characterize their respective (and the implication is separate) modes of existence: “if 
blacks exert pressure toward the recognition of difference, Catholics exert pressure 
toward the recognition of similarity, analogy, universalism” (29).  It is noteworthy that a 
study so attuned to the pluralistic nature of the Catholic experience overlooks how 
Morrison’s work represents both modes of existence simultaneously. Indeed, I would 
suggest that Giles’s lapse is part of a wider critical inability to see Christian themes in 
Morrison’s fiction—and the fiction of most African American authors—as anything other 
than Protestant. 
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Catholic writers. To understand where their arguments converge, we need to look more 
closely at the way Smith defines rememory, and why she regards it as an analogue of the 
past. For Smith, the important point is that the concept embodies—in a physical sense—
“something that is gone yet remains”: the unspoken suffering of millions of slaves (349). 
This happens on the level of the text itself, accounting for the feeling of dislocation that 
Morrison says she wants readers to have when they encounter the novel for the first time. 
But it happens within the narrative as well, at those moments when, suddenly, because of 
some scent or some sound or some touch a character “bump[s] into a rememory that 
belongs to someone else” (Beloved 43). In both of these instances, as Smith points out, 
the phenomenological experience of the text permits a kind of knowledge about slavery 
that would be impossible otherwise—it opens up a means of sharing among individuals 
and across distances of space and time that she says “is clearly prelinguistic” because of 
how it is embodied (350).  
 Thus, rememory materializes the inaccessible in a way similar to the Catholic 
analogical imagination, which regards all earthly phenomena as an analogue (i.e. a 
sacrament) of divine grace. Rather than an encounter with God, however, rememory 
mediates an encounter with slave history instead, making tangible some lost experience 
from the unrecorded past. For that reason, it is not—properly speaking—a sacrament in 
the theological sense. Nevertheless, Morrison does imagine its redemptive potential as 
sacramental. Regarding Beloved, she has said that it was necessary for her to write about 
slavery “in a manner in which it can be digested, in a manner in which the memory is not 
destructive” (int. by Darling 247, my italics). This curious turn of phrase and the imagery 
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it evokes—of a memory that one consumes and digests—is consistent with how Catholics 
perceive Holy Communion. According to theologian Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism 
regards the Eucharistic sacrament as, above all else “an act of remembrance” that “not 
only recalls to mind what Jesus did but also effectively makes it present again” through 
the physical consumption of bread and wine. In this way, McBrien explains that the 
Catholic faithful remember Christ by embodying him—by collectively “sharing in” his 
body and his blood (822). 
 If it appears that I am making too much of the sacramental overtones of rememory 
in Beloved, I would like to return to those passages we have already examined in which 
the Eucharist is directly invoked. First, there is the image of the circled cross burned into 
the skin of Sethe’s mother—an image which bears a remarkable resemblance to the Host.  
Then, there is the scene where Denver performs the Communion rite. I have argued that 
these moments reflect the insidious role that Catholicism played historically in the 
slaveholding South. And they do reflect that. But they are simultaneously indicative of 
how Morrison imagines redeeming that history: the memories which she says must be 
confronted and shared in order to (begin to) heal from slavery. So at the same time the 
Eucharistic resonances in Beloved evoke tremendous pain, they also point towards the 
possibility of redemption through fellowship and love —exactly what Catholics believe 
the sacrament of Holy Communion is capable of doing.38 For instance, just after Sethe 
recollects the scar on her mother’s rib, she has a flash of understanding which comes not 
linguistically, but from the smell of burning hair “that had seeped into a slit in her mind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See McBrien 820-3.  
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right behind the slap on her face and the circled cross.” Taken into her body in this way, 
Sethe’s rememory summons “something she had forgotten she knew” about the woman 
who gave birth to her, pieces of a story about infanticide and survival she heard long ago 
in a language she no longer speaks. Tellingly, she cries “Oh, my Jesus” when it happens 
because—as Catholics do when they consume the Host—she is recalling a sacrifice that 
was as painful as it was salvific (73). In this case, though, the sacrifice was her mother’s, 
and Sethe is forced to reckon with the knowledge that it is she, herself, who has been 
saved.  
 The point I want to make here is that the Eucharist determines not only what 
Sethe remembers (the image of the circled cross) but also how she remembers. In fact, 
Morrison structures the entire scene sacramentally, from the way that memory is 
materialized and consumed to the revelation of Sethe’s salvation. Even the “forgotten” 
words which “Sethe understood then but could neither recall nor repeat now” have an 
equivalent in the Communion rite: they evoke the Latin that was traditionally recited 
during the Roman Mass—another indecipherable, untranslatable “code” from which 
“meaning” can be “pick[ed]…out” (74). For Morrison, Latin always represented “the 
unifying and universal language of the Church,” and she has admitted to experiencing “a 
moment of crisis” and to “suffer[ing] greatly” from its “abolition” after Vatican II (int. by 
Monda 118). This sentiment—which amounts to a kind of linguistic nostalgia—seems 
perfectly in tune with the displacement Sethe feels upon realizing that she will never 
again hear the dialect spoken to her as a little girl. Morrison writes that Sethe  
was angry, but not certain at what. A mighty wish for Baby Suggs broke 
over her like surf. In the quiet following its splash, Sethe looked at the two 
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girls sitting by the stove: her sickly, shallow-minded boarder, her irritable, 
lonely daughter. They seemed little and far away. (74) 
 
Clearly, the act of remembering what Nan had once told her about her mother in the 
language that they used speak is difficult for Sethe, and she responds in a way that 
emphasizes her separation from the two women who raised her—as well as from others 
with whom she had previously felt close: Baby Suggs, Denver and Beloved. 
 The passage I have just quoted indicates how the memory of a single loss (in this 
case, a linguistic one) begets so many more, and this is precisely why Morrison says she 
objected to Latin being supplanted as the ceremonial language of the Mass. She feared 
that its elimination would undermine the communal spirit of the church, limiting the 
institution’s ability to unify people separated by time, distance and dialect. According to 
Catholic doctrine, the sacrament of the Eucharist is the moment in the Mass which most 
clearly celebrates the kind of fellowship that Morrison imagines as essential: “it should 
signify the unity of the Church; it should provide a sharing in the means of grace.”39 For 
her, though, in the immediate aftermath of Vatican II, that sacramental communion was 
threatened by the removal of its universal language. As I have been suggesting, we 
witness those concerns reflected in the “far away” feeling that emerges when Sethe 
confronts a similar loss. And yet, despite this keen sense of isolation, there lingers in 
Morrison’s description some indication that Sethe is not as disconnected from her 
community as it might initially appear. The oceanic imagery, in particular, implies an 
affinity between her experience and the experience of the siblings she never met, those 
children whom her mother “threw away” during the voyage from Africa (74). As it must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Decree on Ecumenism, Vatican II, Qtd. in McBrien, 828. 
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have been for them when they fell into the sea, a wave of maternal longing breaks over 
Sethe “like surf,” and in “the quiet following its splash,” she shares with her absent 
brothers and sisters—if only for an instant—the physical sensation of being pulled under 
water, away from the living who remain.  
 Paradoxically, perhaps, it is Sethe’s capacity for embodying the horrific final 
moments of these children (as well as so many like them who also drowned in the Middle 
Passage) wherein Morrison locates the redemptive potential of this scene, and of 
rememory more generally. Because even as her narration underscores the impossibility of 
recovering that “which would never come back,” it simultaneously offers a way to make 
it present again through the analogy of their shared experience. This is what forces Sethe 
to confront—all at once—both the depth of her sibling’s sacrifice and the decision that 
ultimately saved her from that same fate. For, in re-memorying what happened to her 
brothers and sisters, she is also re-memorying that her mother chose to keep and to name 
her, in honor of the “black man” whom she “put her arms around” (74). Thus, Sethe 
encounters through fellowship with these unwanted, unnamed children the love that was 
her personal salvation. Whether or not this revelation actually ameliorates Sethe’s pain or 
redeems the infanticidal act, the novel does not say. The scene ends abruptly, without 
resolution, and the memories dredged up are not explicitly referred to again. But I would 
argue that its sacramental structure—the way it rehearses and reframes the Liturgy of the 
Eucharist—suggests, at least, the possibility that Sethe can heal from her mother’s story, 
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since it foregrounds the kind of “collective sharing” that Morrison associates with 
redemption.40   
 The other Eucharistic scene I have highlighted, Denver’s re-enactment of the 
Communion rite, serves a similar function—albeit in a more protracted manner. Indeed, it 
is not for several pages following the ritualized meal of biscuits and jelly that we come to 
understand that it, too, has facilitated a means of collectively sharing the experience of 
slavery. At first, the solitary meal seems only to reinforce Denver’s estrangement from 
the past, because it marks the departure of her closest connection to it: the ghost of her 
baby sister, whom Paul D just banished from the house. The ghost’s absence is the reason 
she eats so “miserably” in this moment—and it is also why, “[d]uring the first days after 
Paul D moved in, Denver stayed in her emerald closet,” feeling as “lonely as a mountain” 
(123). There, among the circle of boxwood trees, she continues the sacramental act of 
feeding herself (Morrison writes that “Denver’s imagination produced its own hunger and 
its own food”), with hope of finding “salvation” (35). Of course, salvation from her 
loneliness does finally arrive in the form of a “fully dressed woman” who “walked out of 
the water…past a giant temple of boxwood to the field and then the yard of the slate-gray 
house” (60, my italics). By relating Beloved’s emergence to Denver’s temple in this way, 
Morrison implies something that Denver confirms later on—that the “miraculous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In her interview with Marsha Darling about Beloved, Morrison explained that she 
understands the resistance her characters felt to remembering the slave experience: “They 
don’t want to talk, they don’t want to remember, they don’t want to say it, because 
they’re afraid of it—which is human. But when they do say it, and hear it, and look at it, 
and share it, they are not only one, they’re two, and three, and four, you know. The 
collective sharing of that information heals the individual—and the collective” (248). 
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resurrection” of her sister was what she had been wanting all along, “[s]o when she saw 
the black dress with two unlaced shoes beneath it she trembled with secret thanks” (123). 
 Figured in these terms—as an answer to Denver’s “wish” for “salvation”—
Beloved’s materialization in the novel is, therefore, appropriately Eucharistic. Not only 
does she embody the presence of a child who has suffered, died and was buried, but 
Morrison also associates her with imagery reminiscent of the sacramental meal. For 
example, Beloved reveals a preoccupation with being “chew[ed] and swallow[ed]” (252). 
Likewise, in one of the final passages of the novel, Morrison describes her this way: 
“Thunder-black and glistening, she stood on long straight legs, her belly black and tight. 
Vines of hair twisted all over her head. Jesus. Her smile was dazzling” (308, my italics). 
The diction recalls what Christ said to his disciples at the Last Supper, his promise to not 
“drink again from the fruit of the vine until the day when I drink it new in the kingdom of 
God” (ESV, Mark 14:25, my italics). It is the covenant of an eventual return which 
Catholics celebrate during Holy Communion and which informs the sense of timelessness 
conferred by the sacrament. As Richard P. McBrien explains, Jesus’s “presence in the 
Eucharist…is the presence not only of the crucified…one, but also the presence of one 
who is yet to come” (822). Similarly, just as Beloved re-presents the little girl killed in 
the woodshed two decades earlier—the girl whose sacrifice saved others from 
enslavement—her swollen, pregnant belly anticipates another coming as well.  
 Thus, like the Catholic Eucharist, Beloved marks the convergence of past, present 
and future, signaling that she is (to borrow again from Valerie Smith) “someone who is at 
once in time and out of time” (351). Nowhere does this temporal convergence manifest 
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more palpably than in the sections of the novel devoted to her monologue, where Beloved 
intones about both her recollections and her desires, “All of it is now   it is always now” 
(248). The sense of eternal now-ness in these sections is also what makes them 
undecipherable, since Beloved speaks not only from her perspective but also from the 
perspective of slaves trapped in the belly of a ship during the Middle Passage. Moreover, 
to Stamp Paid—who stands outside the door of 124 Bluestone, listening to her words—
Beloved’s voice cannot be distinguished even from the other women who speak 
alongside her. The monologues of Sethe and Denver eventually merge with Beloved’s, to 
the extent that their individual identities are effaced. All three characters ultimately 
appear to share the same memories of the past, as well as the same need for unification—
what Beloved calls “the join” (248).  
 In this way, then, these monologic sections near the end of the novel signify the 
fulfillment of Denver’s sacramental wish, and they do so with language reminiscent of 
the Eucharistic ritual that occasioned it: “Beloved is my sister,” Denver says at one point, 
“I swallowed her blood right along with my mother’s milk” (242). It is what she wanted 
from the beginning, the return of her banished companion and salvation from her 
loneliness. Now many will argue (and I would agree, at least provisionally) that in spite 
of the collective sharing that she inspires, nothing about Beloved seems particularly 
redemptive. Rather than forgiving Sethe for the murder or Denver for surviving, she 
punishes her mother and sister by further estranging them from the community that could 
sustain them—Stamp Paid and Paul D, most deleteriously. These fissures are clearly 
inconsistent with fellowship that the Eucharist supposedly creates. And yet, they are still 
	  	   	  
87	  
informed by Catholic doctrine, which (following Paul’s First Letter to Corinthians) states 
that when the sacrament is celebrated without fellowship or with “division…[and] 
insensitivity to those in need, there is no real community and [it] brings judgment, not 
grace” (McBrien 822).41  
 Beloved’s tendency towards judgment is something that Morrison herself has 
underscored. She told Marsha Darling that while writing the novel, she “got to a point 
where in asking myself who could judge Sethe adequately, since I couldn’t and nobody 
else that knew her could, really, I felt the only person who could judge her would be the 
daughter she killed. And from there Beloved inserted herself into the text” (248). For a 
while, the verdict appears more than anyone can bear. But it is also what motivates 
Denver to go out on her own and reestablish her family’s connections with the 
neighborhood women who had learned to keep their distance. Denver’s candid plea for 
help and her “soft ‘Thank you’” are the reason these same women decide to come 
together to save Sethe from such dangerous isolation (B 294). And, significantly, when 
they do finally collect near her yard for the first time since the Misery—at “three in the 
afternoon on a Friday”—the gathering plays out like another sacramental act of 
remembrance (303). There are prayers and singing and a different sort of sound, which 
Beloved interprets as “the chewing laughter” that will “swallow her all away” (322). This 
time, though, instead of merely recalling her sacrifice, the Eucharistic resonances of the 
moment produce something else as well: an opportunity for Sethe to make up for the 
decision she made to kill her daughter two decades earlier.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The idea that the sacrament of Eucharist could bring “judgment, not grace” in cases 
where division is present comes from Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians: 11: 17-34. 
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 Standing there on her porch steps, trembling “like the baptized” in the “deep 
water” of her neighbors’ voices and “loving faces,” Sethe imagines that she is reliving the 
instant when Schoolteacher drove up to her house to re-enslave her children (308). Now, 
however, she has what she did not have before—the strength and fellowship of her 
community. As a result, she chooses to turn her weapon on the white man who she 
believes would make them suffer, rather than on an innocent child. The impulse to raise 
her arm is the same, of course; she wants to save “her best thing” from enslavement 
(308). But, here, the flesh she sets out to destroy is not her own, and in that small way, 
she finally heeds Baby Suggs’s warning against the theologically conservative view of 
slavery. For that reason, it is a redemptive gesture to be sure—yet one that also 
acknowledges the historical complicity of Catholicism in the suffering of slaves. Because 
at the same time that the sacramental structure of the scene creates an opportunity for 
Sethe to redeem herself and the infanticidal act, it also reminds readers that it was 
Catholic theology which inspired her to murder Beloved in the first place in a tragic 
attempt to set her free.  
+++ 
 A Mercy reveals a similar ambivalence regarding the redemptive potential of the 
Catholic sacraments. In fact, Florens’s entire narrative—the way she remembers her life 
in slavery—is itself a material analogue of her experience of suffering and abuse. The 
audience comes to understand that the words we are reading have been hand-carved, by 
nail into the walls of one of the rooms on the property where she was enslaved. 
Therefore, as in Beloved, Morrison imagines the materiality of the text to have a 
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sacramental function that aligns with how Catholics perceive the phenomenal world. 
(Each word stands for something gone that remains.) Moreover, the attention she gives to 
the way that Florens wrote her narrative emphasizes the context that enabled its 
production: her conversion to Catholicism and, specifically, her relationship with the 
priest who taught her how to read and write as a child. Florens became literate while 
living on the D’Ortega plantation where, in keeping with the Vatican’s mandate for 
converting slaves, she was indoctrinated to her master’s religion and required to practice 
it. 
 Richard S. Dunn has shown that, in comparison to those of Protestants, Catholic 
conversion practices among slaveholding societies in the New World depended to a 
higher degree on slave literacy (249). Whereas Protestant masters almost universally 
prohibited their slaves from learning to read, Catholics were not only much more likely to 
convert the Africans in their possession, but also to view basic instruction in reading and 
writing as a necessary part of the conversion process.  Therefore, the lessons Florens 
received from the Reverend Father in Maryland—lessons the priest offered in defiance of 
“wicked Virginians and Protestants who want[ed] to catch him” for promoting literacy 
where they forbade it (6)—were integral to her religious education and inseparable from 
the way she practiced Catholicism. The first words she ever scrawled through sand or on 
“smooth flat rock” were those of the “Nicene Creed including all the commas,” which 
she memorized during her conversion (6). Florens’ articulation of this most fundamental 
statement of Catholic belief (“We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of 
heaven and earth…We believe in one holy and apostolic Church. We acknowledge one 
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baptism for the forgiveness of sins…”) constituted her primal experience of symbolic 
language and, as her narrative indicates, continues to influence how she regards the 
written word. For her, then, writing always feels like an expression of faith, a linguistic 
representation of the prayers and sacramental rites she was used to reciting aloud. That is 
why she instructs her reader, “You may think what I tell you a confession, if you like” (3, 
my italics). Although the Catholic act of Reconciliation requires the communicant to 
confess orally—rather than by letter—because of the way she had learned to associate 
literacy and religion, Florens instinctively relates writing to sacrament.42 In these terms, 
the terms she grants a reader may approach the text (“if you like”), the narration becomes 
a kind of penance, something that, according to Catholic doctrine, Florens must 
communicate in order to be redeemed of her sins. 
 By presenting Florens’s narrative as a confession (or, at least, by allowing for it to 
be received as one), Morrison once more deploys a major Catholic sacrament to structure 
how her novel remembers the experience of slavery. In keeping with the way that 
Reconciliation is performed in the church, Florens’s narration involves a covenant 
between teller and audience. The Catholic rite requires the recitation of the Act of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Elsewhere in the novel, Florens refers to writing in terms typically reserved for speech. 
She calls the linguistic symbols scratched onto the surface of rocks “stone talk” (6), and 
she believes that the words she carves into Jacob’s walls “will talk to themselves” after 
she is gone (161).  This purposeful conflation of written and spoken articulation 
throughout Florens’ narrative reinforces the possibility of reading it as a ceremonial act 
of confession, a sacrament in which she would have no longer been able to partake 
properly given the dearth of priests at the Vaark property. What’s more, the fact that 
Florens conveys her story in secret, sequestered “inside” a small, dark “talking room” 
emphasizes the confessorial nature of the telling (161). The room resembles a Catholic 
confessional, where the faithful go to speak—and, ultimately, to be absolved of—their 
sins. 
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Contrition, a prayer to God expressing sorrow for wrongdoing, a vow to confess all, as 
well as a resolution to make reparations and to sin no more. Likewise, Florens’ story 
opens with a pledge: “Don’t be afraid. My telling can’t hurt you in spite of what I’ve 
done and I promise to lie quietly in the dark—weeping perhaps or occasionally seeing the 
blood once more—but I will never again unfold my limbs to rise up and bear teeth” (3). 
These lines fulfill the sacramental mandate for a Catholic confession of acknowledging 
culpability (“what I’ve done”) and swearing atonement (“I promise to…”). Yet despite 
the resemblance to a sacred prayer for forgiveness, it is decidedly the reader here—not 
God—to whom Florens appeals and offers penance. And, as soon becomes clear, that 
intended reader is not some generalized presence who might stumble upon the story 
carved into Jacob’s walls, but rather a single, recognizable character: her estranged lover, 
the illiterate blacksmith she hopes “[m]aybe one day…will learn” to understand the 
words written exclusively for him. If he does not “read this,” she avers, “no one will” 
because she plans to keep the room “closed up” or else burn it down before anyone else 
can access the writing (161). 
 In addressing her act of contrition to the smithy and making him the sole audience 
of her narrative, Florens ascribes to this free black man the authority of the Catholic 
godhead.43 He alone possesses the ability to heed her words and to grant forgiveness. The 
degree of control she imaginatively assigns her lover thus entirely determines her fate; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Although Catholic confessions are mediated by priests, the Church makes clear that 
only God can forgive sins. With respect to this arrangement then and the way it 
imaginatively structures Florens’ narrative, her unintended readers (those of us who 
managed to access the writing in spite of her plan to burn it) could be said to occupy a 
priestly role.  We bear witness to the appeal but remain powerless to absolve her or grant 
mercy. 
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she places herself wholly at his mercy. Unsurprisingly perhaps, this testament of spiritual 
surrender reverberates with the language she had always reserved for the blacksmith.  
From the moment they met when he came to work on Jacob’s gate, Florens has been 
“crippled with worship of him” (63). She transfers all the reverence her Catholic 
education taught her to show God to a mortal man, telling him “No holy spirits are my 
need. No communion or prayer. You are my protection. Only you” (69).  Immediately the 
smithy becomes everything that God had been for her—her savior and her creator, her 
“shaper and [her] world” (71). While some of the novel’s characters look upon Florens’ 
devotion with amusement or even envy, Lina recognizes the danger that such total 
veneration portends for her young friend.  Not only is the blacksmith noticeably less 
invested in the relationship than Florens (having “not troubled to tell her goodbye” after 
completing his work [61]), but he also appears disturbed by the slavegirl’s absolute 
submission to him. 
 The theme of a lover’s loss of selfhood is, of course, a common one for Morrison.  
At turns her novels celebrate and lament the impulse to give oneself completely to 
another person, as well as the risk that such excesses of emotion tend to carry with them. 
So, in a number of ways, the self-sacrificing passion Florens feels for the blacksmith 
could be understood as a thematic extension of the kind of love Haggar shows Milkman 
(Song of Solomon), Dorcas shows Joe (Jazz) or Jade and Son show one another (Tar 
Baby).44  However, what makes this portrait different, what sets it apart from these other, 
earlier Morrisonian depictions of self-destructive love are its theological resonances. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For an argument linking Florens’ “excessive devotion” to that of other women 
characters in Morrison’s fiction, see Vega-González. 	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Because Florens was born into slavery and stripped of her freedoms at birth, the single 
passion she had ever been permitted to exercise was a sacred devotion to God. Even the 
love she should have felt for her mother was tainted, disallowed by her status as a slave. 
Therefore, when confronted finally with the possibility of sharing her future with another 
human being, she chooses to love him the only way she knows how: as fully and 
completely as she had been taught to love the Lord. Her submissiveness, then, must be 
considered in light of the particular theology through which forcibly converted Catholic 
slaves interpreted their relationship with Christ. Specifically, it reflects the conservative 
pole of Saint Paul’s interpretation of the crucifixion and the idea that, in dying for their 
sins, Jesus effectively re-enslaved all sinners to God, who became their spiritual master.   
 As I discussed in the first part of this chapter, the Pauline epistles frequently 
deployed the metaphorical language of slavery to represent the appropriate way for 
followers to relate to the Lord; consequently, as opposed to Protestantism, Catholicism 
retained this conservative formulation in its catechism. Accordingly, in transferring her 
worship from God to the blacksmith, Florens reveals a properly Catholic impulse to 
enslave herself to this new master—regardless of his aversion to the role. Consider the 
following exchange between the two lovers, which takes place just after she has injured 
Malaik and he banishes her from his home: 
  I want you to go [the smithy says] 
  Let me explain [Florens says] 
  No. Now.  
  Why? Why? 
  Because you are a slave […] 
  What is your meaning?  I am a slave because Sir trades for me. 
  No. You have become one. 
  How? 
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  Your head is empty and your body is wild. 
  I am adoring you. 
  And a slave to that too. 
  You alone own me. 
  Own yourself, woman, and leave us be. (141) 
 
The blacksmith recognizes, even before Florens does, that she has given up possession of 
herself and become enslaved to him. Although Florens distinguishes between the type of 
real-world slavery practiced by her lawful owner, Jacob, and the type of spiritual slavery 
she willfully engages in with her lover, she believes she exercises no choice in either 
regard. These two men possess freedom, whereas she identifies—according to both legal 
status and religious affiliation—solely as a slave. Despite how far she has traveled from 
the D’Ortega plantation where the principles of real and divine slavery were first 
inculcated in her, Florens’ relation to each “master” continues to be governed by the 
Catholicism she practiced as a child. For her, the condition of enslavement penetrates so 
far that it determines even her physical response to the blacksmith. While he pushes her 
away and out of his house, she finds herself offering one last sacred propitiation to him: 
“On my knees I reach for you. Crawl to you” (141). Facing ultimate rejection from her 
lover, Florens still assumes the posture of obedience and submission which signifies the 
Catholic follower’s prescribed relationship to authority. In this case, however, her appeal 
goes unheeded. His banishment of her is final, and she remains unredeemed. 
 Florens’ experience of love and unlove with the blacksmith in A Mercy is thus 
concomitant to—and indivisible from—the critique of Catholicism that Morrison 
presents in the novel. Like the Africans Jacob saw on the D’Ortega plantation whose 
“shockproof” eyes expose their subjugation, Florens has fully absorbed the conservative 
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Catholic interpretation of Paul’s teaching that marks her first and foremost as a slave. 
Beyond the physical torments of enslavement, then, her narrative represents the 
devastating psychological consequences the institution holds for its victims: the way it 
taught them to accept and to covet subjection in all areas of their lives. But, as we have 
seen, Florens’s rejection by the smithy is not the only consequence of the confession she 
carved into the walls of Jacob’s house. Written out as they are, her words are also capable 
of being shared with a wider readership, beyond the single audience for which she 
intended them. This is, of course, the conceit that makes it possible for contemporary 
readers to experience her story—and also what drives the final section of the novel: her 
mother’s long-awaited explanation of why she offered Florens to Jacob in place of 
herself.   
 Once the narrative is written—materialized on the wall—Florens cannot control 
who will encounter it next. She realizes this the moment she contemplates setting fire to 
what she has produced: 
These careful words, closed up and wide open, will talk to themselves. 
Round and round, side to side, bottom to top, top to bottom all across the 
room. Or. Or perhaps no. Perhaps these words need the air that is out in 
the world. Need to fly up then fall, fall like ash over acres of primrose and 
mallow. Over a turquoise lake, beyond the eternal hemlocks, through 
clouds cut by rainbow and flavor the soil of the earth. (161) 
 
Like the rememories that Sethe describes in Beloved, Florens’s story is imagined by her 
as part of the phenomenal world, something that can be perceived by touch, or taste, or 
sight, or sound. It is in this way that the novel anticipates her mother’s response and 
ultimately permits her to explain that it was love, not a lack of it, which motivated the 
decision to give her daughter up. Although it remains unclear whether Florens ever 
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acknowledges this revelation, its presence in the novel suggests the potential for 
forgiveness—which is, after all, precisely what a sacramental confession is meant to 
confer.  
	  	   	  
97	  
Chapter Two 	  
A Sacred Communion: The Catholic Side of Possession in The Autobiography of 
Miss Jane Pittman and Two Wings to Veil My Face 
 
 In the essay “Elements of Style” (1994), which serves as a kind of manifesto of 
her non-traditional approach as well as a guide for performers and directors, Suzan-Lori 
Parks makes clear that she has no interest in “badmouthing” more conventional modes of 
theatre, such as the “2-act plays with…linear narratives” that playwrights “are often 
encouraged to write.” Realism can be “beautiful,” Parks insists (citing Lorrain Hansberry 
as evidence). And so, it is important for anyone studying her own writing to know that 
she doesn’t “explode the form” simply because she finds “traditional plays ‘boring.’” 
Rather, she says, “It’s just that [realist] structures never could accommodate the figures 
which take up residence inside me” (8, my emphasis). The “figures” Parks refers to here 
are, in a sense, the subject of this chapter. For what she is suggesting is that the formal 
quality of her work “is dictated” by “ghosts” who haunt the writing: by the spirits of 
people “from, say, time immemorial, from say, PastLand, from somewhere back there, 
say” who inhabit her home—and even her body—while she puts words on the page, 
shaping how each line of text gets written (8). As she explains further (in another essay 
titled, appropriately enough, “Possession” [1994]), Parks likes to think of herself as a 
medium for the living dead to communicate, and she imagines her self needing to “get 
out of the way” as these voices from the past speak their experience through her (3).  
 While Parks’s take on the creative process might indeed seem unconventional, the 
phenomenon she describes—spirit possession—actually has a great deal of currency in 
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contemporary African American literature and, specifically, the neo-slave narrative 
genre. In fact, it bears a striking resemblance to the concept of “HooDoo writing” that 
Ishmael Reed first developed in the poetry collection Conjure (1972) and then later 
expanded in both his nonfiction and fiction.1 The concept is based on the religious belief, 
fundamental to Haitian Vodou, that the lwa, or souls of dead ancestors, play an active 
role in the affairs of the living and at times will temporarily occupy their bodies. In 
Reed’s view, it is “Afro-American writers [who] still summon” the lwa, and his own 
work as a novelist involves giving those spirits voice, in a way that honors their history 
(qtd. in Rushdy 126). To that end, the neo-slave narrative he produced in 1978, Flight to 
Canada, features multiple scenes of possession, in which characters—many of whom are 
writers themselves—become occupied by subjects other than themselves, who speak 
through them and control their articulations. According to Ashraf Rushdy, the first-
person narrator, Raven Quicksill, is possessed at various points throughout this novel—
and this accounts for the “strange” quality of the narration: its polyvocality and 
anachronisms, as well as the way it switches between literary styles and modes of 
address. Rushdy argues that by making Raven “a possessed narrator,” Reed “is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reed’s collection Conjure contains poems titled “Neo-HooDoo Manifesto” and “The 
Neo-HooDoo Aesthetic,” which critics tend to regard as his first statements about the 
relationship between spirit possession and African American literature (see Rushdy 126-7 
and Schmitz). In addition to Flight to Canada, his concept of HooDoo writing bears 
heavily on other works of fiction (e.g. Yellow Back Radio Broke Down [1969] and 
Mumbo Jumbo [1972]) and non-fiction as well (Shrovetide Old New Orleans [1978]). 
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attempting” to “enact” in “a literary text” the moment from Vodou ceremonies when a 
lwa “inhabits the head of his or her servitor” (128).2  
 The two novels examined in this chapter have similarly possessed narrators, as I 
will demonstrate. Indeed, it is my contention that Ernest Gaines’s The Autobiography of 
Miss Jane Pittman and Leon Forrest’s Two Wings to Veil My Face employ the trope of 
spirit possession in a manner comparable to how Suzan-Lori Parks and Ishmael Reed use 
it: to “explode” the realist conventions associated with narrating African American 
history in general and the slave experience in particular. This argument, as we shall see, 
has more significant consequences for the former text than the latter, since Gaines’s novel 
has not been to this point interpreted as a possessed narrative, whereas it would be 
difficult to read Forrest’s as anything but. In both cases, though, despite the markedly 
different ways they deploy the trope of spirit possession, what is striking about these 
novels, I argue, is that they each depict their radical breaks with realism through the 
discourse of Catholicism. In other words, the Catholic margin of the two texts serves to 
frame—and even to facilitate—the antirealist effect that the trope has on their narratives. 
Thus, I am suggesting, by considering where and how Catholicism informs both texts, we 
are better poised to understand the narratological disruptions that spirit possession makes 
possible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In the connection he draws between textual possession and Vodou ceremonies, Rushdy 
is relying on the analysis of Haitian Vodou that Colin (Joan) Dayan provides in his 
brilliant book Haiti, History, and the Gods. 
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I. Creoles, Catholics, and “Hoo-Doo” Culture  
 
 Ernest Gaines’s The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman is widely regarded as 
realist historical fiction: as one of the initial wave of contemporary slave narratives which 
challenged traditional historiography by recovering—as accurately as possible—the 
voices of those who had been enslaved. Its first-person narration was so convincing, in 
fact, that countless readers and even a few journalists regarded the book as genuine 
testimony of a living source, similar to the Works Progress Administration interviews of 
former slaves conducted in the 1930s.3 In some ways, this generic confusion might have 
been predicted; not only does the title undermine the novel’s status as a work of fiction, 
but the text is also framed as an oral history, recorded and transcribed by a black historian 
who asked the subject (Jane) to tell “the story of her life” (vii). Indeed, Gaines has said 
that he drew heavily from the WPA interviews while writing Miss Jane Pittman, even 
calling them his “Bible,” and that he used these documents “to get the rhythm of speech 
and an idea of how ex-slaves would talk about themselves” (int. by Rowell 94).    
 Critics often point to Gaines’s investment in slave testimony when considering 
the formal properties of the novel, associating it with a wider trend in African American 
literature of the period towards a fuller, more accurate representation of lived history. For 
example, Madhu Dubey argues that realist narratives like Miss Jane Pittman were 
“kindled by” the political climate of the 1960s and, specifically, the push from civil rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Among those who believed Jane Pittman to be a real person, Marcia Gaudet includes 
Former New York governor Hugh Lacey, who “included her on a list of historical black 
women”; a number of “national news magazines [that] asked Gaines for a picture of Jane 
to publish along with reviews of the book”; and the study Folklore and Literature in the 
United States, which “lists Jane Pittman in the author index” (24). 
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activists to revise the historical record, which they viewed as entirely divested of the 
perspective of slaves (“Speculative” 781).4 According to Dubey, the “revisionist 
historiographic enterprise” of this period accounts for Gaines’s recourse to literary 
realism, since he was not attempting to discredit the “truth-telling claims characteristic of 
realist historical fiction” but rather to amend or correct what had already been written 
(782). This is the way she distinguishes a work such as Miss Jane Pittman from later, 
“antirealist” strains of the slave narrative genre (such as Leon Forrest’s Two Wings to 
Veil My Face) that “overtly situate themselves against history, suggesting that we can 
best comprehend the truth of slavery by abandoning historical modes of knowing” (784). 
At the time he was writing his novel—in the late sixties, when the WPA interviews and 
antebellum slave autobiographies were first deemed legitimate evidence—Gaines was far 
too engaged himself in recovering a lost history, Dubey claims, to want to destabilize the 
historian’s authority.5 
 The historian in Miss Jane Pittman is, of course, Jane herself: a century-old 
African American woman who was born into slavery and lived through the start of the 
civil rights movement. Her first-person narrative traces, in chronological order and with 
poignant verisimilitude, the major events that had an impact on Louisiana’s black 
population during that time (the Civil War, Emancipation, Reconstruction, Jim Crow 
legislation) through her personal experience of that history. Thus, in structure and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this argument, Dubey explicitly builds upon similar claims made by Rushdy in Neo-
Slave Narratives, 31-42; 91-92. 
5 Dubey argues it was only after “the task of historical recovery seemed to be relatively 
far along” that antirealist slave narratives began to appear, and “in fact, the expansion of 
the historical archive formed a necessary condition of possibility for their emergence” 
(783). 
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content, the novel affirms its realist historiographical aims in a mode that Gaines himself 
liked to call “folk.” As he told an interviewer in 1983, Miss Jane Pittman, is “not a story 
told by an educated person, but an uneducated person, an illiterate person, but someone 
with a tremendous sense of being, of knowing” (int. by Blake 139). And yet, despite how 
seriously Gaines takes his narrator and the historical analysis that her voice provides, he 
destabilizes her authority at key points in the novel to such an extent that Jane’s ability to 
accurately record history is called into question. These moments, as I will demonstrate, 
confound the realist tenure of her narrative by introducing into the text elements of 
supernaturalism, which oppose the rational and objective historiography that she 
otherwise represents. In fact, one of my principal claims is that Gaines uses the 
supernatural trope of spirit possession to articulate alternative means of remembering 
slavery and to engage radically antirealist views of the past—views that, until this point, 
have been mistakenly overlooked in the novel.6  
 I argue that Jane’s narration is haunted—possessed—by a community of 
unacknowledged co-narrators who give voice to an approach to history dramatically at 
odds with her own. Specifically, I show how the Creole characters in the novel, 
characters explicitly linked through their religion (Catholicism) to the very supernatural 
and aberrant beliefs that Jane loudly disavows, force her to remember the past differently, 
in a way that challenges her rationalist impulse. When these characters take over the 
narrative from Jane, they articulate a distinctly “antihistoriographic” approach, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Dubey, for one, associates the trope of spirit possession with the second wave of neo-
slave narratives—those that followed the earlier, realist versions such as Miss Jane 
Pittman. She argues that this trope “resonates powerfully in speculative fictions of 
slavery, amplifying their antihistoriographic impulse” (789). 
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Dubey and like-minded critics associate only with later, “post-1970s” versions of the 
contemporary slave narrative that are plainly “speculative.” In Gaines’s text, I am 
suggesting, it is the Catholic orientation of the Creoles that makes them particularly well 
suited to this kind of narrative disruption, given that Jane—a Protestant convert—
perceives Catholicism as inherently irrational. Gaines thus utilizes the theological 
distinctions between Catholicism and Protestantism (something about which he would 
have been highly informed, because of his theological training in both religions) to 
exceed the limits of realist historiography. I want to stress, however, that in discovering 
where Catholicism informs the novel’s more radical moments, this essay does not claim 
Miss Jane Pittman dispenses with historical realism altogether. Indeed, as I indicate in 
my first section, the portrait of Catholicism that first emerges in Jane’s narrative—on the 
surface level, at least—is perfectly consistent with the predominant realist reading of the 
novel. It is only by examining the depictions of spirit possession in the text, as I do in the 
second section, that we understand how Catholicism affects the way Jane remembers 
slavery. 
+++ 
 Although Jane is a Protestant convert and spends the majority of her time with 
fellow congregants, she also lives among Creoles and Cajuns and is thus indirectly 
affected by the policies of their church. Therefore, Jane’s perspective on church policy 
and her shifting attitudes towards Catholic culture encroach on the narrative in a 
conspicuous way, underscoring the religion’s relevance for African Americans living in 
Louisiana over the years the novel spans. She betrays a particular fascination with the 
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church’s influence on “mulattoes” and its historical identification with that distinct racial 
caste.7 Among her many meditations on the social and political gulf that divides one rung 
of black society from another is the implicit contention that Catholicism fostered—or, at 
the very least, sanctioned—the upward mobility of Creoles of color, often at the expense 
of those African Americans who could not claim Creole ancestry. 
 Jane’s critique of Catholicism is not a new one, of course. As Thomas Haddox has 
shown in his study of southern literature, there exists a long tradition of criticizing the 
church for its “tacit approval” of the system that led to hierarchical divisions between 
African Americans of different ethnic heritage (26). Haddox dates the origins of this 
tradition to the 1840s, with the publication of an anthology of poetry called Les Cenelles, 
authored by members of the gens de couleur libres. According to Haddox, many of the 
Les Cenelles poems highlight the complicity of the Catholic clergy in the institution of 
plaçage, which he calls an antebellum form of “concubinage” that effectively permitted 
French and Spanish colonialists to enjoy common-law marriage with light-skinned black 
women, who were bred for that purpose (9). A hallmark of plaçage were the “octoroon” 
or “quadroon” balls, where a European man would select a mistress from the choices 
paraded before him, typically installing his selection in a secondary property (to keep her 
away from his “legitimate” white family) and continuing to support her and the children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Throughout her narrative, Jane uses the term “mulatto” to refer specifically to 
descendants of European settlers, in a way that distinguishes them from other African 
Americans whose ancestors were white, “but not Creole white. Poor white—no quality” 
(157). Thus, for Jane, “mulattoes” are always already associated with Catholicism, since 
as a group they tended to celebrate their historical links to the French and Spanish 
colonizers, including their religion. For the sake of consistency, in my discussion of the 
novel, I will follow this meaning of the term. 
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they produced together for the duration of his life. Consequently, these open-secret 
unions engendered a separate class of African Americans, who identified as Creole and 
Catholic and enjoyed financial security—yet were never fully embraced by white society. 
Haddox explains that the precariousness of their social position, as well as the sexual 
exploitation of their women, is behind the pointed criticism of the church that surfaces in 
Les Cenelles and in subsequent literary portrayals of plaçage.8 For, even as the Catholic 
clergy provided refuge and spiritual support for Creoles of color, they turned “a blind 
eye” to the moral depravity of the system responsible for creating—and, in effect, 
isolating—this discrete group of people (9). 
 By implicating the Catholic church in the unique situation of Creoles of color, 
Gaines’s novel therefore advances a position similar to the one Haddox documents in his 
study. Jane persistently links the “mulatto” characters in her narrative to Catholicism, 
implying that their religious affiliation exacerbates the isolation that defines them. For 
instance, in the short history she provides of the LaFabre family—a history that began 
with its light-skinned matriarch’s conscription at one of those “great balls before the 
war”—she uses the church to emphasize their segregation from the rest of the 
community: 
 After the war, the family moved from New Orleans to Creole Place. 
What brought them to Creole Place, I don’t know; maybe they had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Haddox’s fascinating analysis of literary portrayals of plaçage includes texts by George 
Washington Cable, Grace King, Alice Dunbar-Nelson, and William Faulkner, which he 
argues “contribute to a perception that the church encouraged miscegenation, integration, 
and a general laxity in the maintenance of racial distinctions.” Although the motivation 
for criticizing the church is different for each of these authors, Haddox points out that 
they all “explore the associations” of Catholicism with the rise of the “mulatto” class in 
New Orleans (10).   
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people there already. You had always had some mulattoes there, since 
long before the war, and now it got to be a settlement for them. 
 The people at Creole Place did everything for themself. Did their 
own farming, raised their own hogs, their own cattles [sic], did their own 
butchering. Had their own church—Catholic; built their own school and 
got their own teacher. The teacher had to come from there just like the 
priest had to come from there. (156) 
 
Clearly, Jane is attuned to the way that Catholicism contributes to the ethnic identity of 
the mulatto class, which is precisely the argument Haddox makes about the poets of Les 
Cenelles. But as a “folk” historiographer who developed her own view of this society, 
having been in close proximity to them for most of her life, Jane also reveals the 
consequences of this segregation for the ethnic group with whom she personally 
identifies.  
 Specifically, Jane denounces the LaFabres and those they live among at Creole 
Place for profiting from the system of plaçage more than they ever suffered. She points 
out how, upon old man LaFabre’s death, the family inherited “money and property—even 
slaves,” thus solidifying their infidelity to the race. In Jane’s telling, the LaFabres and 
other Creoles of color actively encouraged their separation from the African American 
community, and this division exceeded differences in skin color. “No matter how white 
you was if you didn’t have Creole background they didn’t want you” to associate with 
them, she says (156).  As evidence, she offers “a little story” about two non-Creole black 
men who were chased from a mulatto dance and nearly killed just for “messing round” 
with some of their girls (157). Since the characters involved in the episode do not appear 
elsewhere in her narrative and are ultimately extraneous to the novel as a whole, the 
purpose of this vignette is solely to emphasize the fierceness with which the population at 
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Creole Place guarded their claims to European ancestry, to the extent that they would 
murder any African American who threatened to dilute the bloodline. It follows, then, 
that Jane portrays Catholicism as a source of ethnic pride for Creoles of color, a part of 
their cultural exclusivity—like their farming and educational methods—which they cling 
to primarily as a means of distinguishing themselves from other members of their race.  
 Besides the troubling bouts of violence that such exclusivity provokes, what is 
most significant to Jane about the way that Creoles of color have used the church to 
dissociate from the African American community is its bearing on the struggle for racial 
equality. Again and again, she suggests that their European heritage in general and their 
association with Catholicism in particular has inclined them to tolerate without complaint 
the systemic effects of racism, because they preferred not to identify as black. This theme 
becomes especially resonant in the final section of the novel, “The Quarters,” where Jane 
considers the first stirrings of the civil rights movement in Louisiana. As she puts it, 
“Catholics and mulattoes don’t generally get mixed up” in the protests and 
demonstrations, choosing instead to maintain their status quo (231). Her observation 
correlates with official Catholic policy of the period, which often restricted Catholics 
from joining organizations engaged in social protest.9 Given how deeply involved other 
Christian congregations were with the movement, the decision by many U.S. bishops to 
caution their congregants against active participation in the struggle drew condemnation 
from many corners. Gaines was undoubtedly aware of this controversy while working on 
the novel, as Jane’s assessment of Catholic indifference towards racial matters recalls the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For examples of the various roadblocks Catholic bishops in the South set up to prevent 
their congregants from joining the struggle for civil rights, see Gallagher. 
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charges leveled against them by such prominent figures as Martin Luther King, Jr.10 But, 
at the same time, Miss Jane Pittman also anticipates the way church’s public stance on 
civil rights would soon change, in the wake of Vatican II and increasing pressure from 
activists to support social justice campaigns. 
 Although it concludes at some point prior to the moment when the American 
Catholic Church finally endorsed the civil rights movement and publically committed to 
racial equality, Jane’s narrative looks forward to these developments through its portrayal 
of two progressive Creoles of color: Mary Agnes LaFabre and the young Herbert girl 
from “up there in Bayonne,” who volunteers to be the next “Rosa Parks” (230).11 
Together, these characters defy the standard practice of their community by not only 
working closely with non-Creoles but also advocating for the advancement of African 
Americans—decisions that strain relations with their own families. For a novel that is 
otherwise quick to underscore the ethnic isolation of mulattoes, this shift appears 
noteworthy, particularly because Jane reminds the reader that despite the way they have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In his speeches and letters, King regularly references the nonparticipation of Catholic 
priests and bishops in the struggle for racial justice. For example, in “The Experiment of 
Love,” King pointed out that of all the Christian denominations, only Catholics refused to 
send priests to participate in the Montgomery bus boycotts, even though “many of their 
parishioners took part” (17). 
11 The precise date the novel concludes is not clear, though most critics cite “the mid-
1960s” as its end point (Babb 96). I would argue that somewhere between April 1962 
(when Leander Perez was ex-communicated by the Catholic church, an event mentioned 
in the narrative [216]) and the Freedom Summer of 1964 (when the civil rights movement 
in Louisiana gained considerable momentum) is even more accurate, since Jane indicates 
that the protest she joins in the final scene is one of the first of its kind in her part of the 
state. This means that Jane’s narrative terminates just before the moment in March 1965 
that for historians signaled the Catholic church’s full support of civil rights: the 
participation of nuns and priests in the Selma-to-Montgomery March (see McGreevy 
152-60). 
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deviated from traditional Creole values, both women remain Catholic. In other words, 
Gaines does not attribute their progressivism to leaving the church; by some means, 
though it is never clear how, Mary Agnes and the Herbert girl are able to reconcile social 
action with their Catholicism. This fact renders them outliers, for certain, with regard to 
the period represented in the narrative; yet it might not have seemed quite as 
extraordinary just a few years later, when the work was actually written. Since Gaines 
published Miss Jane Pittman after Vatican II and during a time when the liberation 
theology movement was at the forefront of public consciousness, the idea of a radical 
Catholic response to racial inequality would have had precedent. One could even argue 
that his novel’s portrait of these two Catholic women reverberates with its broader 
outlook on the struggle for civil rights and the political agency of those who participated 
in the effort. 
 In the view of most critics, including Dubey, Miss Jane Pittman figures the 
struggle for civil rights as an outgrowth or “culmination” of the “fight for freedom” that 
began a century earlier with slaves who resisted the system that oppressed them. For 
these critics, this is what accounts for the novel’s rigorous adherence to historical 
progress—the “straight line” it draws from “Emancipation to the 1960s” (Dubey 796). 
And, in the ways I have just described, the novel’s treatment of Catholicism initially 
seems to adhere to a progressive trajectory: despite her early reservations about the role 
of the church in Creole culture, as the narrative moves forward in time, Jane cites two 
instances of Catholics who overcome the conservative social agenda of their religion, 
thereby promoting new strategies of resistance that recall the heroic actions of their slave 
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ancestors. This “straight line” approach to reading Miss Jane Pittman does appropriately 
highlight how Catholicism is involved in the work of historical recovery, which Dubey 
and others regard as a categorically realist endeavor. However, I would suggest that to 
read the Catholic margin of this novel solely in terms of realism is to neglect a critical 
feature of its composition—namely, the insidious and persistent way it destabilizes the 
identity of its narrator. For, as I will show, instead of contributing to the singularity of 
Jane’s perspective and the accuracy of the folk history she recalls, her frequent references 
to Catholicism actually subvert the realist pretense of the narration by undermining its 
truth-telling claims. 
+++ 
  Notwithstanding its obligations to literary realism—and its firm standing within 
that tradition—Miss Jane Pittman persistently upends the conventions of such writing, in 
ways that are coded Catholic. Indeed, beyond its associations with historical recovery, 
Catholicism in this novel also promotes a deep wariness about history that the criticism 
usually attributes to later, antirealist examples of neo-slave narratives. That wariness 
reveals itself most palpably in the moments where Jane’s narration appears possessed by 
other voices, voices that—by virtue of their very presence in her “autobiography”—call 
into question the authority of her claims. Witness, for example, the curious account she 
gives of Jimmy Caya’s response to the revelation from Robert (Tee Bob) Samson that he 
plans to marry Mary Agnes LaFabre: 
 “That woman is a nigger, Robert. A nigger. She just look white. But 
Africa is in her veins, and that make her nigger, Robert.” 
 But with all his shaking and screaming at him, he said Tee Bob acted 
like he wasn’t hearing him. 
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 “Robert,” [Jimmy] told him. “Don’t you listen in class? Ain’t you 
heard him” (I forget that teacher’s name, but I think he said Gamby) 
“over and over and over? You think she changed since then? She’s the 
same woman Robert. She know her duty, and all she expect from you is 
to ride the horse down there. But that’s as far as she expect you to go. 
The rest is her duty, Robert. She knows that. He” (I’m almost sure he 
called that teacher Gamby) “told you it was like that then, and it’s the 
same way now.” (171) 
 
 In recalling what Jimmy said to Tee Bob that day, Jane confronts the limits of her 
memory, as she admits to feeling uncertain about the name of the man who taught these 
two white boys the rules of interracial “courtship.” On the face of it, this lapse would be 
expected—something included in the narrative, parenthetically, to remind the audience 
they are reading oral testimony, thus contributing to the verisimilitude of the novel’s 
premise. Yet, by drawing attention to her inability to remember aspects of the 
conversation, the parenthetical remarks simultaneously emphasize Jane’s distance from 
the event. In fact, it is revealed, just a few pages later, that she was not present when 
these words were originally spoken; nor was she there when Jimmy provided his account 
of the dialogue with Tee Bob to the sheriff investigating his death. So either this 
represents her best guess of what was spoken between the two men based on a third 
person’s recollection of the scene, or else it is one of those instances prefigured by her 
transcriber in the introduction to the text, where another teller—someone other than 
Jane—steps in and “carrie[s] the story for her” (ix). Both scenarios diminish the 
narrator’s authority in key ways, the former by implicating her in hearsay and the latter 
by suggesting that the voice she speaks with is not her own. In each case, Jane loses some 
control of the narrative as other perspectives intrude on her story, problematizing her 
identity as its sole author/speaker. Accordingly, the “I” that defines her no longer 
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represents Jane alone, but rather an assortment of potential collaborators who haunt the 
telling. 
 My use of the term haunt here is purposeful, meant to convey the clandestine—
and, yes, ghostly—quality of the narration.12 Because even though Jane’s transcriber 
freely admits that “someone else” would often “pick up” the telling “when she was tired, 
or when she just did not feel like talking anymore, or when she had forgotten certain 
things,” he never names these contributors, nor does he ever announce their intrusion, 
choosing instead to “use only Miss Jane’s voice throughout” the text (ix). It is left 
entirely to the reader, then, to determine when Jane is speaking for herself and when 
another person is speaking for her—absent of all notification from the transcriber. 
Effectively, this places anyone reading the novel in a situation markedly similar to the 
way witnesses have described spirit possessions; without a clear signal designating a new 
arrival, they watch for variations in utterance or behavior to indicate that one of the 
participants has been taken over.13 Likewise, the audience of Miss Jane Pittman must 
make its way through the narrative, perhaps even forgetting that alternate voices threaten 
to interrupt, until a moment such as the one highlighted above, where Jane’s memories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In her essay “Speculative Fictions of Slavery,” Dubey also uses the term “haunt” to 
refer to a mode of articulation that “refutes not only the rational and detached stance of 
modern historiography, but also its linear and progressive temporality” (788-9). Here she 
is explicitly drawing upon the way that scholars such as Avery Gordon and Hershini 
Bhana Young have previously used the term.  
13 The prominent anthropologist Melveille J. Herskovitz noted, in his observations of 
spirit possessions in Haiti, that, a possessed person “often exhibits a complete 
transformation in his personality…and the character of his utterances are startlingly 
different from what they were when he is ‘himself’ (qtd. in Schmidt and Huskinson, 10). 
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appear to contradict what is known about her actual experience, implying that another 
presence has possessed the narration. 
 These kinds of contradictions are, admittedly, rare and therefore do not bear 
heavily on the novel as a whole. (It would be possible to read most of the sections, I 
think, with little consideration of the additional narrators who take possession of Jane’s 
story.) Regarding the portion of the text devoted to Mary Agnes, and the description of 
her relationship with Tee Bob, though, the narrative disruptions are so concentrated and 
so pronounced that the speaker’s identity remains indeterminate throughout. Not only 
does Jane describe repeatedly in these pages events that she could not have witnessed 
herself—each time without explaining where she acquired the particulars of what was 
said or felt—but she also, quite uncharacteristically, includes details which resist rational 
explanation. Twice within this section, in fact, she suggests that people are capable of 
performing actions that they do not control—that their bodies can become occupied by 
other agents, who manipulate them and determine the way they move and speak. The first 
time this happens, Tee Bob has just attacked Jimmy Caya for what he said about Mary 
Agnes. Yet rather than accounting for the burst of violence in terms of Tee Bob’s own 
feelings, she implies that the boy had no agency in the matter: “Tee Bob gazed at his 
hand like somebody or something else had raised it” (171). And she returns to the idea of 
bodily possession just a few pages later, when recounting the final meeting between the 
would-be lovers (another event for which she was not actually present). There, her 
testimony indicates that the bodies of both Tee Bob and Mary Agnes were inhabited—in 
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those desperate last minutes—by their ancestors, who transform a relatively innocent 
scene into one of sexual violence. 
 For a realist novel, with otherwise very limited discussion of the supernatural, 
these moments of possession stand out. They also stand in stark contrast to the claim Jane 
makes elsewhere in the narrative that she “didn’t believe in hoo-doo” (91). Indeed, in 
every other section of the book, Jane takes pains to dissociate herself and her own beliefs 
from superstitions that do not conform to the tenets of the Protestant faith. Although she 
admits to visiting Madame Gautier at one point and even purchasing from her some 
powder that was meant to keep her husband from riding a dangerous horse, she insists 
that “I didn’t believe in her the way you suppose to. I went to her because nobody else 
would listen to me. But after I had gone I still didn’t take her advice” (121). Likewise, 
she vehemently denies the rumor that she asked a hoo-doo to curse Albert Cluveau, the 
man who killed Ned—not because she did not want him to suffer, but because she says 
she did not think it would work. Jane thus makes a point of rationalizing her system of 
belief, expressing at every turn an unwillingness to accept alternative, non-Western 
explanations for even the most irrational experiences. In that way, her identity as a realist 
narrator remains largely unaffected by the occasional tales of root work and prophetic 
visions which populate the text; again and again, she discounts the credibility of any 
otherworldly event that falls outside the bounds of rational discourse. And yet, the story 
of Mary Agnes upsets the rationalizing impulse of Jane’s voice, insinuating that her 
resistance to “hoo-doo” is not as absolute as she endeavors to suggest. The other speakers 
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who haunt this section of the novel, wresting possession of it away from Jane, interject an 
element of supernaturalism for which her Protestantism cannot sufficiently account. 
 For example, although she is initially skeptical of the idea that Tee Bob and Mary 
Agnes were actually possessed by their ancestors—and even accuses Jules Raynard, the 
man who insists that they were, of “specalatin”—Jane does nothing to oppose Jules’s 
version of the scene, allowing his to be the final statement on the matter. In fact, after 
hearing him describe the way that “the past and the present got all mixed up” in a “flash” 
as Mary Agnes transformed into her grandmother and Tee Bob became “that Creole 
gentleman,” Jane appears to accept that these ancestral presences contributed to the 
horror of all that followed (192). Rather than refusing to believe that Tee Bob’s suicide 
was determined by forces beyond his control, she takes Jules at his word, saying in reply, 
“‘He was bound to kill himself anyhow?...Poor Tee Bob’” (193). The concession is 
significant, because it signals her acquiescence to an alternative way of remembering the 
history she is attempting to retell—a way that defies not just the existing written evidence 
of what transpired (i.e. Tee Bob’s suicide letter) but also the realist contract of her 
narrative. Jules’s account of the Tee Bob/Mary Agnes affair therefore disrupts 
historiographic conventions in a manner that critics typically align with antirealist or 
postmodern fictions of slavery, not with a novel like Miss Jane Pittman. Just as Dubey 
argues about post-1970s “speculative” slave narratives, Jules takes an “incredulous 
approach to history,” suggesting the impossibility of objectively representing the past 
(Dubey 784). He does not attempt to add to the historical record, or even to correct it; 
instead, he underscores that every iteration of the story will change with the teller and 
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that the “gospel truth” depends on, among other things, the race of who is listening (192). 
It is for this reason that Jules advocates his own analysis of Tee Bob’s final moments—
one that “[n]obody told” him and that he did not witness himself, but which he maintains 
“happened” nonetheless (191).  
 The knowledge that Jules proffers is, then, subjective and corporeal in the sense 
that it comes not from anything written or spoken about the past, but rather from his 
affective experience of it. This way of accessing history thus conforms to the 
“deliberately antihistoriographic method” that Dubey correlates with “the postmodern 
turn” in neo-slave narratives, because it prioritizes a “structure of feeling” over “secular 
rationality” as the means by which to “learn the truth.” Relying on his imagination rather 
than objective facts to convey what has occurred, Jules’s testimony “violates the realist 
protocols of history by…narrating a type of event—belonging to the order of the sacred 
or miraculous—that is typically excluded from the purview of historical evidence” 
(Dubey 785). Furthermore, the supernatural tone of his narration, and especially the 
suggestion that Tee Bob and Mary Agnes were possessed by the spirits of their ancestors, 
prefigures some of the “paranormal devices” common to the antirealist slave narrative, 
devices which involve “a dramatic foreshortening of the temporal distance between 
slavery and the present” (Dubey 786). Indeed, the reason Jules can be so certain that a 
spirit possession took place is his commitment to the notion that “a set of rules our people 
gived us long ago” dictated the terms of the couple’s relationship and ultimately caused 
Tee Bob to take his own life. As a member of the white Creole elite, Jules understands as 
well as anyone how the racial strictures of slave culture persist in his own time, 
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“condemning” love between “men like Robert” and “women like Mary Agnes” (191). He 
even insinuates that those who adhere to the prohibitions against interracial unions 
without challenging them—including Miss Jane and himself—share responsibility, along 
with the antebellum arbiters of these “rules,” for the damage they have caused. And his 
depiction of ancestral spirits who haunt the present, guarding against the threat of 
transgression, makes explicit this connection. 
 When Mary Agnes became possessed—first by her “mulatto” grandmother and 
then by Verda, the slavewoman with whom Robert, Tee Bob’s father, produced an 
illegitimate child—Jules says that she “knowed how she looked…but she couldn’t do 
nothing about it” (191). He means that, suddenly, both she and Tee Bob were forced to 
confront the terrible truth that she was just as powerless to resist the advances of a white 
man as these older black women had been; in that moment, despite the years that passed 
in the interim between slavery and present day, Mary Agnes remains beholden to 
antebellum conventions that determined how her ancestors lived. Therefore, just as 
Dubey claims postmodern slave narratives use paranormal devices to “make possible an 
unmediated relation to the past as something that has not quite passed into the realm of 
history,” the spirit possession that Jules describes promotes a way of experiencing slavery 
“other than [as] the characteristically remote object of historical knowledge” (787). 
According to Jules, in the last minutes they spend together, Mary Agnes and Tee Bob do 
not only come to understand the situation of their forbears; they involuntarily recreate it, 
thus exposing the inexorability of the racism they each, by different means, had tried to 
“make up for” (156). It is this prevailing tone of immutability that distinguishes Jules’s 
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testimony from the rest of the novel and dislocates the progressive trajectory which 
critics almost uniformly assign to Jane’s narration. Instead of reinforcing a straight line of 
racial progress from the Civil War to the present, his possession narrative signals a 
dramatically different temporal mode—one that circles back on itself, revealing the 
timelessness of the racist attitudes that sustained slavery. 
 The “circular and vacillating sense of time associated with slavery” is, of course, 
common among fiction that pointedly defies realism, driven by a postmodern suspicion 
about historical progress (Dubey 791). But here, in an otherwise realist text written prior 
to the antihistoriographical turn in neo-slave narratives, the distinctiveness of the Mary 
Agnes/Tee Bob vignette cannot be ascribed entirely—if at all—to postmodernism, since 
it signifies such a departure from Jane’s established voice. More accurately, the 
supernatural quality of this section of the novel must be related to the character of the 
man who takes over the narration from Jane, imposing his alternative view of history on 
her and her audience. It is significant, then, that Jules represents a perspective far 
removed from Jane’s. In addition to being upper class, white and Creole, he is Catholic (a 
fact underscored by his identification as Tee Bob’s “parrain” [145]) and, as such, would 
have been more accustomed than Jane to the theological notion of timelessness. 
According to Paul Giles, Catholics are indoctrinated into a worldview, based upon 
Aquinas’s theology of an atemporal God, that supports the possibility of existing outside 
or beyond time. As a consequence of its analogical orientation, Thomist theology holds 
that “every historical existence simultaneously participates in primary spiritual essence,” 
which reflects the continuous presence of a divine being (Giles 186). This is what renders 
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Catholicism especially attentive—at least, when compared to Protestantism—to the 
“limitations of linear history” (ibid.). While “the Protestant principle” (in Paul Tillich’s 
estimation) maintains a rigid separation between the temporal world and the world of the 
spirit, Catholic doctrine stresses the interpenetration of these two worlds, signaled by a 
recurring interruption of chronological time.14 To say it another way: in Catholicism, all 
time is potentially sacred, because of God’s radical, immutable immanence in human 
experience. 
 The tendency to sacralize time has been linked, by Giles and others, to the way 
some “Catholic” writers “defy” a linearly progressive temporality, “infusing” their 
characters “with a ‘spiritual’ substance that epitomizes a higher, ‘divine’ grace” which is 
timeless and eternal (187).15 For Giles, this trend reveals itself even in ostensibly 
“secular” works—including those produced by Catholic apostates, who he claims 
“transform and secularize the impulses of Catholicism” into an “implicit” framework that 
structures their imagination (186).16 Although Jules is a fictional character—whose 
account of the Mary Agnes/Tee Bob affair is, like everything else in the novel, a product 
of Gaines’s imagination, not his own—Giles’s argument offers a useful means for 
understanding how Catholicism informs the portion of the narrative conceded to him, and 
particularly the distinctive way he imagines history. In other words, since Gaines portrays 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a summary of Tillich’s definition of “the Protestant principle,” see Giles 186. See 
also Berger 111-2. 
15 In the portion of his study quoted here, Giles is referring specifically to The Great 
Gatsby, arguing that Fitzgerald’s title character effectively “transubstantiate[s]” Daisy in 
this way, as he “seeks to redeem the accident of [her] time on earth” (186-7).  
16 In making this claim about Catholicism, Giles draws from and expands the argument 
Sacvan Bercovitch proposed about Puritanism in the groundbreaking study, The Puritan 
Origins of the American Self.  
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Jules as author of his own fictional “text,” his character’s religious identity has bearing 
on the form and content of the testimony he provides, just as Jane’s Protestantism has on 
hers. Moreover, what distinguishes each narrator’s approach to the past can be traced to 
the fundamental, theological divergence in the way that Protestants and Catholics 
typically interpret historical time—a divergence in which Gaines himself was, notably, 
well versed. 
 As he explained in a 1973 interview, Gaines was raised Protestant—having been 
“indoctrinated into” the Baptist faith—but attended Catholic schools for a number of 
years (int. by Ingram and Steinberg 51). Therefore, despite abandoning organized religion 
in adulthood, his personal experience provided him with theological training in both 
denominations of Christianity as well as an awareness of the differences between them. 
And, as I have been suggesting, Gaines’s attention to these differences plays out in the 
disruption that Jules causes in the novel when he takes over the narrative from Jane. Not 
only does the nonlinearity of Jules’s account point towards a Catholic conception of 
timelessness, but the spiritual possessions that he describes—and which Jane struggles to 
rationalize—are also more consistent with Catholicism than Protestantism. Peter Berger 
has argued that “the Catholic lives in a world in which the sacred is mediated to him 
through a variety of channels—the sacraments of the church, the intercession of the 
saints, the recurring eruption of the ‘supernatural’ in miracles—a vast continuity of being 
between the seen and unseen. Protestantism abolished most of these mediations” (112). 
While the distinction may be less absolute than Berger suggests (especially when 
considering Lutheran strains of Protestantism), his analysis correctly reflects the 
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frequency with which spirits and other “supernatural” forces intercede in Catholicism. 
Consistent with church doctrine on the communion of the saints, for example, Catholics 
are taught that they maintain spiritual connections with one another—and, in fact, with 
“all departed souls”—through a “vast network of intercession” that transcends worldly 
notions of life and death (Berger 111).  
 A consequence of this theology, according to scholars of the African diaspora, is 
that Catholicism syncretized more readily with African religions during the period of 
New World slavery than did Protestantism. Albert Raboteau, for one, points out that the 
“nature…of Catholic piety…offered a supportive context for the continuity of African 
religious elements in recognizable form,” in contrast with American Evangelical 
Protestantism, which he claims “was not as conducive to syncretism” (88). This argument 
gained momentum and significant expansion in Leslie Desmangles’s 1992 study of 
Haitian Vodou, a religion that though “West African in form” has “borrowed much from 
Roman Catholicism” (3). Specifically, Desmangles documents the “Voudisants’ penchant 
for identifying” each of their pantheon of invisible spirits, or lwa, with a Catholic saint 
(123). Such an identification is possible because the lwa, like the saints in Catholicism, 
were real historical figures who, after death, continue to “direct the physical operation of 
the universe” (92). Therefore, at their ceremonies and in their homes, Voudisants use 
images of these saints—lithographs, statues and other kinds of religious iconography—to 
signify their own ancestral spirits, whom they believe capable of manifesting “themselves 
in matter or in the possessed body of a devotee” (93).  
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 Although the version of Vodou that developed in antebellum Louisiana does not 
correspond exactly to the form that arose in Haiti, it is also based on “similarities between 
African and Catholic myths and symbols,” including the identification of ancestral spirits 
with saints (Desmangles 10). This syncretism—or “symbiosis,” in Desmangles’s 
terminology—is something Gaines highlights in his novel, when Jane describes the 
interior of Madame Gautier’s house—the room where she takes those who come to her 
“for special business”: 
She had candles burning in every corner of the room, and she had 
seven on the mantelpiece. She had another candle burning under a 
little statue on a little table by the window. She had Saint pictures 
hanging on the wall with crepe paper round each picture. (92) 
 
As a hoo-doo and one-time rival of the famous “Voodoo Queen,” Marie Laveau, Madam 
Gautier signals the particular way that Catholic theology was assimilated into African 
traditions and rituals in Louisiana. Her appearance in the text thus establishes Jane’s 
awareness of the relationship between Catholicism and hoo-doo culture. Moreover, the 
uneasiness Jane feels sitting in Madam Gautier’s home, among the sacred icons and 
pictures of saints, implies that—in spite of her tendency towards rationalization—Jane 
cannot help being “a little scared” by what she sees. After all, like everyone in the 
community, she has heard the “talk” about hoo-doos whose religion enables them to 
communicate with the spirit world and defy the limits of physical death. So it is not until 
Madam Gautier puts a log on her fire—proving that “she can get cold just like anybody 
else”—that Jane relaxes and remembers she does not believe in the power of the objects 
displayed in the room; she does not believe, as both the Catholics and hoo-doos would 
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have it, that saints/ancestral spirits populate the material world, intervening in human 
affairs (92). 
 In this way, then, Jane’s visit to Madam Gautier’s house anticipates how Jules’s 
account of supernatural possession will disrupt her narrative in the next section of the 
novel. Though there is no reason to consider Jules a practitioner of hoo-doo—or even 
someone who subscribes to its tenets—his Catholicism links him, by virtue of its textual 
association with African-derived traditions, to a similar conception of ancestral return. In 
other words, by the time Jules takes over the narration from Jane, Gaines has already 
affirmed a connection between Catholicism and hoo-doo which both explains and 
provides context for the alternative history that he articulates. The Catholic church does 
not officially sanction the idea of spirit possession.17 And yet, within the cultural matrix 
of the novel, the religion cannot be divorced from other spiritual systems which do, since 
characters who practice Catholicism—or are otherwise identified with its signs and 
symbols—reveal a simultaneous, and seemingly noncontradictory, affinity for hoo-doo as 
well. Remarkably, the same holds for black “Catholics,” like Madam Gautier, as for 
white “Catholics,” such as the family of Albert Cluveau. Both Cluveau and his daughter 
Adeline, who was raised in the church and strictly adheres to its doctrines, exhibit a fear 
of “curses” that Jane calls “simple-minded” (121). This suggests that, despite being even 
less familiar with hoo-doo culture than Jane, their Catholicism inclines them to believe 
more readily in the power of spirits to possess and control humans. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As Clarke Garrett affirms in his study of Spirit Possession and Popular Religion, the 
Roman Catholic Church does not accept that humans can be possessed by any spirit other 
than God or the devil: “If the spirits are not God’s and good, they must be evil” (7). This 
necessarily negates the possibility of humans becoming possessed by ancestral spirits. 
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 Clearly, Jules shares the same inclination, a supernatural inclination that I am 
arguing Gaines associates exclusively with his Catholic characters. The association is 
significant because it creates a space in the narrative to challenge Jane’s rationalizing 
impulse—but to do so without abandoning her formal commitment to realism. By 
displacing belief in spirit possession onto Catholics in this way, Gaines effectively 
maintains the realist properties of the novel (including its progressive temporality), while 
at the same time giving voice to a decidedly antirealist view of history characteristic of 
postmodernism. Even though Jane expresses skepticism and doubt about the potential for 
spiritual intercession which the text links to Catholicism, these perspectives still intrude 
on her narration, calling into question her ability to rationalize them. Therefore, when 
Jules takes over the narrative and contends that Mary Agnes and Tee Bob were possessed 
by the spirits of their ancestors, he is not only articulating a distinct theological position, 
but also offering another means to approach the past that Jane is attempting to recover—
one not determined by the conventions of literary realism. The intrusion of his voice thus 
exposes the possibility of remembering differently, according to a set of principles that 
resist the prevailing tenor of her story. 
 The fact that the novel can entertain both approaches simultaneously, 
counterbalancing the linearity of Jane’s historiography with a sense of timelessness 
indicative of Catholicism, is an effect of Gaines’s framing device and the way he 
imagines “folk” history to translate in writing. In his essay “Miss Jane and I,” Gaines 
indicates that he originally planned for the book to have multiple narrators, who would 
trade memories about the title character on the day of her death, based upon their 
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individual experiences with her and from their unique viewpoints. Presumably, this 
technique of narrating Jane’s life would have created even more opportunities to explore 
alternative modes of telling that, like Jules’s account, incorporate a variety of temporal 
perspectives, since the different narrators all spoke “in their own way.” After a year of 
writing, however, Gaines “discarded” the polyvocal structure, opting “to tell the story 
from a single voice—Miss Jane’s own” because the “others were making her life too 
complicated in that they had too many opinions, bringing in too many anecdotes”; he 
“thought a single voice, Miss Jane’s, would keep the story in a straight line” (618, my 
italics). Gaines’s choice of words here is striking because it implies that the transition 
from multiple narrators to one (and from a fictional work tentatively titled A Short 
Biography of Miss Jane to The Autobiography) contributed to the progressive trajectory 
that critics have identified with the novel. Dispensing with others’ opinions and 
anecdotes, he suggests, helped move the narrative forward chronologically, as Jane—
alone—took control of the telling. And yet, Claudine Raynaud importantly points out that 
the process of “giving up the ‘authorship’” that he had been originally “bestowed upon” 
multiple characters is not as seamless as Gaines would have it (447). The introduction 
makes clear that the diverse perspectives of would-be co-narrators are still present in the 
novel, even when have been completely effaced by the voice of the “‘I’ narrator” 
(Raynaud 447). Thus, as Gaines himself has written, “Miss Jane…is not any one person”; 
at any point, her narration represents a community of people, each of whom remembers 
history from a different point of view (“Miss Jane” 618).    
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 Owing to this logic, and despite the “straight line” temporality its primary narrator 
favors, the novel is capable of accommodating various historiographical approaches—
including what I (following Dubey) have called Jules’s antihistoriographical approach—
whenever a new character takes possession of the narrative. By acknowledging that 
“there were times others carried the story for her,” Gaines’s introduction efficiently 
accounts for the disruption that such distinct ways of remembering cause, all the while 
foregrounding Jane’s historical memory as the principal mode of the text (x). The 
framing device therefore provides a convenient, formal explanation for internal 
inconsistencies in how the novel describes the past: any deviations from its realist 
orientation can be blamed on characters, such as Jules, who speak from a subject position 
far removed from Jane’s own—in his case, a subject position determined by Catholicism. 
It is worth noting, though, that however much this narrative structure supports the novel’s 
claims of realism, it also—somewhat paradoxically—corroborates the decidedly 
antirealist claims that Jules’s account puts forth. In other words, the very idea that other 
voices haunt Jane’s narration, determining what she says, resonates with how Jules 
remembers Mary Agnes and Tee Bob as well as his description of their final moments 
together. 
 As I have already suggested, the speakers who intrude on Jane’s story do so in a 
clandestine and mystifying way that evokes spirit possession. Because her transcriber 
withholds both the names of these additional narrators and their precise contributions to 
the narrative, the authorship of her words is always in question. At any point, another 
character—be it the “old man called Pap” who “was her main source” or any of the 
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“other people at the house every day” during the interview (viii)—could be speaking 
through Jane, in the voice identified as her own. This renders her subjectivity as unstable 
as Mary Anges’s or Tee Bob’s in the scene that Jules describes, since throughout the text 
she is not just herself but also always potentially someone else. Therefore, even though 
the figures that take over the testimony are not spirits in the traditional sense (they are 
portrayed by the transcriber as living people, friends of Jane’s, who gladly helped her 
remember what she had forgotten), their effect on the narration is similarly haunting. 
Indeed, like the ancestral spirits who possess Mary Agnes and Tee Bob, the ghostly 
presence of these co-narrators problematizes Jane’s narrative authority to the extent that 
her “individual experience intersects with collective experience,” so that it becomes 
impossible to distinguish one from the other. The “intersubjectivity” that this formal 
structure promotes is, as Ashraf Rushdy has shown, a feature of texts that use the trope of 
spirit possession to emphasize the “mutuality” of storytelling—the sense that speaking 
about one’s past is a “community enterprise,” rather than an individualistic endeavor 
(126). 
 For the antirealist neo-slave narratives Rushdy refers to, then, spirit possession 
serves to disrupt the idea, implicit in historical realism, that there is a single, primary and 
objective account of what actually happened. This is what constitutes “the HooDoo 
aesthetic,” as Ishmael Reed first defined it: a prevailing sense that the subject speaking 
about the past is “intimately at one with others in his or her community” (127).18 Given 
her reluctance to associate, on any level, with the principles of hoo-doo, Jane’s character 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Rushdy takes the term “Hoodoo aesthetic” or “Hoodoo writing” from Ishmael Reed, 
whose novel Flight to Canada, is at the center of his analysis. 
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would undeniably reject the suggestion that her testimony has anything supernatural 
about it. And yet, by creating space in her narrative to voice Jules’s (Catholic) version of 
history, Gaines manages to incorporate these alternative viewpoints into an otherwise 
realist novel. 
II. Inscrutability and Catholicism  
 Published thirteen years after The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman and well 
into the period Madhu Dubey correlates to the postmodernist turn in fiction about slavery, 
the novel I consider next has all but abandoned the realist pretense of historical recovery 
that features so prominently in Gaines’s writing. Leon Forrest’s Two Wings to Veil My 
Face is famously (perhaps infamously19) complex: a work, like all of his fiction, which 
resolutely undermines the possibility of accurately representing the past. For that reason, 
critics often cite it as an example of the later wave of contemporary narratives of slavery 
that involve alternative ways of remembering history and challenge modern 
historiographical methods by means of supernatural devises, such as the trope of spirit 
possession. Indeed, Forrest appears to embrace the trope much more thoroughly than 
Gaines ever did, effectively using it to suggest that no single voice has the authority to 
state unequivocally the truth of what occurred. Within a postmodern context, in which 
truth claims are relentlessly and purposefully called into question, the indeterminacy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Of Leon Forrest’s complexity, Edward P. Jones once said that it prevented him from 
finishing the first novel in the Bloodworth Trilogy (of which Two Wings to Veil My Face 
is the last): “You get to the book, and ask where’s the story, where are these people, and 
what is he doing? Everything in me rebels against that. If these are real human beings 
imagination-wise, then you can use plain language to tell what they are doing and saying” 
(int. by Graham 428). 
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occasioned by spirit possession is entirely acceptable: the sort of feature readers might 
even expect from a novel that seems intent on disrupting historical realism at every turn.  
 And so, because of its overtly postmodernist structure, Two Wings does not couch 
its narratological investment in the trope of spirit possession within the framework of 
Catholicism as Gaines does in his novel. In fact, it does not couch it at all. Rather, 
Forrest’s novel takes as its starting point what Rushdy calls a “Hoo-Doo aesthetic,” and 
reveals no obligation to explain or to justify in any way the supernatural content of its 
narration. Yet, as I will show, Two Wings still persistently links spirit possession to 
Catholicism, implying a fundamental connection between the two. That connection gets 
expressed specifically in terms of a desire for coherence, as the novel’s protagonist—
Nathaniel Witherspoon—seeks to make sense of the inscrutability of his family’s history. 
To Nathaniel, who struggles for most of the narrative against the very indeterminancy 
that the trope of spirit possession enacts, accepting his own lack of historical authority 
amounts to having faith in the “mystery and miracle” of the Catholic Mass. Therefore, I 
argue, for him and for the novel as a whole, Catholicism comes to stand for the inability 
ever to know the truth about the past and—more importantly, even—his ultimate 
acceptance of that inability.   
+++ 
 Like Miss Jane Pittman, and so many other contemporary slave narratives, Two 
Wings frames its historiography as oral testimony: a story told by an elderly African 
American character to a member of the younger generation, who has been tasked (for one 
reason or another) with preserving those memories in written form. In this case, the 
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listener/transcriber is Nathaniel Witherspoon and it is his ninety-one-year-old 
grandmother, Sweetie Reed, to whom he appeals in 1958 for knowledge about the past. 
Specifically, Nathaniel wants to know why Sweetie chose not to attend the funeral of her 
husband Jericho fourteen years earlier, a question she promised to address when 
Nathaniel came of age. The answer, though, which takes the entire novel to unfold, 
involves more than just Sweetie’s experience alone; among others, it includes that of her 
father, I.V. Reed, whose story she also relates, in the voice that I.V. himself used when 
making his death-bed confession. I.V.’s first-person account of slavery and emancipation, 
in fact, takes up nearly half of the book’s total pages, threatening to eclipse the main 
purpose of Sweetie’s narrative. 
 In this way, just as in Miss Jane Pittman, the narrator’s testimony gets interrupted 
and displaced by alternate speakers who take over the telling, preventing her—
temporarily, at least—from achieving the kind of straightforward, straight line resolution 
that the audience expects. What Nathaniel seeks from his grandmother is “some order 
over my disorder,” a means of addressing that part of his family history that had always 
been left out so that he might look upon his own life with more clarity and understanding 
(250). As a child, he noticed that the stories he heard at home were “different” from the 
lessons he was taught at school. Unlike learning the ABCs, “when you went from A to B 
to C” according to a prescribed formula and in sequence, he was frustrated to find that 
when his family talked about the past, they “often went from A to C to E” instead (11). 
Nathaniel’s expectations, then, for the narrative Sweetie tells him once he has finally 
reached “his majority,” point towards the closing of those gaps of knowledge. He desires 
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a full and sequential accounting of everything that was previously withheld. This is the 
promise of the novel and—by extension—the promise of realist historiography more 
generally, especially with regard to the theme of historical recovery. The other voices 
which take possession of Sweetie’s narration, therefore, like those which take possession 
of Jane’s, disrupt the history that Nathaniel wants to recover, calling into question her 
authority to represent accurately what has occurred.  
 But whereas in Miss Jane Pittman the narrator regains at least some control over 
these disruptions, ultimately taking back her story from any speaker with whom she does 
not agree, the same cannot be said for Sweetie. Indeed, no single voice or way of 
remembering the past predominates in Two Wings as it does in Gaines’s novel. Sweetie’s 
perspective is relentlessly undermined by I.V. and others who dispute the accuracy of her 
memory, casting doubt upon every detail she recounts, even the most seemingly objective 
ones (such as the identity of an individual in a photograph). For that reason, by the time 
the testimony concludes, Nathaniel feels uncertain what—or whom—to believe, saying to 
his grandmother, “I never said you were a liar. But you do have a fabulous imagination” 
(271). His tendency to question the truthfulness of Sweetie’s narrative reflects what 
Kenneth Byerman has called its “multivoiced character” and underscores the inherent 
difficulty of the novel. Because every voice that takes over the telling “is self-critical and 
also challenged by other voices about its veracity and interests in the narrating process,” 
it becomes impossible to know what really happened with any degree of confidence. 
Instead, like Nathaniel, readers must confront a past that “is not a finished product of 
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agreed-upon data but a struggle for coherence in a field of competing…desires that 
constantly shape and reshape the story” (Byerman 139). 
 On account of the intrusion of so many contending perspectives, the view of 
history offered in Two Wings is far more consistent with the antihistoriographical tenor of 
postmodernism than with the realist historiography that Nathaniel looks to his 
grandmother to provide. Of course, this would be expected, given its overtly 
postmodernist orientation. The disjointed, hybrid quality of its narrative—the way it 
shifts between not only discordant voices but also a variety of conflicting genres (diary 
entries and newspaper articles, for example) as means of accessing the past—emphasizes 
the radical contingency of all knowledge. This places Two Wings among a host of post-
1970s slave narratives, and postmodernist literature in general, which resolutely denies 
the possibility of objectively representing historical truth. According to A. Timothy 
Spaulding, the discourse of postmodernism and the critique of realism that it supported 
was “potentially useful” for African American writers, who sought to deconstruct 
essentialized, univocal notions of “the” black experience (13). In the wake of the 
important strides made by the first wave of neo-slave narratives to recover a lost history 
of slavery, authors such as Forrest turned their attention to destabilizing historiographical 
methods more generally—particularly the idea, implicit in Enlightenment thinking, that 
there can be just one “absolute and objective” record of what happened (Spaulding 13). 
Thus, as Byerman points out, the complex method of storytelling that Forrest developed 
in Two Wings implies that the past is most accurately represented not by a single 
authority, but rather “a profusion of speakers, each with his/her own master narrative” 
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(138). The fact that these master narratives pointedly contradict one another only 
contributes to the sense, foregrounded in the novel, that history itself is multidirectional 
and multivoiced. 
 Having abandoned the straight-line historiography that Gaines used in favor of a 
postmodernist approach, Forrest refrains from explaining or smoothing out its many 
contradictions. Indeed, those contradictions and inconsistencies are an integral part of the 
narrative—something that he purposefully incorporates to convey the complexity of the 
story Sweetie is attempting to tell. The trope of possession, therefore, serves a noticeably 
different function for Two Wings than it does for Miss Jane Pittman. In the introduction 
to the earlier novel, Gaines’s transcriber laments that he “could not tie all the ends 
together in one neat direction,” as he had hoped, because of the various characters who 
take over the telling from Jane (x). The haunting presence of a community of co-
narrators, as I have argued, provides justification for those—rare—moments of 
transgression, when the narration deviates from the tenets of literary realism. Despite the 
pronounced supernatural associations of the possession trope, it nevertheless works 
within the realist framework of the novel to bolster Jane’s credibility and to account for 
the other less realistic (and often recognizably Catholic) voices that intrude on her 
“autobiography.” In Two Wings, however, being possessed does not render Sweetie’s 
narrative more believable; nor does it promote her way of remembering the past over 
conflicting interpretations from alternate narrators. Rather, as Forrest deploys it, the trope 
of possession plainly defies realism at every turn, “amplifying” the “antihistoriographic 
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impulse” of his text, in terms consistent with its postmodern orientation (Dubey, 
“Speculative” 789). 
 The primary reason that possession affects the narrative structure of Two Wings so 
differently than it does Miss Jane Pittman is that the ghostly presences haunting 
Sweetie’s story are actually ghosts, as opposed to living characters. They are the spirits of 
“the lost souls and the dead brought to life” through her words (286). As Nathaniel 
explains, when Sweetie tells her personal experience, her memories are possessed by 
ancestral figures, who “emerge from the steam in the room out of the power 
of…storytelling” (7). This way of understanding possession—as a supernatural 
phenomenon by which long-dead people communicate freely with those still alive—is 
responsible for much of the novel’s complexity, including its deliberate obfuscation of 
historical truth. For the spirits which haunt Sweetie do not “speak with one voice” in 
unison about the past; they argue amongst themselves and with Sweetie to the extent that 
no single one inspires trust above the others (7). What Nathaniel contends with, then, in 
the face of all Sweetie’s spiritual interlopers is a polyphonic, revisionist family history 
that recalls how Brian McHale has defined postmodernist historical fiction—especially 
its propensity for juxtaposing “the officially-accepted version of what happened and the 
way things were, with another, often radically dissimilar version of the world” (90). 
Moreover, the fantastic nature of the voices possessing Sweetie further “exacerbates the 
ontological hesitation” between “the supernatural and the historically real” that McHale 
also aligns with postmodernism (95). 
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 In fact, as a number of critics have been quick to point out: when deployed 
narratologically as a strategy for blurring the line that distinguishes historical truth from 
fiction, the trope of possession is a quintessentially postmodernist device.20 Not only does 
it “integrat[e] history and the fantastic,” but it also dramatically revises the standard—
chronological and progressive—means by which that history is traditionally conveyed 
(McHale 90). These are the literary features that we come to expect from postmodernist 
texts and, as such, in Two Wings, they do not involve the same degree of 
contextualization and rationalization that a realist historiography such as Miss Jane 
Pittman obliges. Thus, when Sweetie intones “then is always now in my heart,” she is 
calling attention to the way her narrative vacillates between the past and the present, as 
she herself—and the voices emerging from her story—remain suspended in a timeless 
space, where history has not yet been relegated to the already passed (270). Unlike 
Gaines’s narrator, then, Sweetie takes for granted both the presence of ancestral spirits 
and their ability to affect how her testimony translates to its audience. There is no attempt 
on her part to deny or otherwise distance herself from the supernatural content of her 
narration—this, despite being Protestant, just as Jane Pittman is, and therefore 
theologically predisposed against the idea of communication between the living and the 
dead. 
 In the fictional world of Two Wings, and really in all of Forrest’s fiction, though, 
one’s denominational affiliation does not determine the extent of one’s supernatural 
beliefs. Most of the characters—Protestants, Catholics, and non-Christians alike—accept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Dubey, “Speculative” 787-789 and Rushdy 125-131. 
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without question that they live among the spirits of their dead ancestors and that “lost 
souls” are capable of interceding in their affairs. According to Danille Taylor-Guthrie, 
this is due to “the cultural context from which the ideas and aesthetics of the novel are 
derived” and, specifically, the multidimensionality of the “African-American spiritual 
culture” depicted therein. She demonstrates that, given how many different religions and 
religious denominations Forrest incorporates into his work, the characters have an 
expansive range of “rituals and theology” from which to choose (or not choose) and that 
even the Christian faiths they subscribe to “are not monolithic” in scope (219). For 
example, Nathaniel was baptized and confirmed in Catholicism, yet his personal beliefs 
as well as the prayer he makes at the end of the novel reflect the impact of Protestantism. 
(The prayer is, as Taylor-Guthrie suggests, modeled on the style of testifying that he used 
to hear in the Protestant church which he attended as a child with his father’s side of the 
family.) Likewise, Aunt Foisty, a roots worker and spiritual healer who learned her craft 
in Africa before being captured and enslaved in the U.S., converts to Christianity—but 
successfully interweaves components of her adopted theology with traditional practice.21 
Stories of religious boundary-crossings such as these proliferate in Two Wings, implying 
that for all of the attention Forrest devotes to precise theological imagery and expression, 
religion itself is in a constant state of flux, as characters adapt a prescribed set of beliefs 
to their own immediate needs. 
 Nowhere is the fluidity of religious belief more apparent—or more humorously 
conveyed—than in the argument between Sweetie and her father, regarding how to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Taylor-Guthrie 226-7. 
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interpret Aunt Foisty’s “resurrection” of Master Rollins from death. Contending that 
Foisty “had only healed up enough of Rollins Reed so as his soul would not come 
unraveling out of his crawling condition,” Sweetie asserts that the old roots worker used 
the resurrected body of their master to curse I.V. for the “balance of [his] days.” I.V. 
clearly objects to the suggestion that he had been cursed, telling his daughter: 
Commandment says out plain as salt through a widow woman, honor thy 
father and thy mother; and you suspose to be a Christian, ‘bout as much 
one as old persecuting Saul. If only I had a rod, I would reel your spoilt 
body in till spilt blood racked your hide as drops of rainsalt cross a bee-bit 
back; sure would be sweetmeat to my good eyes to learn you some 
humility. (149) 
 
The “leaps of faith” that make it possible for I.V. to defend his view of Reed’s rebirth 
while reprimanding Sweetie according to an Old Testament conception of moral law are 
mind-boggling indeed—particularly because it is all in the service of proving that his 
master really had been brought back to life by a traditional Africanist healer. To a 
perverse and utterly absurd degree, I.V.’s tirade highlights the way that Forrest’s 
characters negotiate different belief systems, seemingly without acknowledging any 
conflict between them. And, although Sweetie later criticizes her father for using “the 
Good Book to hide behind” when he, in fact, has never adhered to other tenets of 
Christianity, she reveals an equivalent tendency to make religion her own (159). After all, 
in spite of a deep personal faith and historical commitment to ministering at “camp 
meetings and revivals,” Sweetie long ago abandoned organized worship within the 
institution of the Protestant church, when it started to conflict with her social justice 
agenda (45). Instead, as Nathaniel says, she developed a unique kind of “mission” that 
	  	   	  
138	  
does not correspond to any established doctrine, but rather honors the private “covenant” 
she made “with Almighty God” to “re-create a miracle” for the world’s poor (46). 
 Because of their individualized and highly adaptable approaches to religion, 
Sweetie and I.V. might be said to fit Philippa Berry’s definition of a “post-religious” 
flâneuse or flâneur: someone who, on account of “extremely fragile” and “porous” 
cultural boundaries, moves “intelligently amid…contrasting systems of meaning” to 
foster an “uncanny coexistence” among them (177). Admittedly, Berry’s definition 
depends on an ethical imperative that neither Sweetie nor—clearly—I.V. is motivated by. 
(Berry believes the post-religious flâneuse or flâneur represents our best “chance” to 
unravel the “potent aporias within western thought” responsible for sectarian conflict 
[177].) And yet, her analysis confirms how acceptable it has become, given “the extreme 
commodification of the religious impulse” which characterizes postmodernism, for 
individuals to customize a spiritual identity, if not an entire religion, according to their 
own (changeable) interests (172). As a journalist quoted by Berry observes, within a 
postmodern cultural context, many people 
have moved away from ‘religion’ as something anchored in organized 
worship and systematic beliefs within an institution, to a self-made 
‘spirituality’, outside formal structures, which is based on experience, has 
no doctrine and makes no claim to philosophical coherence.22  
 
 Thus, Forrest’s characters exhibit a religious indeterminancy that is symptomatic 
of the postmodern spiritual condition—what Berry has termed “post-religion.”23 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Berry is quoting Clifford Longley’s article, “A Spiritual Land with Little Time for 
Church” from The Daily Telegraph, Friday 17 December 1999. 
23 Berry uses the term “post-religion” to refer to that “paradoxical (and notoriously 
difficult to define) cultural and economic phase” that succeeded modernity, in which “not 
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novel in fact reads as a pastiche of holy texts: along with the prayer Nathaniel makes at 
its end, there are entire chapters devoted to meandering church sermons as well as 
fragments of hymns and devotional poetry scattered throughout. But rather than 
reinforcing the specific religious content of each individual fragment, the effect of this 
proliferation—as with all postmodernist pastiche, according to Fredric Jameson—is to 
create “a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm” (17). To say it 
another way, the sheer number of religions alluded to in the narrative threatens to strip 
every belief system of its unique value, reducing it to something Jameson refers to as 
“blank parody” or a “random” act of semantic play. We see this especially in the sermons 
that comprise two chapters of the novel. These ostensibly Protestant expressions of faith 
are imbricated with so many religious discourses and modes of allusion—both sacred and 
secular—that they supplant the very tenets of the religion they were intended to uphold, 
rendering the sermonic form itself little more than a repository of other styles. The first, 
Reverend Browne’s, transforms into a political call-to-action that celebrates how a 
declared non-believer (i.e. Jericho Witherspoon) imagined God. The second, Sweetie’s, 
contains a sweeping and intimate description of an encounter with the spirit of her 
deceased husband which recalls, at turns, the Catholic sacrament of confession, a baptism 
in the Baptist tradition, and the way an “African ontological system” understands the 
“proximity of the dead to the living” (Taylor-Guthrie 231).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
only orthodox religions but even the more general concept of ‘value’ appears to have 
reached a critical impasse” due to, among other things, “the dissemination of increasingly 
populist cultural forms” and modes of knowledge (168-9).  
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 Within the novel’s cultural system, then, just as religion is something that can be 
molded to fit an individual’s personal desires, so too are its formal discourses. This is, of 
course, not an aesthetic technique confined to postmodernism—nor one present only in 
postmodernist literature. As Sacvan Bercovitch has persuasively demonstrated, American 
authors from the colonial period through the Civil War manipulated a sermonic form, the 
jeremiad, for wide range of purposes, many of them secular in nature. But what is 
striking—as well as particularly postmodern—about how Forrest deploys the religious 
discourses that appear in Two Wings is the diversity of belief systems they represent. It is 
a diversity that corresponds, perhaps not surprisingly, to Forrest’s own experience of 
religion and to the feeling he had as a child of being “divided between” faith traditions 
(int. by Cawelti 24). For, although he was raised Catholic by his mother and trained in the 
catechism of the church, he denies ever becoming “sufficiently indoctrinated” as some of 
his family members were, due to all the other, often competing, influences in his life (int. 
by Warren 45). Most palpably, there were the “regular weekends” he spent “with the 
Protestant side” of his family, when he read the Old Testament to his great-grandmother 
and “became very interested…in the thrust of negro spirituals and gospel music and the 
great sermons” that he witnessed at Chicago’s Pilgrim Baptist Church (int. by Cawelti 
24). As he told an interviewer in 1992, his religious heritage was “so splintered” by the 
divisions among the denominations of Christianity—and “all kinds of other divisions 
within divisions”—that he never developed a coherent spirituality (int. by Warren 44-5).  
 Initially, when he started writing fiction centered on the African American family, 
Forrest admits this lack of coherence stymied him, and he that worried about how to draw 
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from a personal background that seemed, given all its spiritual and cultural dissonance, 
“rather chaotic” (int. by Cawelti 24). Of particular difficulty, Forrest has explained, was 
the fact that “the Catholic church at that time seemed to be so far from the ethos of 
African Americans” who, prior to Vatican II, were still officially subject to racial 
segregation and other sanctioned forms of discrimination by clergy.24 It was not until 
“reading Joyce and also later reading the Latin American writers,” he says that he found a 
“certain confidence in using the Catholic experience” in his work, a way to write “out of 
it with a certain strength and robustness” (int. by Warren 44-5). The significance of this 
statement, with regard to how Forrest crafted his approach to Catholicism, is that it 
foregrounds the literary, rather than the theological or doctrinal. Thus he came to 
perceive the religion he was born into as a set of aesthetic practices and formal 
techniques that could be incorporated, discursively, into his fiction—a point that he 
elaborates, in the following passage, when discussing what he “gained” from his family’s 
“two heritages”:  
From the Catholic side, I was always attracted to the ritual…and to the 
grandness of the tradition, the concept of original sin and the secret self of 
confession. Maybe that’s where my interior monologues come from. […] 
It was the Baptists on the Protestant side, that made me aware of 
eloquence as a form, not only a protest, but as it evoked the anguish and 
the celebration of black life on a larger stage. It wasn’t writers, because 
after all, when I was coming along, there weren’t that many well-known 
African American writers…It was the eloquence of these great public 
speakers, mainly preachers…that shaped me. It made me want to try to do 
something in a grand manner, in the grand style. (int. by Cawelti 24) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For analysis of the racial discrimination prevalent in Catholic churches in Chicago 
(where Forrest grew up), see McGreevy.  
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Forrest indicates, then, that just like any other literary device, the Catholic confession or 
the Baptist sermon provides “form” for the aspects of “black life” he wants to articulate. 
And the literariness of these religious structures is only compounded by their fluid 
juxtaposition in the text with elements from diverse cultural sources: other religions, as 
we have seen, but also canonical works of literature, such as Macbeth and Blake’s “The 
Lamb,” in addition to contemporary music and art.25 
 What emerges from the “discursive bricolage” of Two Wings is the sense that all 
religious experience—indeed, experience of any sort—can be appropriated linguistically, 
absent of a cohesive “spiritual agenda” (Berry 172). As such, the trope of spirit 
possession, which structures Sweetie’s narrative and accounts much of its 
supernaturalism, does not necessarily signal the beliefs of a distinct cultural group (like 
the Creoles and the Cajuns in Miss Jane Pittman), nor is it relegated to the novel’s 
periphery. Assorted characters, regardless of denominational affiliation, regularly refer to 
the way their “souls” are “possessed” by ghosts of the dead. In some cases, these 
possessions are acrimonious: a kind of retaliatory gesture meant to avenge a grievous 
injustice. This is how both I.V. and the wife of his master, Mistress Sylvia, describe their 
relationship with the spirit-world. They regard the ghosts who haunt them as recompense 
for the advantages taken during slavery. Claiming that “I am possessed by 
niggers…solely by niggers my soul is owned,” Sylvia blames the countless Africans on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For example, a single passage from Two Wings brings together allusions to the 
Jewish—or, possibly, Islamic—rite of circumcision (“our old ways must be discarded, as 
the foreskin of flesh”) with references to Blake and Paul Robeson (211). Another 
interweaves quotations from Christian liturgy (“oh Kyrie eleison, oh Christe eleison”) 
with Macbeth’s tomorrow speech (295). 
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whose bodies her fortune was made for eventually bringing her to the brink of poverty 
and powerlessness on the eve of the Civil War (66). Likewise, I.V believes that he suffers 
all sorts of indignities because the spirit of Reece Haywood visits nightly to punish him 
for turning his back on a fellow slave and for indirectly causing his death. (Not only did 
I.V. instigate the confrontation between Reece and Master Rollins, but he also threw a 
rock at Reece to prevent him from killing their master, thus ensuring his capture.) The 
idea that a formerly dispossessed person—a slave—would return, after dying, to impose 
his will on a living body can be interpreted as an act of resistance against the deplorable 
conditions of slavery. It is in these terms that scholars such as Colin Dayan and Michel 
Saturnin Laguerre have described the “political” thrust of spirit possession, pointing out 
how for many cultures being possessed is as much “a symbolic reaction against a 
dependent societal status” as it is a religious event (Laguerre, qtd. in Rushdy 125). 
 Along similar lines, although Nathaniel himself is far removed from the material 
conditions of enslavement, his experience of possession reflects a need to reckon with an 
unsettled past—more than it does his particular theological orientation. Ever since he was 
a boy, Nathaniel “knew that he would always be haunted by the memory and presence” 
of his grandfather, both because of the stories about his daring escape from slavery and 
because of the mystery surrounding his relationship with Sweetie (28). Therefore, he 
regards Jericho as a force who, like so many of his dead ancestors, will forever “be with 
the family in spirit, power and voice” as they struggle to make sense of their history (6). 
The manner by which these ancestral spirits come to possess Nathaniel, though, is not the 
result of some sacred ceremony with a prescribed set of ritualistic practices, but rather 
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through the art of Sweetie’s storytelling: a fundamentally secular undertaking, occasioned 
by Nathaniel’s desire to learn about his past. For all of these reasons, then, spirit 
possession as Forrest depicts it in Two Wings transcends both its religious and cultural 
associations, suggesting a means of remembering and accounting for history that is not 
defined by any single theology or set of beliefs. And yet, despite being theologically 
unmoored, the trope is still—quite remarkably—linked to Catholicism in ways that have 
profound implications for the meaning Nathaniel draws from the stories Sweetie tells 
him. 
 The link between Catholicism and spirit possession first appears in the opening 
passage of the novel, as Nathaniel recalls listening to his grandmother’s stories when he 
was a child, while eating in her kitchen. Back then, the steam from the food she had 
prepared days earlier and then wrapped in warming sleeves 
opened him up to Great-Momma Sweetie Reed’s storytelling powers and 
recollecting of leftovers to be remade once again by the boy when Great-
Momma Sweetie unveiled the last of the sleeves and his imagination 
produced a vision of preserved mummies sliding forth (perhaps because of 
the thinning, see-through condition of the warm-up jackets) as if to play a 
joke on himself, but instead (as always) a bevy of life-giving celebrants of 
bread emerged almost bursting with life, not crumbling (4) 
 
The “vision” of dead bodies (mummies) baked into bread and then transforming into 
“life-giving celebrants” under the “powers” of Sweetie’s voice is one distinctly 
reminiscent of the Catholic Mass—an event that Nathaniel had witnessed countless times 
during his service as an acolyte. In fact, in “his imagination,” his grandmother and the 
priests he served at church were performing equivalent acts: both using their words and 
their memory to call forth figures from a past that was otherwise inaccessible to him. 
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Therefore, he thought of “the mystery of the water and the wine, and the bread and the 
wine that mysteriously took the place of Jesus Christ’s body and blood” whenever 
Sweetie spoke about their family history (9). And he imagined the leftover food she gave 
him as a kind of Eucharist, which he chewed and absorbed faithfully in spite of its 
“decaying smell,” hoping to satiate his desire for knowledge (10). 
 For young Nathaniel, a boy trying desperately to decode the adult world, there 
was little to distinguish the “wonders and mysteries” of his grandmother’s storytelling 
from “what they said at Mass.” Sweetie’s words were often just as inscrutable to him as 
the Latin the priests spoke while pouring wine into the chalice in preparation for Holy 
Communion. Even with the English translations that his Aunt DuDora would whisper 
into his ear during the consecration ritual, Nathaniel believed those prayers were “beyond 
his powers of understanding,” because they purported to accomplish something “so 
bedeviling” and “overpowering” that it defied rational explanation. Indeed, to him, the 
mystery of the Mass—and the miracle of Jesus being made present again—was a direct 
result of this verbal dissonance, a direct result of the impenetrable language he heard 
recited over the gifts. Because it was in the midst of the estranging, yet “beautiful prayer 
the priest prayed at the Epistle side of the altar” that DuDora said the divine spirit of 
Christ “deigned to become partaker of our humanity” through the Eucharistic sacrament 
(9). Thus, from an early age, Nathaniel learned to associate his experience of linguistic 
incomprehension with the promise of a “wondrous” possession. And so, Catholicism 
provided him with a mechanism to explain what he “tasted” and “felt” in Sweetie’s 
kitchen, as he gulped down her leftovers “along with [her stories] about the strange and 
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nourishing beginning times” (10). He came to regard his struggle to understand his 
grandmother in sacramental terms, since—like the priests whom he served at church—the 
inscrutability of her voice indicated the presence of “the dead brought back to life” (286).   
 It was at the times Sweetie’s stories were most confusing and difficult to follow 
that Nathaniel took to imagining them as “Catholic mysteries.” For in those moments, 
when her words became incomprehensible to him, he witnessed the emergence of ghostly 
spirits: lost souls from slave times, who suddenly appeared where they had not been 
before—“in all of the parts of her stories that Great-Momma Sweetie always left out, 
even as she added to her stories inside of stories” (10). Just as Jesus was said to reveal 
himself at Mass through the priests’ mysterious mediation, so too did Nathaniel relate the 
halting and mystifying way his grandmother spoke to the appearance of all these forms of 
“dead life” that surrounded him in her kitchen. In his mind, then, there developed an 
indelible connection between “the mystery of history” revealed through the spirits that 
possessed Sweetie’s storytelling and the mystery of Christ’s sacramental revelation (9).  
 As a child, this connection brought him comfort, because it was premised on the 
existence of a supernatural truth that was both absolute and eternal. In other words, 
Nathaniel had faith that out of the obscurity of grandmother’s language, he would 
ultimately be granted full knowledge of his past. This was, for him, akin to believing in 
the miracle of the Eucharistic sacrament—that when he was old enough to receive his 
First Holy Communion, his body would “feel new and wondrous” as the meaning of the 
sacrament finally became clear. Significantly, though, by the time the novel begins, 
Nathaniel has rejected this childish association, agreeing with his Uncle Hampton that the 
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“Colored Catholic mysteries of the Mass only add to the mystery of our History” (10). 
Hampton had always been skeptical of Nathaniel’s tendency to apply what he learned 
from the catechism and from Aunt DuDora to his own family’s experience, warning that 
Catholicism would make the boy “more mucked up than…those Creoles” (10). He was 
implying, of course, that due to the historic racism of the Catholic church, Nathaniel 
should avoid using its doctrines as a means of understanding a past that was already 
hopelessly out of reach. Better, Hampton cautioned his nephew, to study Frederick 
Douglass and the verifiable “wonders” of his story than to seek truth from an institution 
that had systematically threatened and abused its black congregants. The warning 
obviously stayed with Nathaniel, since as an adult, his reverence for Catholic mysteries 
has diminished. Now, in the novel’s present, when he listens to his grandmother’s 
storytelling, he thinks “yes, give me Frederick Douglass,” instead of the sacraments of his 
youth (10). If his conscious thoughts turn to Catholicism at all, it is to recall the “guilt 
and fear” priests made him feel about his burgeoning sexuality (82), or that time white 
Catholics burned down their own cathedral “rather than see it be turned over to the 
coloreds” (65). 
 Thus, the young man we meet at the start of Two Wings is highly attuned to the 
social and theological inconsistencies of his boyhood experience with Catholicism. He 
laughs, from both shame and bemusement, at the way he had for many years “stubbornly 
held to this idea,” inspired by the Catholic Mass, that Sweetie’s “special gift of entering 
another world of hearing and seeing” was endowed to her by God (6). Given how his 
grandmother has broken from organized religion, imagining her stories as sacraments 
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now seems ridiculous to him—made all the more so when she reminds him, “I’m not 
Catholic” (250). Accordingly, in preparing to receive her answer to the question about his 
grandfather that occasions the novel, Nathaniel takes a classically rationalist approach, 
which establishes his ambivalence towards Catholicism and the doctrine of theological 
mysteries that undergirds it. Rather than faithfully accepting as he did as a child that 
supernatural truths are beyond human reason, he vows to record everything Sweetie tells 
him in longhand on a pad of yellow legal paper, in order “to bring all of the recollections 
together” in a way that will finally unlock their meaning (7). His quest for historical 
knowledge is therefore coextensive with his turn away from Catholicism, since Catholic 
theology, for him, signifies an inscrutability that, having reached “his majority,” he is no 
longer willing to abide. 
 Nathaniel’s decision to capture his grandmother’s words in writing arises from a 
desire to make sense of what seemed insensible to him as a child. As he remarks to her 
near the end of the novel, just before she reveals to him why exactly she became 
estranged from Jericho: “it’s not for the story alone that I need to…get the story right. 
But to get right what is missing from you and me. Between us too.” Nathaniel says he 
wants “to know what is hidden from me and what you have hidden maybe from yourself, 
as unspeakable in the long ago” (250). And so, the act of transcribing Sweetie’s 
testimony becomes for him and for her both the best way to account for all that has been 
lost over the years when memories were too painful to speak out loud. In fact, it was 
Sweetie who first suggested that he “bring along a pen and pad, not a pencil either” to 
establish for all time a permanent and indelible documentation of their family’s history 
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(7). This would suggest that even she believes in the power of the written word to 
meaningfully convey something she found impossible to understand as it unfolded before 
her. Yet the novel itself seems determined to refute this suggestion, indicating again and 
again how “indecipherable” Nathaniel’s longhand is—a fact that the transcriber blames 
on his penmanship’s being “culled from a thousand influences, going back to the 
beginning.” In other words, when Nathaniel looks at the five legal pads he has filled up 
with Sweetie’s story, he does not see just his own handwriting but also the handwriting of 
countless additional scribes, mixed together in “a labyrinth of calligraphy” that appears to 
him “as whirled cobwebs spun back to dancing ghosts” (218). 
 Although Nathaniel has been the only one transcribing what his grandmother tells 
him, the polyvocality of her narrative translates onto the page, changing how he shapes 
each word when different speakers take over the story from her. His very hand seems 
possessed, then, by the “dancing ghosts” that possess Sweetie herself, as she talks about 
her past. Nathaniel, in fact, imagines a direct correlation between his grandmother’s 
physical form—which trembles with the presence of ancestral spirits—and the letters he 
has inscribed on the legal pad: “Ah, the characters within her cedar-colored clay, the 
richest kind and kin of calligraphy in its broadness, he thought” (220). To him, both 
“texts” are haunted with the voices of many different authors, whose distinct perspectives 
challenge and confound the possibility of finding a single explanation for the history 
being recalled. Even when Nathaniel endeavors to write that history himself, he finds 
there is no way to manage the competing discourses intruding “from the boundaries” of 
the document (218). Thus he discovers that his own writing reflects precisely what he 
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always found so frustrating about the family stories he used to listen to as a child. It is 
replete with the same gaps and inconsistencies and circumventions, which mystified him 
in his youth. Confronting his failure to achieve coherence in this regard proves almost as 
difficult for Nathaniel as contending with the startling revelation Sweetie makes at the 
conclusion of her testimony: that the baby she raised as her son—Nathaniel’s father, 
Arthur—was actually the “bastard” child of Jericho and a teenage girl named Lucasta 
Jones.  
 For a young man hoping to achieve mastery over his past by sorting out all the 
divergent strands of his grandmother’s memories, the revelation amounts to a devastating 
blow, because it all but confirms the impossibility of constructing a coherent meaning out 
of the information Sweetie gives him. Indeed, what she reveals upsets the balance of 
every other historical “certainty” on which Nathaniel had come to stake his identity: his 
grandfather’s integrity, his father’s legitimacy, his own blood-ties to his grandmother. If 
all that Sweetie says is true, no part of his personal history can be thought of in the same 
definitive terms again. In response, then, he asks her something that exposes just how lost 
he feels by the close of the novel: “Is nothing as it seems but the visions we have in 
nightmares that demand that we question the easy sleeve of sleep?” (282). After listening 
to his grandmother talk for hours upon hours on subjects he had long been wanting to 
learn about—to bring “order” to his existence—he ends up even more disordered than he 
was previously, unable finally to distinguish between the imaginary and the real. Notably, 
the disorientation and utter lack of resolution he experiences at the conclusion of his 
grandmother’s narrative mirrors the way Sweetie herself felt following I.V.’s death-bed 
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confession. Like Nathaniel, she had at one time sought answers for the aspects of her life 
that were inexplicable to her. In particular, she wanted to know why her father sent her 
away in the aftermath of the Civil War, choosing to remain loyal to his former master 
rather than building a home together with the only family he had left. The reason behind 
I.V.’s decision had always been a mystery to Sweetie—as nonsensical to her as portions 
of Nathaniel’s past were to him. And so, upon receiving news of her father’s imminent 
death in 1904, she traveled to see him, hoping to understand what motivated him to ship 
her North at the age of fifteen for an arranged marriage with a man forty years her senior. 
But, as she recounts to Nathaniel by way of the story that takes up half the novel, I.V.'s 
explanation does not resolve the uncertainties in her biography; it only compounds them, 
since—as she says—“truth never had a pumping bloodline to [his] heart,” even while he 
lies dying (143). 
 The tale of Sweetie’s visit to I.V. thus doubles the sense of irresolvability that 
Nathaniel confronts as his grandmother’s narrative concludes. Although the former 
slave’s deathbed confession ostensibly sheds some light on the secrets that have plagued 
the Witherspoon family from the beginning (explaining, among other things, why 
Sweetie and Jericho were married in the first place as well as the resentment that ruined 
their relationship), it ultimately opens up more questions than it answers. For the history 
that I.V. provides is, like that of his daughter, multidirectional and multivoiced: a 
composite of many conflicting perspectives, which shift and contradict each other as he 
talks. In fact, I.V. was famous for being able to impersonate anyone he heard—and 
Sweetie remembers “he was known to have a thousand voices by the old slaves, in the 
	  	   	  
152	  
old days! From old Master Rollins Reed—to birdcalls” (56). In the view of Nathaniel’s 
grandmother, this renders every word of his testimony untrustworthy, given the way he 
could turn, in a flash, into someone other than himself, his very soul “going off in seven 
different directions” at once, as alternative narrators speak through him (148). Therefore, 
it appears that Sweetie also understands what it is like to try to wrest meaning out of a 
story possessed by numerous speakers—that she, too, has struggled to make sense of “the 
multilayered collectivity” of voices that give radically divergent interpretations of the 
past. For that reason, Nathaniel comes to regard her experience with I.V. as a model for 
how he might approach the “indecipherable” words transcribed by his aching, burning 
hand over five pads of yellow paper. Specifically, he thinks about how “in her retelling” 
of I.V.’s confession his grandmother added yet another layer to the narrative, 
transforming it with the sound of her own—unique—articulation: 
changing, now-you-see-him, now-you-don’t, laminated onion of soul; 
beyond all peeling, but flavorful in the soup of any stewing story; and the 
others as well—pruning and culling, superimposing (editing?) even as the 
word was given to her, charged and changed. (246) 
 
 It is significant, I would suggest, that near the end of the novel, as Nathaniel 
comes to terms with the disordered and intrinsically unmanageable nature of the “saga” 
he has transcribed, his thoughts turn to what Sweetie did with the troubling story her 
father told her, half a century earlier. As he sees it, his grandmother was not merely a 
passive vessel through which I.V.’s voice—and the myriad other voices possessing his 
narrative—communicate. Rather, Nathaniel acknowledges that Sweetie plays an active 
role in the retelling, charging and changing “the word” that “was given to her” and 
transforming it into something that he calls “miraculous” (245). The image he envisions 
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is of a cook, whose particular talent involves bringing together many assorted, and 
potentially changeable, ingredients into one “stewing,” “flavorful” concoction. Since 
Nathaniel had always celebrated Great-Momma Sweetie’s ability to create memorable 
meals from the leftovers in her kitchen (he equates it to making “caviar out of short 
rations” [246]), this imagery recalls the times he spent with her during his childhood—
when he would gulp down her stories along with the food she prepared him, the “wonders 
and mysteries” of both churning deep “in his gut” like the Host he consumed at church 
(10). Indeed, the persistent inscrutability of what she tells him in the present moment 
reminds him of how he used to feel as a young boy, who had neither the knowledge nor 
the perspective to decipher the strange and halting way she spoke. Back then, as I argued, 
he embraced the mystery of Sweetie’s language, out of faith—premised on the Catholic 
sacrament of Communion—that the truth would at some point be revealed. And now, 
even though Nathaniel has long since stopped believing in Catholicism, the way his 
grandmother calls forth the spirits of her ancestors still evokes in his mind the Eucharistic 
sacrament, because it resonates with the transformative power ascribed to the priests he 
had served as a child. He goes so far as to say, “If I can be part of that transformation, 
magician-like, I’ll be happy to be quiet, if not still, serving as acolyte at her High Mass” 
(245). 
 Therefore, in spite of his obvious aversion to Catholicism and his desire for 
historical accuracy, Nathaniel seems to be reverting towards the conclusion of the novel 
to the very same sense of mysticism that he consciously turned away from in adulthood. I 
am arguing that this happens as a result of his increasing awareness of how mysterious 
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and unsettled his family’s past will continue to be to him—even once he has heard 
everything that his grandmother has to say. To put it another way: accepting the 
irresolvability of Sweetie’s story is commensurate in his imagination with believing in 
the sacramental rite of Communion, for it requires faith in “a higher stage of 
consecration,” which exceeds all rational explanations (244). After listening to her 
testimony and contending with the competing voices from their collective past, Nathaniel 
no longer feels capable of distilling a univocal meaning from all that he has heard. By the 
time his grandmother stops speaking, he knows his inheritance—the history she has 
bequeathed to him on pads of yellow paper, plus the assorted documents she used in the 
telling—comes not from a single source, but instead from a complex web of progenitors, 
whose individual experiences are hopelessly entangled with his own. Every word of this 
family saga, he realizes, is imprinted by countless hands, each one of which has some 
claim over how it gets told. In his very penmanship, he witnesses the presence of 
ancestors whom he calls the “black and unknown bards of Calvary, Auntie Foisty, Shank 
Haywood, Wayland Woods, Angelina [Sweetie’s mother], Grandfather 
Witherspoon…even I.V. Reed” (295). And because he cannot wrest possession of the 
narrative away from the ghosts who haunt his writing, the only option available to him—
as he see it—is to share the story with them, in all its harrowing complexity.  
 Embracing the complexity of the past is a fundamentally postmodern gesture, 
consistent with the antihistoriographical impulse of the novel as a whole. Thus, it seems 
perfectly appropriate that at the end of Sweetie’s testimony, Nathaniel would be unable to 
resolve the tension and conflict to which her historical account gives voice. According to 
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Byerman, “tension and conflict” are essential components of the “deeply ambiguous 
history” that Forrest sought to represent; his text therefore concludes without a 
conclusion, implying that “truth” lies “not in resolution but in the multiplicity of voices” 
that the act of remembering brings forth (145-6). In fact, for many critics, the implicit 
value of a polyvocal narrative is that resists closure, making it impossible to reduce our 
collective understanding to one person’s idea of what happened. That is why Ashraf 
Rushdy argues the trope of spirit possession has proven so useful to contemporary novels 
of slavery: because it promotes a communal (“intersubjective” is the term he prefers) 
rather than an individual view of the past (126-7).  
 Forrest uses the trope to similar effect in Two Wings, as suggested by the way 
Nathaniel comes to regard all his ancestors—including those he is not particularly proud 
to claim—as co-authors of the story he has just transcribed. At the close of the novel, 
then, readers witness a young man who has finally acceded to the dissonance and 
ambiguity that these many divergent perspectives bring to light, effectively giving 
himself over to the antihistoriographical approach that characterizes postmodernism. The 
text’s final pages find him in a state of utter incredulity, incapable of trusting even the 
most objective evidence about his past as a straightforward path to truth. Much to his 
grandmother’s dismay, for example, he swears that a tintype of Lucasta (which is labeled 
with her name) is actually a photograph of Sweetie’s mother, Angelina; then a few 
seconds later, he sees in her the image of his own deceased mother, Madeline. All three 
women appear to haunt the face in picture. This kind of uncertainty signals how difficult 
it has become for Nathaniel (and for readers too) to settle on a single, definitive account 
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of his family’s history, when it is possessed by multiple personalities, each with his or her 
unique story. Therefore, Forrest’s text accomplishes what Madhu Dubey argues is at the 
heart of paranormal literary devices like spirit possession: the drive to fuel “a strong 
reaction against the rational and realist principles” of modern historiography 
(“Speculative” 794). But what is so striking about how Two Wings ends is that 
Nathaniel’s reaction against rationality and realism constitutes a move towards 
Catholicism. For among the very last words he speaks in the novel is a Eucharistic 
prayer, in which he asks God to help him discover a meaning amid the overwhelming 
disorder of his grandmother’s narrative: 
Oh dear God, grant that through the mystery and the miracle of the water 
and the better grapes of Golgotha’s wrath and the broken bread of His 
flesh (all suffering together), we may know the meaning of our furnace-
refined chalice cup of suffering and affliction, forever, Great-Momma 
Sweetie, and ever, world without end…Oh, to live in luminous light ever 
rekindled is to live forever in doubt, as pure as faith is…(295, original 
ellipses) 
 
This prayer suggests that to Nathaniel’s mind at least, “communion” with the spirits of 
his ancestors—and the “mystery and miracle” that such communion entails—is still 
resolutely linked to Catholicism and his (child-like) faith in a truth beyond all reason.  
+++ 
 In both Gaines’s and Forrest’s novels, then—two works which are usually taken 
to represent vastly divergent approaches to the contemporary slave narrative form—we 
discover that Catholicism informs their breaks from realism, accounting for the disruption 
that alternative views of history bring to the text. Thus the voices that intrude on the 
narration, wresting control of it away from the primary storytellers, do so in a manner 
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consistent with how Suzan-Lori Parks and Ishmael Reed describe the trope of spirit 
possession in their work. But whereas Parks and Reed foreground the non-Western 
resonances of their possessed narratives, Gaines and Forrest filter their deployment of the 
trope through a Catholic sacramentality that explains the way it “explodes” realism. It is 
worth noting, however, that although I have focused on The Autobiography of Miss Jane 
Pittman and Two Wings to Veil My Face in this chapter, works by Parks and Reed also 
use Catholicism in ways that warrant further study—though not necessarily with respect 
to spirit possession. For example, Parks has said that she structures her plays as Catholic 
rituals, while Reed often equates excessiveness in his characters (i.e. excessive violence 
or sexual desire) with their Catholicism.  
	  	   	  
158	  
Chapter Three  
 
Catholicism and Narrative Time:  
Transcending the Past and the Present in Stigmata and Oxherding Tale  
 
 Temporal disjunctions—or the abrupt and often inexplicable ways that texts 
destabilize conventions of linear time—will, by now, be recognized as a common feature 
of contemporary narratives of slavery. To various degrees, all of the works examined in 
my earlier chapters bear witness to the alternative temporalities that I consider in this one 
and in the next. As we have seen, the tropes of rememory and spirit possession compel 
radically different representations of narratological time from the “straight line,” 
progressive chronology of realist historiography. For instance, in Beloved, which uses 
rememory to suggest that a slave’s traumatic history lives on in material form even after 
her death, the distinction between past and present is relentlessly undermined as 
characters encounter (literally “bump into”) the experience of their ancestors. Likewise, 
Gaines’s Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman interrupts the otherwise conventional 
linearity of its narrative with descriptions of spirit possession that emphasize the sense of 
immutability associated with slavery. These examples reflect what A. Timothy Spaulding 
has called “[p]erhaps…the most fundamental” aim of contemporary slave narratives: to 
“challenge our impulse to bury the past with willful ignorance or abstraction.” According 
to Spaulding, African American authors tend to “conflate time” when writing about 
slavery because doing so forces readers to acknowledge that the history of racial 
oppression in the U.S. persists long after Emancipation, thereby “expanding” their 
“critique” of institutional racism “to include a critique of its legacy” in the present (25).    
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 There can be no question that an abiding consequence of temporal disjuncture in 
contemporary slave narratives is, as Spaulding and other critics claim, the “conviction 
that slavery is not yet a matter of history” (Dubey “Neo-Slave” 344). This largely cynical 
view of race relations in the U.S. sustains a considerable number of works in the genre—
particularly those which deploy assorted time-bending devices to draw explicit, unsettling 
parallels between antebellum slave society and post-Civil Rights America. Indeed, the 
entire sub-genre of speculative or postmodernist fiction about slavery is typically defined 
by its resistance to an Enlightenment concept of historical progress. On this point, 
scholars have found widespread consensus: they consistently read the flash-forwards, 
anachronisms, and time-travel ubiquitous in these texts as indications of a broader 
skepticism towards modern historiographical methods which stress the continual forward 
movement of time.1 Ashraf Rushdy, for one, relates the disorienting temporal landscape 
of Ishmael Reed’s Flight to Canada to its author’s attempt “to sabotage history” by 
conducting a campaign of “ongoing guerilla warfare against the Historical 
Establishment” (Reed qtd. in Rushdy, 110). Rushdy’s analysis suggests that the 
anachronistic images of a fugitive slave narrator who watches television and travels by 
plane to such places as the White House contribute to the sense, pervasive in the novel, 
that the “cultural production” of contemporary society is still driven, more than a century 
since slavery’s official conclusion, by “the machinery of the racialized state” (121).  
 Along similar lines, the alternative temporalities of the two novels I analyze in 
this chapter do, undoubtedly, underscore the persistence of racial oppression in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On the scholarly consensus regarding historiographical skepticism in contemporary 
narratives of slavery, see Dubey, “Speculative.” 
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contemporary culture. Through their manipulations of past and present modalities 
(respectively), Phyllis Alesia Perry’s Stigmata and Charles Johnson’s Oxherding Tale 
implicitly contradict the principle that history moves forward progressively and linearly. 
So in that way they each might be said to confirm Frank Yerby’s oft-quoted assertion 
from the preface to A Darkness at Ingraham’s Crest: “American slavery lasted from 1619 
to 1865, two hundred forty-six years. It was further extended under various shabby 
subterfuges until well into the 1960’s, that is if one concedes that it has even ended yet” 
(9). But however much these novels participate in the historiographical critique that 
Yerby articulates in his preface—by using temporal disjunction to imply that aspects of 
the slave system endure well into the present and even the future—their representations 
of time are not as “pessimistic” as some scholars have argued.2 What sets them apart 
from other contemporary narratives of slavery, in fact, is that the alternative temporalities 
they imagine do more than just confront “the concrete and material connections” between 
the antebellum period and their own moment in history (Spaulding 29). The novels I 
discuss here actually manipulate time as a means of transcending those connections, of 
imagining a way out of the cycle of racial suffering they depict. That is, as opposed to the 
branch of speculative or postmodernist slave fiction that expresses its suspicion about the 
idea of historical progress by implying the interminable persistence of slavery over time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In her entry on “Neo-Slave Narratives” in A Companion to African American 
Literature, Madhu Dubey claims that “[s]ome variant” of Yerby’s “pessimistic view of 
US racial history impels most novels of slavery published since the 1970s, especially 
those that break from narrative realism” (344).  
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these two texts refuse to foreclose the possibility of moving beyond it.3 This, I hasten to 
note, does not make them any less critical of the “historical narrative of racial 
emancipation” on which modern historiography is founded, nor does it suggest they 
regard the future of race relations in the U.S. with any more optimism than do 
comparable works in the genre (Dubey “Speculative” 793). Rather, I will be arguing that, 
for the two novels considered in this chapter, temporal disjunction is itself the means by 
which they contend with the persistent trauma of the slave experience because it creates 
an imaginative space outside the limits of Western temporality.  
 In other words, the novels by Perry and Johnson (as well as Edward P. Jones’s 
The Known World, which I examine in Chapter Four) privilege temporal disjunction—
and the kind of aesthetic that foregrounds disorienting shifts in chronological order—in a 
way that distinguishes them from other contemporary slave narratives employing similar 
techniques. As these texts demonstrate, art that self-consciously interrupts standard 
chronologies of time has the advantage not only of upsetting the traditional 
historiography of slavery but also of promoting non-Western approaches, which have 
been de-legitimized in the West since the Age of Enlightenment. Stigmata, for example, 
makes a clear attempt to recover in its narrative (and in the artwork its narrative 
celebrates) an Africanist perspective of human temporality, while Oxherding Tale quite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Examples of contemporary slave narratives which deploy various time-bending devices 
to indicate the on-going presence of slavery in contemporary culture include Octavia 
Butler’s Kindred (1979), Jewelle Gomez’s The Gilda Stories (1991), Steven Barnes’s 
Blood Brothers (1996), and James McBride’s A Song Yet Sung (2008). Through 
descriptions of time-travel, vampires, possession, and paranormal vision these speculative 
novels support the “pessimistic view” of race relations in the U.S., which Dubey 
associates with “most” slave fiction produced after 1970.  
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baldly proclaims the influence of Eastern religions (Buddhism primarily, but also 
Hinduism and Taoism) on its narratological structure and on how it orders events. 
Ultimately, it is as a result of these non-Western conceptions of time that both these 
novels imagine the potential for a future liberated from the legacy of slavery—a future in 
which it might be possible to transcend, or at least to transform, that legacy through art. 
 Yet what is striking about the non-Western temporal modes that each of the 
novels privileges is how dramatically they are informed by Catholicism. Specifically, as I 
will demonstrate in the following, their alternative temporalities reveal a strange and 
often disconcerting faithfulness to the theology of time that Augustine of Hippo laid out 
in The Confessions. Since Augustinian theology has had such formative, lasting 
consequences for Western Christianity, and for Catholicism in particular, it might appear 
contradictory to insist upon its relevance here in the novels under consideration, which 
very plainly reject Western conceptions of chronological progress. However, I endeavor 
to suggest that theological contradictions of this sort actually sustain the way these texts 
distort the accepted historiography of slavery.   
I. Embodying the Past: Phyllis Aleshia Perry’s Stigmata 
 I turn first to Stigmata, which engages more overtly with Catholicism than 
perhaps any of the texts in this study. The novel’s title refers to wounds resembling those 
endured by Jesus during the crucifixion that are believed to mysteriously appear on the 
bodies of saints and other devout persons. Since the thirteenth century, when Saint 
Francis of Assisi had the first recorded case of stigmata, stigmatics have been celebrated 
throughout Roman Catholic Church history for the supposedly supernatural cause of their 
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suffering. And unlike other branches of Christianity, whose credence in the phenomenon 
has receded over time, Roman Catholicism persists even today in its veneration of 
“confirmed” stigmatics. As Phyllis Alesia Perry has explained in interviews about her 
fiction, it was the church’s veneration of contemporary cases of stigmata that drew her 
imagination to the subject. Though she was raised Baptist and does not identify with any 
religion currently, Perry attended Catholic schools as a child, where she says certain 
aspects of the faith had a tendency to “seep in” more than others. In particular, the stories 
of modern-day stigmatics stayed with her, “in the back of my conscience [sic], for many 
years” (int. by Duboin 642). These stories eventually provided inspiration for her first 
novel, in ways I will describe, and helped her articulate the struggle of its narrator—a 
young African American woman whose mysterious wounds correlate not to Christ’s 
crucifixion, but instead to the historical trauma of her enslaved ancestors. In fact, Perry 
quite explicitly foregrounds Catholicism in the text, using a Catholic explanation of 
stigmata (voiced by the character of a priest) to account for her narrator’s experience.  
 So it would seem that Catholicism is inextricably bound up in how Stigmata 
depicts slavery’s persistence over time and, thus, in how it challenges conventional 
narratives of racial progress. Yet, to this point, there has been no attempt to locate the 
theological basis of this connection, nor to understand the stakes of Perry’s appeal to 
Catholicism. Most critics regard the stigmata itself as a convenient, yet otherwise 
immaterial, vessel—an empty signifier—that Perry deploys for the sole purpose of 
expressing the supernatural phenomenon of time travel at the novel’s center. Indeed, 
Perry herself has described stigmata in similar terms. But, as I will demonstrate, readings 
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like these neglect the very palpable ways that Catholic theology informs the novel, 
specifically with regard to the temporal disruptions which define its narratological 
structure. I argue that the narratological structure of Stigmata and the temporal 
disruptions that constitute it actually depend on a fundamentally Catholic conception of 
time, which Augustine developed originally in the Confessions. Acknowledging the 
novel’s recourse to an Augustinian logic of temporal unknowability is vital, I argue 
further, if we seek to understand the reconciliatory power it assigns to art. For, despite 
Perry’s intentions to excise the religious symbolism of her narrator’s stigmata, the text 
repeatedly—and somewhat problematically—reinscribes the theological significance of 
the wound by associating it with aesthetic production. 
+ + + 
 Stigmata recounts the story of Lizzie DuBose4: a thirty-four-year old woman who, 
in the opening scene of the novel, is preparing to be released from the psychiatric hospital 
where she had been confined for over a decade. At present the year is 1994, a fact 
indicated by the chapter heading. But the narrative soon shifts abruptly in time—first 
backwards to 1898, by way of a journal entry that contains the first-person testimony of a 
former slave; then ahead to 1974, when Lizzie started to experience the early symptoms 
of the mental disorder with which she would eventually be diagnosed. Each subsequent 
chapter follows a similar pattern of temporal disjuncture, as the text moves back and forth 
between distinct moments in history without a clear sense of what compels these 
narratological turns. It is in fact the central conceit of the novel that its alternative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Though Lizzie’s last name has obvious resonances with W.E.B. DuBois’s, Perry insists 
she was thinking of her own family’s history when she chose it (see int. by Duboin).   
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temporality mirrors the pathology of Lizzie’s psychotic episodes. Ever since exploring 
the contents of a trunk belonging to her deceased grandmother when she was fourteen, 
Lizzie has been subject to disorienting breaks from reality, during which she either 
travels to an historical period far removed from her own or speaks with the voice of a 
long-dead ancestor. In roughly equivalent fashion, then, Perry’s narrative recreates for 
readers the sensation that Lizzie feels herself every time she is thrust unwittingly and 
usually without preparation into another temporal realm. 
 If this all sounds a bit like Beloved and the concept of embodied memory 
developed in that novel, I will affirm that the resemblances are palpable. As an early 
reviewer was quick to note, Stigmata was written “in the great tradition of…Toni 
Morrison.”5 Perry’s non-linear plot structure and often confusing lapses in narrative 
chronology recall Morrison’s attempts to engender a “shared experience” between her 
audience and “the novel’s population,” by snatching them “just as the slaves were 
[snatched] from one place to another, from any place to another” with no warning of 
where they were headed (Morrison, “Unspeakable” 32). Similarly, in Stigmata, the act of 
reading enacts not only the displacement Lizzie suffers as result of her psychiatric 
condition, but also the displacement her African ancestors felt when they were kidnapped 
and sold into slavery. Lizzie’s “illness” and the trauma associated with it are, indeed, 
intimately connected throughout the text to the memories of her great-great-grandmother, 
Ayo: a woman who was taken as a girl from Africa and forced to endure the horrors of 
the Middle Passage before being dragged “like a sack of meal” from one New World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 From Evelyn Coleman’s “Advance Praise for Stigmata,” published on the cover of the 
novel’s first Hyperion edition. 
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slave market to the next (55). For most of her life, Lizzie has been remembering Ayo’s 
past as if it were her own—despite never meeting her great-great-grandmother and 
knowing almost nothing about what she experienced during slavery. Initially, these 
recollections came in the form of terrible “visions,” which were likely triggered by the 
journal Lizzie found among her family’s possessions when she was still a child; but, as 
she got older, Lizzie started to feel Ayo’s pain, along with the slavegirl’s “fear” and 
“blood,” coursing through her own body (175). Her physical identification with Ayo 
grew to such an extent that she would bleed from the very places where her great-great-
grandmother was scarred by the slavemaster’s whips and shackles.  
 Clearly, then, it is not just in terms of narratological structure that Stigmata 
supports comparisons to Morrison’s writing. The novel’s content, too, is deeply indebted 
to the idea—rooted in rememory—that traumatic experiences do not die with the person 
to whom they belonged; they “stay…out there, in the world,” as Sethe explains in 
Beloved, “waiting for” future generations to experience them again (43-4). Like Sethe, 
Lizzie insists that the phenomenological effects of Ayo’s memories exceed anything she 
could think up on her own. She believes her maternal ancestor has actually passed on to 
her, the way one might hand down any other kind of material possession, “the terror” she 
lived through as slave. Now, she says, “every…part” of that ugly history “belongs to me” 
(Stigmata 175). In language strikingly reminiscent of the famous scene from Beloved, 
where Sethe invokes the word “rememory” for the first time, Lizzie describes the 
sensation in the following way: 
What I’m trying to tell you is that these are memories, that’s what 
they feel like. And when the…conditions, I guess…are right, they’re 
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more than memory, they’re events. They’re replays of things that 
have already happened. Do you understand? I’m there, I see things, I 
hear things, I feel everything that’s going on […] Truthfully? No. I 
don’t think they’re dreams. (139) 
 
The point Lizzie tries to make here is precisely the one Sethe makes to her daughter, 
Denver, in Morrison’s novel: that these encounters with the dead conjure up more than a 
mental image of the past in dreams (or what Sethe dismisses as “a thought picture”). Both 
characters emphasize the tangibility of the memories they experience by detailing their 
sensory responses to them. For these women, the body itself—the way it sees, hears and 
feels—establishes the truthfulness of their claims. At one point, when discussing how she 
“remembers” Ayo, Lizzie simply holds out her arm, as though the “faint reddish mark” 
on her wrist proves beyond any possibility of doubt that she is the living embodiment of 
her great-great-grandmother’s suffering (138).  
 But, of course, whereas the concept of embodied memory is legitimized within 
the context of Morrison’s narrative, Stigmata refrains from making an equivalent gesture. 
Indeed, one noteworthy difference between Perry’s novel and Beloved is the way the 
larger African American community responds to the supernatural experience that each 
woman describes. As opposed to Sethe, whose family and neighbors eventually confront 
the truth of what she says (in the materialization of her murdered daughter, whose 
physical presence they cannot deny), Lizzie struggles to convince nearly everyone in her 
life of her relationship with her ancestors. The community’s resistance to Lizzie’s version 
of the past is underscored in the first pages of the novel when Dr. Harper, a young 
clinician with “Pretty brown skin,” quizzes her on the day she is scheduled to be released 
from the hospital (2). More than any of the other psychiatrists who cared for her during 
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her long confinement, Harper was the one “who really got to” Lizzie and made her want 
reenter the world—a fact she attributes to his race and his “familiarity” (4). Harper 
reminds Lizzie of everything she misses at home, and so she decides to give him what he 
and the rest of her community want from her: a persuasive account of “redemption and 
restored mental health” (5). This means she must disown the “fantasy” of embodying 
Ayo and accede that the episodes of time-travel she experienced were only elaborate 
delusions, resulting from a pathological condition. 
  Because “freedom” for Lizzie depends on her explicit renunciation of irrational 
beliefs, the situation she finds herself in at the start of the novel is not unlike that of the 
fugitive slave autobiographer, who for reasons of personal and communal survival had to 
demonstrate a capacity for rationalist discourse.6 Thus we might relate the way Lizzie 
“dazzle[s] Harper and everyone else” with her “story” of psychological recovery to, for 
example, Frederick Douglass’s attempts to distance himself from the “heathen” he was as 
a child (5).7 As Eric Sundquist has argued, Douglass felt compelled to construct a 
“traceable metamorphosis” of his life in order to show how completely he had absorbed 
the Enlightenment tenets of self-possession and objective reflection by the time he 
reached adulthood.8 Likewise, Lizzie takes pains to assure Harper that she has abandoned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a discussion of the lengths that fugitive slave authors had to go to prove their 
capacity for rational thought, see Olney. Lee discusses the ambivalence with which 
Douglass in particular often approached the rationalist imperative in his writing (95-109). 
I also consider the rationalist imperative of slave autobiography in Chapter One of this 
study. 
7 In My Bondage and My Freedom, Douglass refers to the child-slave “as happy as any 
little heathen under the palm trees of Africa,” thus purposefully detaching his younger 
self from the older (and more rational) adult author (35). 
8 See Sundquist 83-93. 
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the “Confusion” of her teenage years, to which she ascribes the erratic, self-destructive 
behavior that landed her in psychiatric confinement: “I lost myself there, for a long time,” 
she confesses. “But…I’m alright now. I just want to go home” (5-6). And, as evidence 
for her transformation into a competent adult with a rational mind—someone who can 
distinguish between the fantastic and the real—Lizzie grants, when prompted, that the 
wounds on her body were caused by her own hand, instead of by Ayo’s slavemaster, as 
she had previously asserted. This pointed reversal of earlier testimony once again calls to 
mind Douglass and, specifically, his notorious footnote from the Narrative, denigrating 
Sandy’s root as mere “superstition.”9 Just as Douglass seemed to understand that his 
audience would not tolerate any suggestion of the power of African root work, Lizzie 
knows her psychiatrist will refuse to sign her release forms if she continues to insist that 
she can feel her dead ancestor’s pain. Therefore, she refers to what happened to her as a 
suicide attempt, rather than risk further accusations of irrationality. 
  Her performance succeeds. Soon after hearing Lizzie admit that her scars came 
from a paring knife—and not chains and manacles—Harper pronounces her free from 
confinement, releasing her to her parents’ care. (As confirmation that she has provided 
him with the answers he was hoping for, he tells her, “You done good. It’s finally over” 
[6].) But even when she arrives home in Tuskegee, Lizzie feels obligated to maintain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is notable that the footnote about Sandy was inserted in the Narrative a number of 
pages after Douglass’s description of the root’s apparent success. In other words, it seems 
as though Douglass used the footnote to walk back the suggestion he gave earlier in the 
autobiography that Sandy’s magic actually helped him overpower Covey. Whereas he 
previously wrote that he was “half inclined to think the root to be something more than I 
at first had taken it to be,” in the amended footnote he refers to Sandy’s claims of success 
as “superstition…very common among the more ignorant slaves” (111, 119). 
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narrative that she “polished…to such a high shine” at the hospital (5). For most of the 
novel, in fact, it is solely the reader who knows that Lizzie faked her recovery and that 
she still believes she can travel through time to distinct moments in her family’s past. To 
everyone else in her hometown, including her mother and father, she toes the line of 
reason, recognizing that she will only be “rewarded” by them with increasing amounts of 
freedom if she proves to be “on the right side of normal” (26). This discrepancy—
between what Lizzie reveals in the journalistic portions of the text and what she reveals 
to members of her community—makes the reader complicit in a so-called irrational 
experience that other characters tend to pathologize. Not only is anyone reading the novel 
privy to the knowledge that Lizzie deliberately “fooled” her entire medical team with 
some “well-acted moments of sanity,” but we also learn quite quickly by way of the 
abrupt shifts in narrative time that the “madness” persists (6). She continues to suffer 
disorienting episodes of temporal disjuncture, with the reader as witness to (and 
participant in) her experience. 
 Sharing in the experience of disorientation forces readers to acknowledge how 
real the episodes of time travel are for Lizzie. Although this cannot necessarily protect 
her against charges of unreliability (Perry reports that she is often asked whether her 
narrator was actually “insane”), the novel’s structure implies that Lizzie’s clinicians and, 
by extension, her family and her friends have failed her in some profound way. Instead of 
providing a “cure,” their treatment plan only encouraged Lizzie to conceal her symptoms 
from them—a choice, it becomes clear, that proves as inadequate for her as it does for 
those who love her. None of her relationships will prosper, nor will her ancestors leave 
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her at peace, if she maintains the story of recovery that she delivered at the hospital. The 
stakes of Stigmata are unequivocal in this regard: to heal herself and her community, 
Lizzie must discover a means of communicating to them the truth about how she relates 
to the past. Most significantly of all, she needs to help her mother understand that 
denying the memories embodied in Lizzie is preventing them from moving beyond the 
hold those memories have on them both. Thus Lizzie comes to view it as her 
responsibility, as well as her singular mission upon returning to Tuskegee, to discover 
“the best way, the gentlest way” of articulating her experience “without freaking people 
out” (222). 
 The desire to make “the subject of my past” accessible to those around her is what 
drives Lizzie towards a new narrative form (222). Having determined that she cannot talk 
openly about traveling through time, she turns instead to the medium of quilting, 
clandestinely weaving scenes from her unspeakable episodes into a project of which her 
family can approve. Her mother and her father even contribute to the effort, not realizing 
they are enabling Lizzie to express something they had otherwise forbidden her from 
discussing (for fear of triggering a relapse). The “story quilt” therefore promotes an 
alternative means of narrating what happened to her, one with decidedly transformative 
consequences for everyone involved. As they work on the project together, Lizzie and her 
parents confront both the traumatic history that their ancestors lived through and the way 
that history materially affects the present—but they do so through a non-linguistic 
aesthetic that is inherently less threatening than speech or writing would be. To Sarah and 
John DuBose, who, for reasons not limited to the concerns they have about their 
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daughter’s mental health, remain unwilling to hear “’all of that…goddamn reincarnation 
stuff’” from Lizzie, the quilt does not necessitate a complete upending of their core set of 
rationalist beliefs (226). They can appreciate its beauty and the skill involved in 
designing such an intricate piece of art without acknowledging the memories woven into 
it. And yet, the quilt’s imagery and the strange, disjointed pattern of its fabric test the 
limits of the DuBoses’ rationalism, exposing them to a worldview that implicitly 
challenges their own. For example, Lizzie detects a feeling of wistfulness overtake her 
father as he gazes upon the near-finished design. (“My father the doctor, wistful?!” she 
notes in obvious amazement [195]). This nostalgic turn—as well as the burst of 
sentimental dialogue it spurs—stands in sharp contrast to the objective, dispassionate 
tone John usually takes with his daughter, and which she has always associated with his 
medical training. In the terms dictated by the novel, and certainly to Lizzie, Dr. DuBose’s 
reaction to the quilt is thus potentially enabling for their relationship, because it gestures 
towards a different kind of understanding that is not informed by scientific reason alone.  
 Though, while Lizzie feels bolstered by her father’s uncharacteristic display of 
emotion, her primary audience for the quilt is, first and foremost, Sarah. Indeed, as she 
explains to her cousin, Lizzie will not be able to leave Tuskegee or start making a life for 
herself outside her parents’ home until she can convince her mother of the material link 
between past and present. The success of the entire project for Lizzie hinges on Sarah’s 
willingness to believe something that she had been conditioned—from multiple fronts—
to perceive as irrational. Not only has her long marriage inculcated Sarah to Dr. 
DuBose’s empirical sensibility, but it is also implied that her religious faith and her status 
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in the community are at odds with what Lizzie is trying to accomplish. The always 
“completely composed Mrs. Dr. DuBose” has striven to make her life as orderly as 
possible: she attends (Protestant) church services regularly, maintains a pristine house as 
well as a pristine appearance, and seems in every way the model of an upper-middle class 
American lifestyle (19). That this value system predisposes Sarah against the disorder 
represented by Lizzie’s quilt is something Perry underscores rather heavy-handedly in the 
novel, such as in the following scene: 
  We’ve taken the quilt project out of the dining room—Mother 
cannot abide the scraps of thread and fabric falling and becoming part of 
the carpet—and to the attic, where we sit under the crazy whirl of the fan. 
[…] 
 “You could tell better what was going on if the pictures were in a 
row,” Mother grumbles, wiping the film of sweat from her forehead before 
continuing her task: tracing an outline from one of my drawings. “This is 
hopelessly jumbled.” 
 Mother made it clear early in the quilt project that she finds the 
design unsettling. I look at the outline under her fingers, which draw 
tailor’s chalk across midnight blue background fabric—the moments of a 
life moving in a semicircle […] 
 “Life,” I say, “is nonlinear, Mother.” 
 “Depends on how you look at it. You may see it as a circle. But it 
always seems like a line to me.” She puts the chalk down and wipes her 
fingers daintily on a paper towel. “The past is past.” (93) 
 
With her preference for narrative linearity and commitment to the continual, forward 
movement of time, Sarah gives voice here to a view of history that is classically Western 
in orientation. She appears to have assimilated, without irony, the totalizing rhetoric of 
historical progress that (as I discuss in Chapter Two) suggests modern societies are 
moving ever away from the “darkness” of the past and thus towards freedom, knowledge, 
and prosperity. The last line of the above passage makes clear that, as someone whose 
personal trajectory reflects a steady rise in both affluence and social prestige, Sarah does 
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not want to dwell on the struggles of her African American ancestors; to regard time “as a 
circle” would be, for her, to risk backsliding into a way of life she deliberately left 
behind. 
 None-too-subtly, then, in this passage and elsewhere, Perry correlates Sarah’s 
wariness about the quilt—and the “unsettling” nature of its design—to her desire for class 
mobility. Among the society the DuBoses have established themselves in Tuskegee, there 
is no place for anything that falls outside the bounds of the linear, progressive temporality 
to which they subscribe. That is why they were quick to send Lizzie off for psychiatric 
treatment when she first showed symptoms of an “obsession” with the past. And, 
significantly, it is also what renders her daughter’s suggestion that the “world…move[s] 
in cycles” so problematic for Sarah (93). A cyclical notion of time cannot be reconciled 
with the Western model she unabashedly privileges. Its vaguely African resonances recall 
a belief structure that she associates with ignorance and superstition. Sarah’s own mother, 
after all, as well other relatives on her maternal side were—in her estimation—inhibited 
by similar ideas. In fact, as the text hints, part of the reason Sarah fears the memories 
woven into the quilt is that they lay bare a connection she has taken pains to avoid: 
between the women in her family and a spiritual tradition inherited from their slave 
ancestors from Africa. Although Stigmata never explicitly connects Lizzie’s time-
traveling episodes or her view of the past to African spirituality (leaving ambiguous the 
source of her visions in a manner consistent with speculative fiction), it implies at various 
points that she comes from a long line of female seers, who share her supernatural 
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experience and abilities.10 Moreover, the novel’s prequel, A Sunday in June, which Perry 
published six years after Stigmata in 2004, explores the roots of this matrilineal heritage, 
ultimately tracing it back to Ayo—the very same slavewoman that haunts Lizzie. There, 
Ayo is figured as a “strong spirit, in life and in death,” whose conjuring powers are 
unmistakably African in origin (260).  
 A Sunday in June, therefore, makes plain something Perry intimates in Stigmata: 
that the tendency to pathologize Lizzie’s visions and to critique her cyclical worldview 
are symptomatic of a larger, cultural resistance to non-Western—and particularly 
African—modes of knowledge. In interviews, Perry has said she uses fiction to promote 
greater “openness about religion and spiritual experiences, meaning I would like for our 
culture to not have so many rules about it, or only so many avenues that are considered to 
be ‘normal.’” Both novels highlight what she called in 2007 an increasing “tension” in 
upwardly mobile communities of color surrounding alternative approaches to spirituality. 
Because, while Perry acknowledges that African Americans have been historically 
syncretistic in their religious beliefs, she claims the drive for wealth and social 
acceptance in the United States often negatively affects this historical sense of 
“inclusiveness.” To her, the wholesale rejection of traditional practices like root work, 
spirit possession, and mystical visions comes down to a “class issue,” because “one of the 
ways to ‘move on up’ is not to have these associations with Africa and African religion, 
or even Native American religion.” Thus, she conceives of her fiction as a vehicle for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For example, towards the end of the novel, Sarah’s Aunt Eva accedes in an aside that 
Lizzie is “one of you,” suggesting that her supernatural claims about time travel and spirit 
possession have precedent among the women in their family (218).  
	  	   	  
176	  
reclaiming a lost or threatened syncretism in the contemporary world, where the 
dominance of a monolithic Western value-system has made it harder for divergent 
spiritualities to “exist side by side” (int. by Duboin 643). In Stigmata, the reclamation 
happens by means of Lizzie’s quilt, which is, as I have been suggesting, a double for the 
novel itself. The circular and disjointed, yet not completely inaccessible, narrative 
structure of the “story” woven into it compels the DuBoses to share in, if just for a 
moment, their daughter’s supernatural relationship to the past. And although they 
willfully reject the irrationality represented there (as evidenced by Sarah’s attempts to 
straighten out its “jumbled” pattern), Stigmata concludes on a note consistent with the 
religious inclusivity that Perry espouses.  
 Indeed, the penultimate scene of the novel depicts Sarah’s response to the quilt as 
a kind of conversion experience. Witnessing the design for the first time in its finished 
form, she finally recognizes the memories woven into it and, thus, can no longer deny the 
devastating story her daughter has been trying to tell. The effect on her is one of 
immediate alterity: Lizzie notes, “Her face is wet and wild. I’ve never seen her look so 
lost, my always so-correct mother” (225). Yet, in the midst of this confusion—which is, 
of course, a consequence of having shaken her faith in the Western discourses of 
rationalism and historical progress—Sarah grants that what appears “crazy” to her is also 
true. All at once, the distinction between past and present that had defined her perception 
of sanity does not hold. She even communicates with the spirit of her dead mother whom 
Lizzie channels, effectively participating in an African-derived possession ritual that she 
would have previously deemed “insane.” This radical, transformative act not only affirms 
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Lizzie’s cyclical worldview and the temporal disorientation of the narrative depicted in 
her quilt, but it also—quite significantly—confronts the intergenerational legacy of 
slavery. As one critic argues, by engaging the voices of her maternal ancestors through 
her daughter’s body, Sarah is, at once, “ensuring the survival” of their traumatic 
memories and discovering how “to heal the rupture” those memories have inflicted on 
her own life (June 70). Thus, the scene ends with the image of the quilt sliding to the 
floor as Sarah puts her head in Lizzie’s lap and allows her daughter to “stroke the hair out 
of her eyes” (230). Ultimately, it seems, the two women have discovered together a way 
out of the tragic cycle of loss and misunderstanding represented in the design. Sarah’s 
now-clear vision suggests the possibility of a future that transcends the immutable pain of 
their ancestors. By first acknowledging and then “putting…aside when we’re through” 
the material link between past and present, the novel indicates she is free to move beyond 
it (228). And so, the quilt, like Perry’s text, has served the function its weaver/author 
intended, underscoring the redemptive potential of artwork that disrupts the dominant 
Western mode and challenges its audience to see the world differently. 
 The hopeful, reconciliatory tone of spiritual “inclusiveness” on which Stigmata 
ends, however, is complicated by the fact that the non-Western worldview which inspired 
it is validated throughout by Catholicism. In other words, Perry presents Catholicism as 
the authorizing force of Lizzie’s narrative and—by extension—of the transformative 
aesthetic vision her quilt (and thus the novel) confers more generally. The authorization 
comes by way of Father Tom Jay, a Catholic priest whom Lizzie meets while living in 
the psychiatric hospital, at the depths of her emotional and physical despair. Through a 
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series of short flashbacks, in which Lizzie describes her initial impressions of this 
“charity visitor” as well as the conversations they had during her confinement, Father 
Tom’s significance is swiftly established (208). First, he is the only person to perceive, 
and to state explicitly, that she does not belong in a mental health facility, stating within 
minutes of knowing her, “’You’re not like the others. You’re not babbling, no rambling, 
no talking to unseen people. Completely rational as far as I can tell’” (211). Although 
these claims of rationality are ironic on multiple levels (and not just because, as she is 
quick to confess, Lizzie does in fact have an active relationship with the “unseen”), they 
provoke her to speak openly with him about her episodes and the scars on her skin. 
Second, in listening to the “fantastic” account of “walking, talking memories and the 
lifetimes layered one on top of the other” in her body, Father Tom gives Lizzie something 
that manifestly changes how she interprets the experience: a name for the suffering she 
has endured. Simply hearing the term “stigmata” invoked for the first time brings her a 
degree of comfort, since the word’s very existence denotes a precedent for the mysterious 
wounds. Moreover, from the priest, Lizzie learns of at least one institution where her 
story could be accepted as “‘authentic’” (213). Within the Roman Catholic church, he 
tells her, stigmatics have been insulated against charges of insanity and, in some cases, 
considered healers—even saints. The fact someone like Father Tom would want to honor 
Lizzie’s “tortured flesh” instead of being repulsed by it is a “new feeling” for Lizzie that 
that impels her, in turn, to doubt the legitimacy of the system which has pathologized her 
from the start (214). 
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 According to Camille Pasquella, whose analysis is representative of how other 
critics tend to read Father Tom’s role in the novel, the priest helps “Lizzie begin to 
connect with the outside world” by “relinquishing the fear of what happened to her body 
and mind and discovering her identity in light of whom and what she carries.” Articulated 
in these terms, his character performs a valuable service, to be sure, but one not 
necessarily unique to him. Indeed, Pasquella brackets together the scenes involving 
Father Tom with a number of such “encounters”—Lizzie’s conversations with Mrs. 
Corday, for example, or her relationship with Anthony Paul—all of which also, she 
argues, constitute “an essential part of her psychological and physical healing (154). Yet, 
while the acceptance of a fellow patient and her lover is undoubtedly beneficial for 
Lizzie, I would submit that neither of these characters, nor even the transformation her 
mother undergoes at the end of Stigmata, affects her as profoundly as does this Catholic 
priest. It is Father Tom, after all, who endows her with language that bespeaks the 
sacredness of her experience (the importance of which is substantiated by the novel’s 
title) and convinces her to try to communicate that sacredness to others with conflicting 
points of view. In that sense, both the text on page and the quilt which doubles its 
narratological structure are the direct result of Father Tom’s intervention. For, the final 
chapter of the novel confirms that Lizzie’s aesthetic will—her drive to produce artwork 
which “overflow[s] with past-life episodes”—was cultivated by the priest’s insistence 
that she take a monastic approach to writing and creating. He encouraged her to devote 
her art to resisting the “unrelenting pressure” of “the world at large,” suggesting that in 
doing so is effectually “’clearing a path to your place among the saints’” (232).  
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 That Lizzie’s journals and sketchbooks are linked so unambiguously at Stigmata’s 
conclusion to Father Tom is suggestive, I am arguing, of how Catholicism shapes its 
larger narrative. This is a point necessary to make due to the gap in critical attention to 
even the most overtly “Catholic” elements of the novel and of, as my project argues, 
African American literature in general. Among critics who do consider the “religious 
connotations” of Father Tom’s influence on Lizzie, there remains little attention to the 
specific nature of the theology he represents. (Their focus is limited to the way his 
character highlights Lizzie’s “Christlike” capacity for “deliverance and recovery”—an 
argument that, while sound with respect to a Christianity broadly conceived, cannot speak 
to the priest’s particular denomination, nor to the theological justification he gives for her 
artwork [Pasquella 160, fn. 7].11) This oversight wrongly marginalizes the Catholic 
overtones of Stigmata, foreclosing questions that demand scholarly attention. 
Furthermore, it prevents us from contending with an inconsistency at the heart of Perry’s 
notion of spiritual inclusivenesss. Because if Catholicism, a sine qua non of Western 
religious orthodoxy, is really what instigates Lizzie’s artistic expression and what defines 
the reconciliatory effect of her art, then does this not further compromise the threatened 
(non-Western) belief systems that Perry aims to recover? Why, of all the religions she 
might have drawn from, would Perry choose to depict Lizzie’s redeemer as a Catholic 
priest, when she might just as easily have imagined another type of spiritual guide, maybe 
a conjure woman or roots worker, in his stead?12 What could Father Tom possibly teach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In addition to Pasquella’s article, see Duboin and Sievers. 
12 In fact, Perry’s second novel does this very thing. The redeeming force in A Sunday in 
June is Miz Willow: a roots worker, trained in the traditional African practice by Ayo 
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Lizzie about telling her family’s story or how to represent—to transcend—the traumatic 
history of slavery? 
 To answer these questions we need to attend carefully to the depiction of the 
stigmata itself, as both a theological and aesthetic concept, for it is from a stigmatic’s 
perspective that Father Tom spurs Lizzie to produce art. In particular, he feeds her 
information about “a devoted monk” whose name he “can’t remember” but whose “case” 
of inexplicable bleeding “is well documented with photographs” (213-4). The referent 
here is almost certainly Padre Pio: one of the most prominent stigmatics of the twentieth 
century and the subject of a protracted campaign for canonization during the time Perry 
was writing the novel.13 Perry has said that ever since attending Catholic school as a child 
and learning about religious devotees “like Padre Pio,” she “was just endlessly 
fascinated…with the idea that someone would carry someone else’s pain on their body.” 
In fact, she had been actively researching his biography (there was a file on her computer 
with “some notes” about him and other “famous stigmatics”) when the plan for her first 
work of fiction started to take shape. Yet, she describes the sudden realization that its 
main character would suffer the stigmata too as something she never could have 
predicted—due to the discrete and seemingly disconnected manner in which she 
approaches her craft: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
before her death. Just as Father Tom does for Lizzie in Stigmata, Willow uses her 
spiritual training to help two characters (Eva and Mary Nell) contend with the burden of 
their supernatural vision and learn how to use it in a productive manner. 
13 In 1998, when Stigmata was published, Padre Pio had recently passed the second of 
four stages in the process of canonization in the Roman Catholic Church. The process 
began in 1982, the year an investigation into his candidacy for sainthood was officially 
opened, and concluded in 2002, when John Paul II declared him a saint.  
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I have bits and pieces of things that occur to me, vignettes that I 
get down, but sometimes I don’t know that they belong together 
for some time. So I had the word “stigmata” in a computer file all 
by itself and I had [the notes about] Padre Pio. I also had the names 
[of the novel’s characters] in another file […] I don’t remember the 
moment when I realized that Lizzie was going to be stigmatic. I 
had the story and I had the character of Lizzie. I knew that I 
wanted connection between her and her slave ancestors. But until I 
put these two elements together, I didn’t know what was going to 
happen. (int. by Duboin 642) 
 
What is striking about the way Perry depicts the text’s inception is how closely it mirrors 
Lizzie’s own drive to write and to create. In other words, Perry suggests here that the plot 
and structure of the novel (“what was going to happen” in it) came into being only after 
she had a name for the “connection” between past and present that she had been trying to 
articulate—only after she was made to realize, by the chance proximity of files on her 
desktop, that there exists a language and a precedent for “the bits and pieces of things that 
occur” to her. As we have seen, Lizzie experiences a comparable rush of aesthetic output, 
following Father Tom’s revelation, his naming, of her wounds as stigmata.  
 Thus “stigmata” (Stigmata) is, as Perry imagines it for both herself and for Lizzie, 
a fortunate wound—a felix culpa, in the original, Augustinian sense of the term—that 
permits the articulation of new forms of representation. Hélène Cixous has argued that 
this meaning of “stigmata” sustains a great number of literary descendents of Augustine, 
all of which cite the bodily mark, the injury as a creative stimulus for memory: 
It all begins with a Felix Culpa. A happy fault, a blessed wound. 
Blessèd. This is what St. Augustine tells us in his Confessions. The 
remarkable fortunes of this thematics of the wound are well known 
in the work of the other Augustine, James Joyce, but maybe less 
perceptible or explicit in other notable texts. In Proust it is buried, 
one must exhume it. For Genet the wound is the founding secret of 
all major creation. (243) 
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Cixous’s analysis, as well as the neologism “stigmatext” that she uses to classify such 
works of literature and art, underscores both the sacred and prolific nature of suffering—
something that always struck her, she says, “as very ‘Catholic’” (244). She is referring to 
the theological compulsion in Catholicism to use the body as a way of remembering 
Christ’s sacrifice (manifest in the ritualistic performance of the Stations of the Cross at 
Lent, for example, and in the Church’s doctrine of transubstantiation, as well as in its 
persistent celebration and canonization of stigmatics14). Augustine’s Confessions and the 
stigmatexts that descended from it signify, for her, the textual equivalent of this 
compulsion, because of the way they circle back, again and again, to the memory of the 
primal wound, maintaining and reanimating its traces. In Cixous’s view, by making 
something out of his suffering and his being marked, Augustine, in effect, justified a type 
of narrative testimony that has been since exceedingly attractive to artists (herself 
included) seeking to mediate their “own relation to the inscription on the body of 
psychomythical events” (245). What Augustinian theology brings to bear on the 
“thematics of the wound,” then, as she sees it, is “the promise of a text” in which 
“resurrection is hatched” out of the aesthetic impulse to remember and to share one’s pain 
(xiv). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Sociologist Michael P. Carroll notes that although “some stigmatics have been 
Protestant, the overwhelming majority have been Catholic” and that “the correlation 
between the stigmata and Catholicism” still persists today, whereas such a correlation has 
fallen away in the Protestant tradition (80-81). Thus, the Catholic Church’s ongoing 
policy of honoring stigmatics, like its doctrine of transubstantiation and the ritualistic 
performances of the Stations of the Cross celebrated during Lent, speaks to the rather 
exceptional means by which the body in Catholicism mediates memory. 
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 I want to claim that Father Tom performs a similar function in Stigmata—that his 
role in the novel and the theological validation he gives to Lizzie’s art are Augustinian in 
the way that Cixous means. To understand why this matters and how a fundamentally 
Catholic aesthetics could inform a text so clearly opposed to Western narratives of 
progress will require a brief explanation of Augustine’s theology of felix culpa, as well as 
the complex temporal theory which undergirds it. As Cixous indicates, the Confessions 
both endorses and gives rise to a memorializing compulsion in literature that posits 
“traumatism”—the continual revisiting of historical injuries in the form of a stigmatext—
“as an opening to the future of the wound” (xiv). The premise that narrating the past 
involves the simultaneous actions of looking back and looking forward is founded on 
Augustine’s construct of the threefold present, developed in Book XI. Because, unlike 
God, human beings are intrinsically incapable of measuring time with any precision 
(given the non-being of time itself), he writes that our only option for contending with 
this ontological aporia is by rethinking the past and the future as temporal qualifications 
of our experience of the present. Hence, for Augustine, the present insofar as we are 
“permitted to speak” of it comprises three separate modalities at once: “a present of 
things past, a present of things present, and a present of things to come” (11.20. 26). The 
tripartite structure of time comes into play whenever we attempt to narrate suffering, he 
asserts, because it remains the sole means available for expressing the trauma of human 
existence (and thus the stigma of our essential difference from God). That is to say: by 
meditating on—and giving language to—the impossibility of distinguishing between a 
past, present, and future time, we acknowledge “just how distended and scattered our 
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temporal lives are” in contrast to the forever stillness of the eternal Word (Kearney 149). 
Yet, far from succumbing to hopelessness in the face of eternity, these meditations on the 
non-being of temporality, according to the logic of the Confessions, represent an 
eschatological desire for reconciliation which confirms one’s faith in the transcendent 
power of God. 
 While Cixous is not especially interested in confirming the power of God per se, 
her theoretical investment in stigmata (and the stigmatext) alights on the relationship 
Augustine draws between the way we narrate temporal experience and an abiding faith in 
transcendence. For it was in the Confessions, she implies, that narrative accounts of the 
wound were first associated, through the figure of felix culpa, with acts of self-renewal—
and thus with the hope for some “blessèd” future time that transcends the here and now. 
In Perry’s novel, Lizzie ultimately comes to a similar conclusion about her own pain, and 
I am arguing that Father Tom is the one who delivers her there by way of Augustinian 
theology. Although he does not refer to Augustine directly, he invokes the construct of 
the threefold present when he tells her, “Maybe you’re marked so you won’t forget this 
time, so you will remember and move on” (213, my italics). His point, which she 
immediately heeds, is that instead of rotting away in the psychiatric hospital where she 
had been confined, Lizzie should devote her stay, like a monk in a monastery, to “quiet 
contemplation” of the source of her suffering (232). On its surface, the priest’s suggestion 
might not seem so different from what the psychiatrists and other clinicians were 
imploring her to do all along; Lizzie’s treatment, from the beginning, involved thinking 
and talking about the painful episodes she experienced. But in Father Tom’s phrasing, we 
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hear the echoes of something far more radical than a therapist’s invitation to discuss 
one’s feelings. We hear the echoes of Augustine’s famous—and disarming—thesis that 
the present (“this time”) exists only to the extent that we conceive it in our minds, 
through the fluctuating acts of memory, attention, and expectation (memoria, contuitus, 
and expectatio). By proposing that Lizzie’s mark, her stigmata, compels her to envision 
the past, present and future not as separate things in themselves, but rather as 
modifications of her own experience of temporality, Father Tom effectively asks her to 
concede how unknowable and immeasurable time really is—the very foundation of Book 
XI of the Confessions.  
 Augustine believed that accepting the unknowability of time constitutes a 
necessary step towards genuine faith. Therefore, he stressed that even the construct of the 
threefold present, which represents the human soul’s best attempt to make sense of “a 
present of past things, a present of present things and a present of things to come,” cannot 
hold up to scrutiny from without: “In the soul there are these three aspects of time, and [I 
do] not see them anywhere else” (11.20.26). As Augustine made clear, any means we use 
to measure time or to speak of what has passed and what is coming will always be 
implicated in the “tumults” of the mind’s “impressions” (11.27.36). And that is why 
Father Tom does not contradict Lizzie, when she responds rather despondently to how he 
explains her stigmata—murmuring “‘So, it is all in my mind,’” as though he has just 
confirmed her insanity. Instead of insisting that she is not just imagining the ancestral 
memories she describes, he says the following: “Nothing is that simple. I think it’s all in 
your mind in the sense that this person, this ancestor, is with you in some way, just as 
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Christ was with the monk. The merging of spirits and all that.” (213, my emphasis). 
Notice that, in trying to comfort Lizzie and convince her that he trusts her story, Father 
Tom applies almost exactly the same logic that her psychiatrists used to justify her 
hospitalization, telling her that the way she remembers the past is entirely psychological 
(a product of her mind). But, to him, acknowledging this fact does not discredit her sanity 
or render what she has told him any less true; quite to the contrary, he maintains it 
actually bolsters her chances of being “considered a saint, a healer” (213).  
 The theological motivation for such a claim, I would suggest, comes also from the 
Confessions, and the skeptical attitude towards time revealed therein. In other words, it is 
precisely because Father Tom—following Augustine—locates the measure of all time 
within the human psyche that he does not appear particularly disturbed by Lizzie’s 
nontraditional view of the past or her so-called irrational visions. Her experience, as he 
perceives it, is simply one among many possibilities for the way the mind conceives the 
“intricate enigma” of temporal existence (11.22.28). Yet what sets her apart, and places 
her on the path to sainthood, is how radically her standard of measurement diverges from 
the standard that has been normalized by a rationalist society. This divergence—this 
“separation from the world at large” that Lizzie’s unique memories afford—well poises 
her, in Father Tom’s estimation, to seek after something that does, in fact, transcend the 
limits of time: a promise of reconciliation and purpose to her life (232). For, as opposed 
to the clinicians treating her and the family members who hold so rigorously to their 
rational explanations of the world, Lizzie understands the feeling that Augustine 
described as being “severed amid times, whose order I know not” (11.29.39). She has 
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come face-to-face with the disordered and intrinsically unknowable aspect of time. Thus 
Father Tom encourages her to trust—to give herself over to—that sense of temporal 
disjunction, which, in Augustinian terms, opens one up to the possibility of 
transcendence. Like Augustine, he believes that attending to the great schism at the center 
of the human temporality will lead to an intensification of faith in that which lies outside 
time (i.e. the “Father everlasting” of the Confessions).15 And it is with this belief in mind 
that Father Tom directs Lizzie to submit to the strange, confounding, painful memories 
afflicting her, rather than to try to rationalize her experience. 
 Of course, Lizzie is not seeking spiritual transcendence or a closer relationship 
with God. Her concerns are much more material than that: she wants to know what “to 
do” with the lifetimes of suffering which plague her, the seemingly inescapable and 
immutable trauma of slavery that her ancestors have passed along to her (214). Therefore, 
the theological motivation behind Father Tom’s encouragement seems irrelevant to her, 
and she dismisses out of hand his suggestion that she is anything close to a saint. The 
frequent references to faith and holiness in the letters he sends her only annoy her, since 
she does not “feel very holy”—nor does she consider herself religious in any way (232). 
So the result of their conversation and ensuing correspondence is obviously quite 
different from what Father Tom might have hoped, if (as Lizzie’s father sardonically 
offers) the priest’s intention was, in fact, “recruiting” her “for the church” (217). But I 
stipulate that Lizzie’s reservations about the theology he espouses cannot discount the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As Richard Kearney puts it, “Augustine underscores the fact that it is in the very midst 
of our experience of temporal dispersal that our desire for some eschatological 
reconciliation emerges” (149). 
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impact Father Tom has on her or the radical changes he provokes. For, as the final pages 
of the text reveal, she discovers in talking with him a new desire to represent her 
memories in writing and in art. This will to create, which she describes as “a need…that 
wasn’t there before,” manifests itself in the journals and sketchbooks that she fills up 
with uncommon vigor, in the weeks and months following her initial meeting with the 
priest (218). As I indicated earlier, Lizzie’s aesthetic production—like Perry’s—is thus 
figured as a response to, and unintended consequence of, the stories of the stigmatics to 
which she was exposed by her Catholic “education.”16 And, because the novel itself is 
comprised entirely of those journal fragments that Lizzie wrote after receiving Father 
Tom’s encouragement, the priest has an undeniable and abiding effect on the work as a 
whole. 
 We should not ignore this effect, I argue, or otherwise bracket off its significance 
since doing so would be equivalent to denying the value that the novel assigns to artistic 
creation. For, Lizzie’s art—her writing, her sketches, her painting—is what ultimately 
enables her to recover from the devastating toll of psychiatric confinement. As she puts it 
in one revealing journal entry, the act of creating something out of her memories “eases 
my mental pain and illuminates it, makes everything swimming through my head 
touchable” (219). Furthermore, it is another artistic creation—her quilt—that accounts for 
the redemptive and hopeful tone on which the narrative concludes as well as for Lizzie’s 
reconciliation with her mother. The transformative power of art thus constitutes a primary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 My use of the term “education” here is not meant to suggest that Lizzie receives formal 
theological training from Father Tom; there is nothing in the novel to suggest that she 
does. I intend merely to highlight how similar the effect of learning about stigmatics was 
for Perry and for her character Lizzie.   
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theme of Stigmata, one that defines how the novel imagines getting past the persistent 
trauma of slavery. In no uncertain terms, Lizzie’s personal transformation (from hopeless 
mental patient to thriving artist) and the transformation of her parents (especially her 
mother) are mediated through an aesthetic experience that challenges the limits of 
rational discourse by incorporating past-life episodes. However, as I have been 
contending, the stimulus for this “irrational” aesthetic experience comes from an unlikely 
source: not from someone familiar with the particular worldview represented in Lizzie’s 
art, but instead from a Catholic priest. The way to make sense of the rather paradoxical 
function of Father Tom in the novel is by means of the Augustinian theology to which, I 
have argued, he appeals. Not only does Augustine’s skeptical attitude toward time 
provide theological justification for alternative temporal experiences such as Lizzie’s, but 
the emphasis he puts in the Confessions on narrating one’s suffering also validates the art 
that Father Tom spurs Lizzie to create. For a text committed to religious inclusivity and 
the reclamation of non-Western belief systems, it seems contradictory—troubling, 
even—to discover Western theology at its center. Perhaps that is why critics have tended 
to ignore or marginalize its Catholic elements. Likewise, it could explain why in the 
novel she wrote after Stigmata, A Sunday in June, Perry resists making any reference at 
all to Catholicism and depends exclusively on an Africanist conception of time as 
explanation for its temporal disruptions.  
II. The timeless present: Charles Johnson’s Oxherding Tale 
 The novel I turn to next, Charles Johnson’s Oxherding Tale, privileges temporal 
disjuncture in a manner similar to Stigmata. As in Perry’s text, the narrator’s 
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transformation—and potential for redemption—hinges on the alternative temporalities 
that define his memories of slavery. Except, of course, that Johnson’s narrator, Andrew 
Hawkins, is not remembering someone else’s suffering; his first-person account of the 
trauma of enslavement is distinctly his own: a tale told, as Johnson explained in the 
introduction to the 1995 Plume edition, from the imagined perspective of a more-than-
hundred-year-old freeman, who decides “at some time in the twentieth century” to write 
about the experience of being enslaved, escaping, and, eventually, achieving 
emancipation (xvi). So, on the face of it, Oxherding Tale adheres much more faithfully to 
the classic form of a slave narrative than other speculative or postmodernist fiction about 
slavery. Its trajectory follows a fairly straight-line progression from bondage to liberty. 
And yet, Johnson quite jarringly interrupts that chronological progress at various points 
to suggest the unfeasibility of depicting Andrew’s “journey to freedom” in any traditional 
configuration (xiv). These interruptions to the temporal continuity of the narration, along 
with a host of other meta-fictional and parodic digressions, are responsible for the 
transformative vision the novel promotes. According to Johnson, it is “technical 
virtuosity” and the drive to exceed the “galaxy” of “forms that are our inheritance as 
writers” that push literature “toward new possibilities,” thereby liberating a text from the 
limits of tradition (Being 52-3).  
 For African American artists in particular, Johnson regards formal 
experimentation as a necessary feature of the creative process that, in his view, is too 
often neglected in favor of ideology. He has been famously critical of fiction born of the 
Negritude and Black Arts movements, which for the “noble” purpose of “counteracting 
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cultural lies” and combating racism, “easily slips toward dogma that ends the process of 
literary discovery” (Being 29). In his doctoral dissertation, Being and Race: Black 
Writing Since 1970, he called for a innovative type of African American literature that 
would surpass the “depressing sameness” of contemporary publications in two ways: 
first, by drawing upon a larger variety of genres and styles than what is currently in 
circulation; and, second, by relentlessly—but “lovingly”—transfiguring those forms of 
expression through original interpretations (51, 53). Oxherding Tale represents Johnson’s 
attempt to make good on both of these demands. Thus, interwoven into the basic structure 
of a slave narrative are allusions to various fictional and philosophical works not 
commonly aligned with representations of American slavery, from Fielding and Sterne to 
Schopenhauer and Marx, as well as Eastern parables. Indeed, the novel’s title refers to a 
twelfth-century Chinese illustration series that depicts a young man searching for his lost 
ox, a Buddhist symbol for the self. The goal of combining—and then adulterating—so 
many diverse intertexts, Johnson claims, is patently different from that of postmodernist 
pastiche (which, as Fredric Jameson has said, constitutes a value-less imitation of past 
forms). Oxherding Tale endeavors “to move beyond the pastiche” and to “project a new 
vision” of African American life that is not beholden to any single, circumscribed way of 
writing (Being 53).  
 Specifically, Johnson says that he envisioned his narrator as “the first protagonist 
in black American fiction to achieve classically defined moksha (enlightenment).” By 
this, he goes on to explain, the narrative is intended to trace Andrew’s path towards 
“liberation from numerous kinds of ‘bondage’ (physical, psychological, sexual, 
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metaphysical) right down to the aesthetic preferences of one-celled chlamydosauria” 
(Oxherding xvi). At the conclusion of Oxherding Tale, then, Johnson sought to reveal a 
narrator who is not only free of the actual chains of chattel slavery, but also of the 
figurative chains that persisted for over a century after Emancipation—in the guise of 
“aesthetic preferences” which determine how he can tell his story. That latter set of 
chains, the result of proscriptions placed on African American writing by white and black 
audiences alike, finally gets thrown off towards the end of the novel in a tongue-in-cheek 
chapter called “The Manumission of the First-Person Viewpoint,” wherein Andrew is 
liberated formally from the conventions of slave narratives. Notably, his literary 
manumission from “the limitations placed on the narrator-perceiver” precedes his 
physical manumission and, the novel indicates, might even make it possible (152). The 
final sentence of the section implies that Andrew’s ultimate freedom in fact depends on 
his ability to write without restriction and without containment about the world as he has 
experienced it: “Having liberated first-person, it is now only fitting that in the following 
chapters we do as much for Andrew Hawkins” (153). 
 As a number of critics have argued, it is because of Johnson’s desire to transcend 
the (aesthetic) legacy of slavery, that he portrays time in multiple dimensions. James W. 
Coleman, for example, discovers in the temporal disjunction of Oxherding Tale a “deep 
faith” in the idea that at some future point “there will be a free world for black people 
collectively; or, if this is not true, black people will make a better world along the way, as 
they devote themselves to spiritual interaction with others and with the universe.” In 
Coleman’s analysis, the novel’s alternative temporalities reflect Johnson’s attempt to 
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move “in a moral direction” towards that final goal by undermining how slave narratives 
typically unfold. He therefore reads Andrew’s path to moksha as a corrective for African 
American texts whose emphasis on “oppression and struggle” suggests that “blacks will 
always be slaves, no matter what the laws and institutions of society say, and no matter 
what time it is” (633-4). Likewise, William Gleason demonstrates that Johnson appeals in 
Oxherding Tale to the tenets of Zen Buddhism—and particularly the principle of opening 
the “third eye”—in order to “rebuild the Afro-American literary tradition, in relation to 
which Johnson stands, paradoxically, as both father and son, looking optimistically ahead 
to the day” when its productions will not be circumscribed by identity politics and will 
have no particular history delimiting it (723). Both of these readings, as well as many 
others that followed, have highlighted the way that various Eastern religions (Taoism, 
Hinduism, and different strains of Buddhism) shape Johnson’s transformative approach 
to the historiography of slavery.17 
 At the time he was writing Oxherding Tale, during a seven-year period that 
preceded the book’s publication in 1982, Johnson immersed himself in Eastern 
philosophy, with special attention to “Buddhist scholarship.” That study, he says, and the 
novel that grew out of it, being structurally and thematically inspired by the quest for 
moksha, was supposed to quench his lifelong interest in Zen meditation. Ever since he 
first tried meditating as a teenager, Johnson had been avoiding a sustained commitment to 
the practice because he worried that it would restrict him from pursuing more worldly 
goals. Meditation, as he describes it,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For readings of the influence of Eastern philosophy and religion on Johnson’s fiction, 
see Little, Seltzer, and Storhoff. 
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radically slowed down my sense of time, cleared away the 
background noise always on the edge of consciousness, and 
divested me of desires. My vision was clearer; I felt capable of 
infinite patience with my parents, teachers, and friends. Within me, 
I detected not the slightest trace of fear or anger or anxiety about 
anything, [sic] Nor was I conscious of myself, only of what was 
immediately in front of me, and that, I assure you, was indeed an 
unusual experience for a fourteen-year-old boy in 1962. But…[i]t 
came to me that if I kept this up, I might well become too detached 
and dispassionate and lack the fire—the internal agitation—to 
venture out into the world and explore all the things, high and low, 
that I, as a teenager, was burning to see, know, taste, and 
experience. 
 
Thus, rather than committing to regular practice, Johnson implies that he sought to “deal 
with” these early meditative insights at first academically, by consuming “the major and 
minor texts” in the Eastern spiritual traditions, and then creatively, by incorporating into 
his fiction both his personal knowledge of Zen and what he gleaned about it from those 
texts (Oxherding x-xi). It is perhaps no great surprise, then, that in Oxherding Tale 
Andrew’s transformation at the end of the novel is expressed in terms quite similar to the 
way Johnson depicts his own primal experience of meditation. For the narrator, 
liberation—from slavery as well as from the formal conventions of the slave narrative—
happens in a revelatory instant, when time gets “suspended” and a “mystical feeling of 
transport” takes over (140). 
 That moment of temporal suspension, in which time moves neither forward nor 
back but appears locked in an all-encompassing present, structures Andrew’s journey to 
freedom and determines how the novel represents his final revelation. It is the textual 
equivalent of the feeling of immediacy that Johnson associates with Zen meditation: a 
disjuncture in the endless succession of “nows” that defines Western temporality and, 
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thus, narratives of progress.18 But as I show here, the narrator’s transformation is not 
determined by Eastern religious practices alone. In what follows, I argue that the Catholic 
theology of salvation informs, to a considerable degree, the liberation Andrew 
experiences at the end of Oxherding Tale, and that this theology creates an irresolvable 
tension in the way he becomes free. Arguing that Johnson’s fiction—and his fictional 
representation of liberation—is informed by Catholicism will understandably surprise 
some readers, especially those who are acquainted with his biography. For, unlike the 
other authors in this study, Johnson was never a practicing Catholic, nor did he attend 
Catholic schools, nor were any members of his family Catholic. In fact, he was raised in 
the African Methodist Episcopalian Church, to which he belonged until he “fell away in 
college from a belief in institutional religion” and began to study Buddhism (int. by 
O’Connell 24). Since that time, Johnson has referred to himself as “always” a “sincere 
Christian and a Buddhist,” whose personal religious identity incorporates diverse 
theological traditions, even though his “roots” are in the AME (int. by McWilliams 296). 
The inclusivity of Johnson’s approach to religion led him to study the theology of the 
Catholic Church, and he counts works by Saint Francis and Augustine of Hippo among 
those that influenced his interest in the “life of the spirit” (int. by Boccia 205). And so I 
argue here that his intellectual engagement with Augustinian texts, and the Confessions in 
particular, bears itself out in Oxherding Tale. 
+++ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Derrida describes the Western philosophy of temporality as a “succession of ‘nows,’ 
where we have a horizon of the future, the coming, the next now, the coming now” 
(“Composing” 23). 
	  	   	  
197	  
 Johnson’s engagement with Augustine reveals itself in the opening pages of 
Oxherding Tale. A quote from the Soliloquies is the first of four epigraphs introducing 
the novel, the sum of which quickly establishes a wide swath of Western and non-
Western influences. (Alongside the citation from Augustine are references to Rig Veda, 
Ten Oxherding Pictures, and a short story by Kafka.) Later in the text, in one of the two 
metafictional chapters that interrupts the progress of Andrew’s journey from slavery, 
Augustine is referred to a second time—and, once again, his name is listed among a 
variety of literary and non-fictional sources from which the narrative draws. Chapter 
VIII, called “On the Nature of Slave Narratives,” attempts to sketch out the history of the 
form that the novel ostensibly adheres to. According to the voice of the “essayist 
interlude” (which is suspiciously close to Johnson’s own voice19), Oxherding Tale 
follows the classic style of the fugitive slave narrative, an autobiographical genre whose 
formal components derive from a number of other types of autobiographies, all of which 
“are the offspring of that hoary confession by the first philosophical black writer: Saint 
Augustine” (119). By referencing the Confessions in this way, the narratological 
“intermission” endeavors to show that underneath even the most content-specific and 
original texts, such as “authentic” experiences put into writing by fugitive slaves, there 
lies “a long pedigree that makes philosophical play with the form less outrageous than 
you might think.” Case in point? Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the Life, now 
considered one of the foundations of African American literature, is modeled with “only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, for example, how closely the chapter’s description of the formal history of 
American slave narratives resembles what Johnson wrote about this same topic in the 
introduction to Oxherding Tale that was appended to the 1995 edition of the novel (xiv).  
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slight variation,” according to the author of this interlude, on the Augustinian movement 
from sin to salvation—a movement that was itself inspired by Plato and, then in turn, 
went on to inspire the Puritan version of spiritual autobiography (118).  
 The notion that Augustine’s Confessions provided the formal logic both for 
Puritan and slave narratives is not unique to Johnson, of course. Variations of this 
argument had been made by scholars of literature and religion for decades.20 But what is 
suggestive about its appearance here, in Oxherding Tale, involves the ambivalence with 
which the text approaches its literary forebear. On one hand, the author of the chapter 
insists upon acknowledging the influence of Augustine: “No form, I should note, loses its 
ancestry; rather these meanings accumulate in layers of tissue as the form evolves.” 
Evoking a palimpsest, an image used to comparable effect in Being and Black, Johnson 
contends that divesting any narrative of slavery of its Augustinian intertext would be 
impossible. So instead of trying to silence or deny this ancestral history, he (via the 
persona of the intruding essayist) implores the “modern” slave narrator to “dig, dig, dig—
call it spadework—until the form surrenders its diverse secrets” (119). The grim 
connotations of the racially-charged term “spadework” bespeak Johnson’s awareness of 
how controversial it is to suggest that contemporary African American writers owe 
anything to the canon of Western literature. And yet, due to his scholarly investment in 
broadening the number and scope of sources to which “black writing” appeals, he deems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For example, in his famous essay on the slave narrative form, “‘I Was Born: Slave 
Narratives, Their Status as Autobiography and Literature,” James Olney discusses the 
ways that the genre both incorporates and overturns the conventions of the Augustinian 
confessional mode.  
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it necessary to grapple with the layers of accumulated meaning that works such as the 
Confessions impose on Oxherding Tale.  
 On the other hand, though, there arises in this chapter and throughout the novel a 
competing sense that Augustine’s inscription on the narrative has been overwritten—or, 
at least, overwhelmed—by the sheer volume of intertextual references accompanying it. 
In other words, implicit in Johnson’s acknowledgement of the Confessions’s influence on 
his writing is an acknowledgement of every text, before or after, which has likewise 
affected the conventions of representing slavery (as the allusions to Plato and Douglass 
imply). And, as we might expect from an author with his academic training and wide-
ranging reading interests, those intertexts proliferate in Oxherding Tale, making it futile 
to try to excavate a single, fundamental archeology of its formal structure. The “hole” of 
influence “is very deep” and the “archeological work” so necessarily “slow,” the chapter 
seems to be saying, that it would diminish the reading experience in some significant way 
to focus too rigorously on all this excavated material. Speaking directly to the reader, he 
says by way of drawing these meta-fictional musings to a close, “already you are 
frowning impatiently, and with good reason, about this essayist interlude. (Only one more 
intermission follows; I promise.) We will, therefore, rejoin the action in Spartanburg, 
where Horace Bannon is unloading the human cargo from his wagon” (119). The 
abruptness of this transition back to the chronological progress of Andrew’s journey 
forecloses, rather strangely, the chapter’s stated purpose, which is to come to terms with 
how the form of the slave narrative has evolved over time. So, despite the light Johnson 
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wants to shine on the origins of the form, it is clear that he also views his own novel as 
unbeholden to its Augustinian—or any other line of—ancestry. 
 This two-part gesture of acknowledging and moving beyond a text’s formal 
predecessors, of course, constitutes Johnson’s optimistic view of the future of African 
American literature. What I have interpreted as ambivalence in his approach to 
Augustine, then, he would likely ascribe to “mastery” over the literary styles and 
structures implicated in his adaptation of the slave narrative form. For, as we have 
already seen, he promotes in Being and Race a type of writer “who slides from genre to 
genre, style to style, leaving his or her distinctive signature on each form lovingly 
transfigured and pushed toward new possibilities. No creator, black or white can be 
exempt from this standard. No genuine artist would wish to be.” The standard of genuine 
artistry that Johnson delineates both here and in Oxherding Tale pivots on the way a 
writer controls and manipulates the various sources alluded to in the work. According to 
his analysis, in the hand of a masterful creator, strands of influence are always in the 
service of something greater than their original function; thus, they should bend and be 
molded at will to whatever “new possibilities” the author endeavors to push them toward. 
Following this logic, all the intertexts of Oxherding Tale, including those that naturally 
“contradict each other,” would articulate Andrew’s path to moksha, the direction in which 
Johnson says the novel unambiguously moves (Being 53).  
 But, as I am going to argue, the intertextual engagement with Augustine in 
Oxherding Tale exceeds the meaning Johnson assigns to it. Indeed, the Confessions 
informs the novel on multiple levels and is altogether less manageable than the text self-
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consciously allows—to the extent that even Andrew’s transformation at the conclusion of 
the narrative can be interpreted in Augustinian terms, in accordance with how the 
theologian defined forgiveness. By this, I do not intend to suggest that Augustine’s 
confessional theology replaces the Eastern concept of moksha Johnson foregrounds, but 
rather that it supplements the novel’s totalizing vision of Zen-inspired liberation in ways 
that are worth considering. In particular, I want to claim that the “freedom” Andrew 
ultimately achieves depends, rather problematically it turns out, on the timeless and 
eternal logic of salvation espoused in the Confessions and reified for centuries by the 
Catholic church. As numerous critics have noted, the affirmative ending of Oxherding 
Tale is compromised significantly by the manner in which Andrew actually becomes 
free: he marries an Anglo woman and passes for white. Andrew’s passing has posed an 
insurmountable hurdle for scholars such as Spaulding, who point out that this act of racial 
denial diminishes the novel’s liberating potential, effectively proving that race, and the 
social systems that govern it, cannot really be transcended—neither by the principles of 
Zen Buddhism to which Johnson appeals, nor by any other textually constructed 
“solution” (91). Along similar lines, Gleason suggests that, to some readers, it will appear 
at the end of Oxherding Tale that Johnson “authenticates the very power structures he 
seeks to undermine (or, perhaps more indicting, that he never sought to undermine them 
at all)” (724). 
 Arguments such as these, which cast doubt on the terms of Andrew’s liberation 
from slavery and its legacy, highlight a fact the text leaves unresolved: that, in spite of his 
personal experience of freedom, the world the narrator inhabits remains “mired in 
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Eurocentric racial ideology” (Spaulding 91). This is true with regard to both the historical 
moment depicted at the narrative’s conclusion (in the early part of the Civil War) and the 
historical moment from which Andrew supposedly writes his memoir (roughly 80 years 
after Emancipation). Oxherding Tale never goes so far as to deny the persistence of 
debilitating racist structures in the U.S., either during the slave period or a century later. 
Yet, in keeping with Johnson’s own views about the transcendent possibility of art, the 
novel does imply that “great writers” possess the ability to imaginatively bypass those 
structures—because, as he put it in Being and Race, “language is transcendence and so is 
fiction” (39). Critics opposed to the idea that ideologies of race could ever be 
transcended, imaginatively or otherwise, are thus wary of how Johnson applies the 
Buddhist philosophy of moksha to the “dilemma” facing African American literature; 
they are wary of what Gleason calls “the liberation of Zen as enacted by Oxherding Tale” 
(725). One result of all this wariness has been a long and lively debate about the spiritual 
principles informing the final moments of the novel. Is Andrew’s freedom as consistent 
with “classically defined” moksha as Johnson claims? If so, would Zen Buddhism also 
offer comparable freedoms to a character who could not also pass for white? Does 
Johnson’s Eastern aesthetic have any real world significance for African Americans still 
contending with racism and the legacy of slavery?  
 Instead of directly tackling these questions (which are handled much more ably by 
scholars, such as Jonathan Little and Linda Furgerson Selzer, who have written 
convincing analyses of various Eastern religions present in Oxherding Tale), I aim to 
shift their focus a bit by bringing Augustinian theology into the conversation. It is my 
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contention that Johnson’s ambivalence towards the Confessions betrays an abiding 
attraction to Augustine’s timeless vision of salvation that he has, consciously or 
unconsciously, integrated into the classically Buddhist framework of the narrative. 
Furthermore, in considering how Augustinian salvation supplements the liberation 
Andrew achieves at the conclusion of Oxherding Tale, I believe we are better poised to 
address its problematic implications for the future of race relations in the U.S. Those 
familiar with Jacques Derrida’s “logic of the supplement” from Of Grammatology will 
recognize the gesture I am making: my argument turns on the idea that supplemental 
material can have unintentional—indeed “dangerous”—consequences for text being 
supplemented. In this case, the “danger” of the Augustinian supplement to Oxherding 
Tale is revealed in the unresolved racial tension at the novel’s end. Bringing Derridean 
theory to bear in this way on Oxherding Tale might appear counterintuitive, especially 
since Johnson is by training a phenomenologist, and even his investment in Zen 
Buddhism amounts to, as he has described it, his “own quirky variations on 
phenomenology” (Being ix). Derrida’s work relentlessly critiques the phenomenological 
approaches central to Johnson’s thinking about identity and race, and so I grant that 
evoking it here does a sort of interpretive violence to the ostensibly affirmative view of 
racial identity with which his novel concludes. Yet, as I hope to demonstrate, that 
violence is already written into the text of Oxherding Tale, by way of the (supplemental) 
presence of the Confessions.  
 For example, let us look more closely at the language Johnson uses in Chapter 
VIII to convey his novel’s formal relationship to Augustine: 
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In point of fact, the movements in the Slave Narrative from slavery 
(sin) to freedom (salvation) are identical to those of the Puritan 
Narrative, and both these genuinely American forms are the 
offspring of…Saint Augustine. In The Confessions we notice (and 
perceive also in the Slave and Puritan Narratives) a nearly Platonic 
movement from ignorance to wisdom, nonbeing to being. (118-19) 
 
I have indicated that the goal of this meta-fictional interlude is to establish—for the 
purpose of getting beyond—the literary ancestry of Oxherding Tale. The chapter 
highlights how radically the contents of the form have shifted over time, while their 
“movements” remain “identical” to those of the source texts. Aware that some readers 
might object to his unconventional adaptation of the slave narrative, Johnson’s “essayist” 
self-consciously deflects the critique by pointing out that a precedent for this kind of 
formal variation can be found in earlier narratives of slavery, the Puritan narratives, and 
even in the Confessions itself. Thus the bracketed nouns “sin” and “salvation” in the 
quoted passage are meant to show that authors like Douglass simply swapped out the 
Christological implications of confessional autobiography for a secular objective when 
they adapted the form to suit their abolitionist politics.21 But, as we know from reading 
Douglass’s Narrative of the Life, as well as countless other autobiographies by fugitive 
slaves, the religious content of the confessional did not ever really fall away as Johnson 
implies. Quite to the contrary, in fact, scholars of African American literature have long 
recognized the spiritual imperative of these antebellum texts; fugitive slave narrators, just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In this chapter, the essayist notes that Puritan Narratives, like Augustine’s Confessions, 
were autobiographical testimonies of having “accepted Christ” (118). 
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like their Puritan predecessors, were expected to testify that they too had been saved by 
Christ (as a way of justifying their own worthiness vis-à-vis the abolitionist cause).22  
 So the religious contours of Augustine’s Confessions are still, then, of great 
significance to the narratives of fugitive slave authors. I would submit that Johnson’s 
parenthetical references to “sin” and “salvation” suggest that those foundational Christian 
principles are inscribed in his narrative as well, and that they provide a necessary 
supplement to the way Oxherding Tale defines the terms with which they are linked. In 
other words, a full understanding of the meaning of Andrew’s “slavery” and his 
“freedom” requires understanding the Augustinian concepts that are bracketed to them 
here, in this passage. What is more, the two other pairs of opposing terms mentioned 
above (“ignorance” and “wisdom”; “nonbeing” and “being”) supplement the narrator’s 
personal transformation in ways that must be considered as well, if we endeavor to make 
sense of the irresolvability at the novel’s end. Indeed, Andrew’s journey to freedom is 
figured as the inversion of all four of the pairs of binary oppositions Johnson lists in this 
chapter, each of which is implicated in the revelatory moment of temporal suspension 
that irrupts in the final pages of the text. Therefore, that instant of timeless presence, in 
which Andrew becomes free from slavery and its legacy, is also commensurate in the 
narrative with his coming into wisdom, into being, and his spiritual salvation. 
 To perceive how these other sets of inversions inform the narrator’s Zen-inspired 
liberation, we will need to examine in more detail the transformation he undergoes from 
the start of the novel to its conclusion. Andrew’s journey begins, as most fugitive slave 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Pierce, whose scholarship traces the themes of spiritual enlightenment and 
Christian salvation in fugitive salve narratives. 
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narratives do, with his birth into slavery. Like a large number of those antebellum texts as 
well, there remains some uncertainty regarding the precise circumstances of the narrator’s 
parentage, though it is clear he resulted from a transgressive liaison between a white 
slaveholder and a black slave. Andrew rather humorously writes that since his white 
mistress/mother refuses to acknowledge him, he has only his father’s “version of the 
story” to go on, and that this may or may not be an accurate account of his origins (7). 
While the obscurity surrounding the event of his conception might appear to substantiate 
the narrator’s resemblance to other well known slave autobiographers (Douglass among 
them), who also knew very little about their progress into the world, it turns out to have 
an altogether different effect. In fact, the first chapter of Oxherding Tale amounts to a 
comical reimagining of the typically traumatic origin story of the biracial slave, meant to 
convey the exceptionalness of Andrew’s situation. It is a vehicle to explain the entirely 
unconventional education he received while enslaved on Cripplegate plantation—his 
extensive instruction in “a program modeled on that of James Mill for his son John 
Stuart” (12). For, in the context of American slavery, only an episode as outlandish as the 
one Andrew tells at the beginning of the narrative would account for his master’s 
decision to pay for the private instruction of his wife’s illegitimate, black son. And, as 
Johnson makes clear in the book’s introduction, it was essential to the structure of the 
novel that its narrator would “start his journey to freedom already knowing everything 
western intellectual history could offer…so that as he quests for a deeper knowledge of 
the self, he is poised for whatever eastern philosophy might offer” (xiv).  
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 Put in these terms, the Western texts that Andrew studies until the eve of his 
twentieth birthday constitute the “ignorance” from which his journey will ultimately 
deliver him; Eastern philosophy signifies the deeper and more profound “wisdom” he 
acquires when his transformation is complete and he finally becomes free. Thus the 
novel’s trajectory, from slavery to freedom, involves a playfully ironic take on the 
standard of intellectual enlightenment celebrated in the West. Rather than achieving self-
knowledge by “learning everything” in the Western scholarly tradition, he must learn to 
embrace what that tradition cannot provide—what, in Johnson’s view, it is fundamentally 
incapable of giving him: the radical self-less-ness or no-self intrinsic to Zen liberation. 
And so, after briefly explaining and then summarizing the education Andrew received at 
Cripplegate, Oxherding Tale immediately proceeds to chronicle its narrator’s progress 
towards a new (to him) Eastern way of conceiving the self that resists any attempt at 
categorization and containment. Andrew’s narratological progress traces, in broad 
strokes, the path illustrated in the twelfth-century Chinese pictorial-series from which the 
novel takes its name.23 Like the oxherder depicted in Ten Oxherding Pictures, whose 
seeking after a lost ox (self) leads him through a succession of experiences that culminate 
in his liberation from the very idea of self, Johnson’s narrator embarks on a quest for 
legal emancipation (i.e. self-determination under law), which also finds him moving 
progressively closer to Zen’s self-less ideal. Every step of Andrew’s journey, then, from 
the moment he leaves Master Polkinghorne’s plantation in search of money to buy his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For a thorough account of how Johnson’s novel dramatizes the Ten Oxherding 
Pictures, see Gleason. His article provides a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the 
narrative’s fictional re-telling of each of the images, which considers in impressive detail 
the way Oxherding Tale both confirms and reinvents its twelfth-century intertext.  
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manumission, contributes to his final realization that selfhood cannot ever actually be 
possessed since it is “interwoven with everything—literally everything—that can be 
thought or felt” (152). Thus the “wisdom” he arrives at when the novel concludes 
confirms the Buddha’s “no-self” doctrine, which teaches that “Grasping after self is 
clinging to illusory ignorance,” and that ignorance must be abandoned before real 
freedom is achieved (Burns 94).  
 In this way, Andrew’s transformation encapsulates and absorbs the “the nearly 
Platonic movement from ignorance to wisdom” that Johnson associates with Augustine’s 
confessional form (even though the “wisdom” he achieves is, at its base, antithetical to 
Plato’s own philosophy of the self). And, by pressing a bit further, we can see too how it 
involves that other pair of oppositions, “non-being” and “being,” which the novel 
likewise correlates in Chapter VIII to narratives of confession. At the end of Oxherding 
Tale, as condition of his liberation, Andrew radically shifts his view of what it means to 
be in this world. The shift is sudden; according to the “classically defined” experience of 
moksha, it happens in a revelatory instant—during his last conversation with the 
slavecatcher Horace Bannon, at the moment he believes Bannon will kill him. But, also 
in accordance with the framework of Zen enlightenment to which the novel adheres, the 
seeds for the narrator’s liberating revelation were sown much earlier on in his journey, 
when he meets Reb on the Leviathan plantation.24 In fact, the way of being that Andrew 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In his analysis of the novel’s dramatization of the Ten Oxherding Pictures, Gleason 
points out that the model Johnson explicitly drew from (an illustration series based on the 
earlier Chinese pictures by the fifteenth-century Zen artist Kuo-an Shihyuan) “describes a 
progressive movement toward enlightenment” (714). Each picture in the series, Gleason 
contends, brings the oxherder closer to his enlightement depicted in the last image. And 
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assumes in this moment clearly reflects Reb’s influence and the phenomenological 
approach his character stands for in the text. 
 Reb is “Leviathan’s Coffinmaker,” the man responsible for building the boxes 
that carry all of Flo Hatfield’s slaves to their final resting spots. A slave himself, Reb is 
the first person Andrew encounters after leaving Cripplegate under an agreement with 
Master Polkinghorne to work towards his freedom in service to Flo. The ominous 
connotations of being welcomed into his new role by a coffin-maker increase measurably 
as Reb refers to the narrator as “fresh meat” and then laughs, like “a hangman,” while 
showing him into the mistress’s house. “Had you entered with us that day,” Andrew 
writes, 
 you’d have passed through outside odors arranged in a strata so 
that we moved, slowly like a funeral procession, from room to 
room through curtains of smells that included cabbage, hominy 
made from Indian corn, and fresh fish. You’d have seen a white-
pillard doorway leaded with sidelights, then, as Reb stepped aside, 
an oak-paneled, high-ceilinged boudoir of whorehouse luxury (36) 
 
Reb later reveals to Andrew that, in his opinion, Flo Hatfield died 15 years earlier, the 
result of heart failure she suffered during her sleep and was ostensibly revived from but 
never really recovered. So, in one regard, the funerary images and “curtains of smells” 
redolent of rotting flesh in this passage point to her death—or, at least, to what Reb 
perceives as dead inside her. Additionally, though, there is a palpable sense here that the 
Coffinmaker is simultaneously conferring Andrew to his grave, by means of a luxurious, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
so, he reads Andrew’s journey in similar terms: as part of a cumulative progress towards 
liberation, in which every interaction along the way (with Flo, with Reb, with Dr. 
Undercliff, and so on) contributes to his ultimate “deliverance from the bondage of 
Samsara (both life and death)” (716).   
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“oak-paneled” box that smacks of uncontrollable desire. And, as we come to find out, 
that is precisely how Reb interprets the scene. Not only have years of experience at 
Leviathan taught him that handsome young men consigned “in the services of the senses” 
to Flo do not live long, but he also recognizes in the narrator a worldview that 
fundamentally contradicts everything he believes about the nature of being. Therefore, to 
his mind, Andrew has already died, consigned to a state of non-being the moment he set 
out from his master’s house in search of his selfhood. 
 Reb’s beliefs about non-being and being are determined by the (fictional) African 
tribe into which he was born. As he explains to Andrew, Allmuseri tribespeople hold fast 
to the principle that there is no singular identity. All life, as they see it, is 
interconnected—part of a vast expanse of Absolute being that resists individualization. 
Thus Reb rejects personal pronouns. In his native language there are “no words for I, you, 
mine yours,” and Andrew learns the Allmuseri “had, consequently, no experience of 
these things, either, only proper names that were variations on the Absolute” (97). This 
linguistic system makes it impossible for the individual to position him/herself in the 
world, promoting a set of communal values that recall the Buddha’s teachings on radical 
self-less-ness. Of all the characters in the novel, in fact, Reb comes closest to the Zen 
ideas that Johnson was studying at the time and later committed himself to practicing.25 
According to Reb, rugged individualism—or the desire to divide oneself from life’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For further discussion of the Zen values that inform Reb’s worldview, see Little 93-95 
and Rushdy 199-200. Johnson himself has also confirmed that the character stands for 
these values, saying in a 1987 interview, “Reb is the Zen Buddhist in the novel, and a lot 
of reviewers don’t realize that. They don’t know enough about other cultures to recognize 
him as such. He doesn’t operate out of desire, he operates out of duty. It’s duty that is the 
foundation for all his behavior” (int. by O’Connell 25). 
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diverse interconnectedness—remains a failing proposition. That is why he perceives both 
Flo Hatfield (a woman consumed by her need to satisfy personal desires) and Andrew 
(who wants to establish his place in society) as dead inside. His early spiritual training in 
Africa, combined with what he learned about the slave system in the U.S., taught Reb to 
embrace “self-obliteration” and, therefore, to neither expect nor hope for anything 
beyond what is immediately available to him; he grasps after nothing, saying “‘Yes’” to 
“suffering” and “misfortune.” While this way of living might appear to readers a sad and 
destructive consequence of Reb’s enslavement (the result of having his “food, property, 
and loved ones…snatched away” from him for over 40 years by an unjust institution), the 
novel ultimately validates its liberating potential through the narrative of Andrew’s Zen-
like transformation (76).  
 Indeed, as Ashraf Rushdy has argued, the “Allmuseri phenomenology” that Reb 
advocates provides Andrew with the “education” necessary for his eventual liberation.26  
Although the narrator is initially skeptical of Reb’s resignation to slavery and does his 
best for most of the novel to disavow the Coffinmaker’s embrace of suffering, there can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It should be noted, however, that Rushdy does not believe Andrew actually achieves 
that liberation at the end of the novel. He argues that the narrator’s decision to pass for 
white fundamentally contradicts Allmuseri teaching, because it reveals a desire for self-
possession which Reb denies. In Rushdy’s reading, Reb is thus the only character who 
fully satisfies the novel’s “vision” of freedom by becoming “a revolutionary to the degree 
that he becomes unpositioned in the material world and manages to make his possession 
of property a means of further unpositioning himself” (199). Although Andrew makes 
important and tangible strides towards a similar goal, Rushdy claims that he remains 
mired in the social order which Reb manages to escape. My reading of the end of 
Oxherding Tale also finds Andrew complicit in the power structures of a racist society. 
But, as I will explain, the reasons for Andrew’s complicity have more to do with how he 
defines temporal salvation (by way of Augustine) than with his desire to possess 
property.   
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be no doubt that in the final moments of Oxherding Tale he comes to see the world as an 
Allmuseri. The last scene, which I would now like to consider in some detail, signifies 
what Rushdy calls Andrew’s “surrender to Being,” meaning that his character finally 
accepts Reb’s belief in the “diverse unity” of all life forms—past, present, and future—
effectively completing his movement from “non-being” (188). Here is how it unfolds: 
after a complicated series of events that depicts Andrew and Reb’s narrow escape from 
death at the Leviathan plantation by fleeing to a small town where they are unknown and 
the narrator can pass for white, they are eventually tracked down by Flo Hatfield’s slave 
catcher, Horace Bannon, who plans to murder them both at his convenience. By the time 
Bannon catches up with Andrew, Reb has already left Spartanburg with plans to move 
further north, but the narrator presumes his fellow fugitive was killed before even leaving 
the town limits. With Reb’s murder a near certainty—and his own only a matter of 
time—Andrew allows the “Soulcatcher” to take him without much resistance from the 
home he shares with his pregnant white wife, so as to avoid a violent confrontation in 
front of the family he has come, to his own surprise, to love. It is, therefore, in a vacant 
field a short distance from his house that the narrator finds himself at the end of the novel 
with Bannon, preparing himself for what he hopes will be a “clean, quick kill” (170). 
 Instead of being killed, however, Andrew engages in a life-altering conversation 
with Bannon, during which he experiences the revelation that confirms—as Johnson’s 
introduction promises—his “liberation from numerous kinds of bondage.” (The title of 
this last chapter is “Moksha,” after all.) First, he learns that the only person aware of his 
fugitive status harbors no plans to bring him to justice. Bannon tells Andrew that he 
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recently gave up the bounty hunting business, having “been bested by Reb, who was 
safely now in Chicago” (174). So in physical terms at least, there remains no reason for 
the narrator to consider himself a slave. Yet, even with the knowledge of Reb’s escape 
and his own freedom all but guaranteed, the narrator feels persistently like chattel, owing 
to the other fact he learns from their conversation: that his father, George Hawkins, was 
murdered by Bannon prior to the Soulcatcher’s retirement. George’s murder devastates 
Andrew—and not just because it means he failed his filial pledge to purchase the old 
man’s manumission. What the narrator finds most troubling about the news is that it 
happened before he had a chance to come to terms with his father over the “inheritance” 
that was left him. For years, Andrew has been struggling to overcome the “way of 
seeing” that George passed on to him as a child. And now, as an adult about to be 
formally released from the hold of slavery, he views himself as still enslaved by his 
father’s essentializing rhetoric and the emphasis he always placed on the “distinctions” 
between people of different races and genders (172). 
 The character of George Hawkins is, by Johnson’s own account, a prototype for 
the black nationalist agenda of the 1960s and 1970s—a man who taught his son that 
whatever he does in life either “pushes the Race forward, or pulls us back” (21).27 It was 
this logic of cultural essentialism, crystallized in the aesthetic of the Black Arts 
movement, that Johnson railed against in his doctoral dissertation, arguing that such 
ideological constraints foreclose “the free investigation of phenomena” in life and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In the introduction to Oxherding Tale, Johnson refers to George Hawkins as a tragic 
figure: a “black nationalist….forever suffering from the pains caused by racial dualism” 
(xvii). 
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literature (Being 26). Thus, at the end of Oxherding Tale, his narrator discovers that real 
freedom is contingent upon liberation from the bondage of an essentially divisive 
ideology as well. To complete his transformation, Andrew must abandon his father’s 
teaching and accept the absolute interconnectedness of all being, which in this novel, as I 
have been suggesting, is equivalent to absorbing the Allmuseri worldview. That 
revelatory moment, wherein he finally achieves moksha, therefore signals the triumph of 
Reb’s phenomenological perspective. It happens in an instant, while Andrew is gazing at 
“the intricately woven brown tattooes” on the Soulcatcher’s body, each one a 
representation of an individual (animal, plant, and human) murdered by Bannon. 
Suddenly, the narrator writes, it was 
[n]ot tattooes at all, I saw, but forms sardined in his contour, 
creatures Bannon had killed since childhood: spineless insects, 
flies he’d dewinged; yet even the tiniest of these thrashing within 
the body mosaic was, clearly, a society as complex as the higher 
forms, a concrescence of molecules cells atoms in concert, for 
nothing in the necropolis he’d filled stood alone, wished to stand 
alone, and the commonwealth of the dead shape-shifted on his 
chest…their metamorphosis having no purpose beyond the delight 
the universe took in diversity for its own sake, the proliferation of 
beauty, and yet all were conserved in this process of doubling, 
nothing was lost in the masquerade, the cosmic costume ball, 
where behind every different mask at the part—behind snout beak 
nose and blossom—the selfsame face was uncovered at midnight, 
and this was my father (175) 
 
Reminiscent of the way Reb says the Allmuseri elders taught him to “send his kra forth to 
dwell…in ten thousand hosts” and to observe “intimately” how every organism is 
connected, even in death, the world inscribed on Bannon enlightens Andrew—all at 
once—to the diverse unity of being. (49). The will to distinguish between individuals or 
groups of individuals on the basis of their essential differences has been extinguished. As 
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the grammar of the passage indicates, the narrator now sees only sameness where he was 
inclined previously to divide. (Note, for example, the disinclination to use commas to 
separate items in a list: “snout beak nose and blossom.”)  
 Andrew has in this moment, then, fully transcended the desire to position himself 
uniquely in the world, which Reb associates with non-being or being “dead inside.” 
Indeed, like the Allmuseri, he has come alive finally to the radical position-less-ness of 
the self by perceiving its intrinsic presence in others. In this sense—the sense of 
achieving new knowledge about what it means to be—his transformation thus reflects the 
Platonic movement towards being that, in Johnson’s view, along with the movement 
towards wisdom, undergirds all confessional narratives since Augustine. I have spent so 
much time fleshing out the various ways that the narrator’s journey to freedom 
incorporates these other two Platonic movements, in fact, in order to highlight the 
correspondence between Andrew’s revelatory vision, his moksha, and the vision of God 
that Augustine describes in salvific terms in the Confessions. For, just as Andrew’s Zen 
liberation involves his instantaneous acclimation to a radically altered perception of the 
world, Augustine writes that he was saved from sin in a flash of transcendent light, with 
which his eyes were shocked “so that I might see that what I was seeing is Being” 
(7.10.16). Up until the instant of his revelation, Augustine’s sight was characterized by 
“weakness,” he confesses; it was limited by an inability to perceive the presence of divine 
nature in all existing things. But after he came to see differently, in this one moment of 
sudden enlightenment, the Confessions demonstrates that he never again doubted what 
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was revealed to him: that God is being itself, the source and creator of every other part of 
existence. 
 As Scott MacDonald has recently shown, despite the abruptness of Augustine’s 
salvific vision, his narrative “makes clear” that it actually did not occur “in the twinkling 
of an eye” as the saint suggests. Rather, “the journey leading to that crucial point was 
long,” MacDonald argues, the result of years spent grappling with the intellectual 
traditions in which Augustine was embroiled. Specifically, he argues further, the way 
Augustine conceived of being had to evolve over decades from Manichean dualism “by 
way of Platonism to an understanding of the God of Christianity” (20). Without going too 
far into the philosophical subtleties of MacDonald’s argument, it is sufficient for my 
purposes to note that the Confessions portrays its narrator’s mature thinking about 
being—and thus his Christian salvation—as a sloughing off of a “youthful ignorance” 
that made him “defenseless” to the Manichees’ influence. Most notably, Augustine 
garnered from his study of Plato the “wisdom” to challenge the Manichean principle of 
evil, an intellectual development which facilitated his apparently instantaneous 
conclusion that “God is the reality that truly is” (31). And so, MacDonald’s painstaking 
analysis of the Platonic basis for Augustine’s spiritual epiphany confirms how Johnson 
represents the formal structure of the Confessions in Chapter VIII of Oxherding Tale—as 
a “movement from ignorance to wisdom, nonbeing to being.” But it also, quite 
significantly, points to another connection between the novel and its Augustinian 
intertext, one that Johnson seems more reticent to acknowledge. Namely, we find that 
Andrew’s transformation in the final moments of Oxherding Tale draws noticeably from 
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the way Augustine ultimately resolved his dispute with the Manichees and thereby 
reconciled himself with the beliefs of the Catholic Church. 
 MacDonald explains that the main obstacle to Augustine’s salvation, prior to his 
salvific vision, was a series of questions posed to him in his youth by Manichees, who 
ridiculed “the Christian belief that God created human beings in God’s own image” (21). 
According to Manichean rationalism, the existence of evil on earth invalidates the idea, 
fundamental to Catholic theology, that the divine will is omnipotent and incorruptible 
(for would a good God really choose to create evil?). The reality that as a young man 
Augustine could not adequately defend Catholicism against these doubts—and, in fact, 
grew susceptible to them himself—becomes the greatest regret of his post-conversion 
life. Again and again in the Confessions, he laments being persuaded by the solution the 
Manichees proposed for the problem of evil, referring to his dalliance with their dualistic 
worldview as “the principal and almost sole cause of my inevitable error” (5.10.19). 
Hence, Augustine presents that moment in Milan, when he says his eyes were finally 
opened to God’s unifying power, in terms of deliverance from the sin of false doctrine. 
Claiming that his vision left “absolutely no room…for doubt,” he means that seeing God 
in this way—as being itself—convinced him, once and for all, that the Manichees were 
wrong to regard the natural world as independent of the divine (7.10.16). In his mature 
understanding, “evil exists only as a privation of good,” because God unifies every part 
of creation, from the lowest to the most highly developed (3.7.12). Even maligned 
creatures, such as poisonous snakes whose only purpose seems to be destructive, bear 
some degree of divine nature, Augustine comes to realize, given that they “come from” 
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God and God “made all things good” without making “all things equal” (7.11.17, 
7.11.18). What this indicates, then, is that following his time in Milan, Augustine learned 
to recognize aspects of true being anywhere he looked. For, as he writes in another text, 
On the Catholic and the Manichaean Ways of Life: “If you look for something strictly 
contrary to God, you will find absolutely nothing” (qtd. in MacDonald 32). 
 I would suggest that in finding his father’s face “behind every different” organism 
“thrashing within” the “diversity” inscribed on the Soulcatcher’s chest at the end of 
Oxherding Tale, Andrew is effectively reenacting the revelation from the Confessions—
in addition to the Allmuseri-inspired revelation, which the passage more overtly evokes. 
Indeed, it should be noted that if Andrew were perceiving that vast commonwealth from 
an exclusively Allmuserian perspective, it would be an image of his own being (his “kra” 
as Reb calls it) that he would be locating beneath the masks of all those creatures. So the 
fact that he sees George Hawkins there instead of himself implicates Augustinian 
theology in his revelatory vision. Not only does Augustine emphasize the necessity of 
discovering one’s “supremely good Father” in and through the created world, but he also 
uses strikingly similar imagery to account for the effect of this immutable paternal 
presence on creation. Consider, for example, how the passage excerpted above continues, 
as Andrew proceeds to describe the experience of seeing George, over and over, among 
the “thousand individualities” moving about: 
the profound mystery of the One and the Many gave me back my 
father again and again, his love, in every being from grubworms to 
giant sumacs, for these too were my father and, in the final face I 
saw in the Soulcatcher, which shook tears from me—my own face, 
for he had duplicated portions of me during the early days of the 
hunt—I was my father’s father and he my child (176)  
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The reference here to love—to a father’s love—being returned eternally to Andrew by 
“the profound mystery of the One and the Many” recalls the way Augustine discusses 
God’s love, in the wake of his conversion. Before the revelation in Milan, Augustine 
admits in the Confessions that he failed to love appropriately, seeking only transient 
fulfillment of his desires in the material realm. Afterwards, though, he came to 
understand love in Trinitarian terms: as the “gift” of the Father, bestowed on earth by the 
Holy Spirit, who unites every facet of existence through his Son.28 In this sense, God’s 
love is a “common and immutable good” that can be rejoiced in and shared among 
diverse members of creation, making—as Augustine has written on numerous of 
occasions in related language—“‘one heart’ out of many” or “many souls one soul.”29 
 Thus, for Augustine, the love of the Father transcends temporal divisions because 
it is itself indivisible and timeless, the primal unity of everything that exists, has existed, 
or will exist. We find equivalent logic in the way that Andrew sees George’s love for him 
given back “again and again” in self-sameness by a multitude of life forms “from 
grubworms to giant sumacs,” living and dead, who “too were my father.” Note the tense 
of his phrasing. Andrew is not referring to an ongoing development by which these 
organisms are becoming more and more like George over time; rather, the use of the 
indicative past (they “were” George) emphasizes an originary fact about their very being, 
suggesting that all existence—past, present, and future—is ontologically determined by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 On Augustine’s understanding of love as a divine gift, bestowed by the Holy Spirit, see 
Meconi, who notes that “It is an Augustinian commonplace that the Holy Spirit is the Gift 
of the Father and the Son, the Love between the Lover and the Beloved, the Glue who 
unites persons eternally (221). 
29 See Augustine’s Tractates on the Gospel of John (39.5), for example, qtd. in Ayres.  
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him. In fact, it should be clear that the “process” documented in this passage does not 
actually involve George, or even any of the creatures who appear to be newly assuming 
his image. The transformation is entirely the narrator’s own, a consequence of (finally) 
seeing something that had been there, as the grammatical tense implies, from the 
beginning: his father’s love revealed in the universe. Once that love is revealed to him in 
its timelessness, Andrew alights on what unifies, instead of what divides, the complex 
“society” represented on the Soulcatcher. He perceives George’s presence immanent in 
each different part of creation. And, as I have been arguing, this resonates with how 
Augustine came to perceive his “Father’s” presence following the revelatory vision in 
Milan. Book 7 of the Confessions shows him discovering “in the flash of a trembling 
glance” God’s “invisible nature” in all the “things” of the earth and his sudden 
understanding that to God all these things “owe their existence” (7.16.22, 7.15.21). The 
power of Augustine’s revelation therefore hinges on the very same shift in perception that 
Andrew’s does. Both men are awakened to the common goodness of the material world 
when they discover in it the previously hidden (yet always there) love of the 
father/Father.   
 With respect to the crisis of faith that drew Augustine away from Catholicism and 
led to his sojourn with the Manichees, it follows that he would need a vision to establish 
God’s immanence in creation. His failure to recognize that all things derive from God 
was, as he claimed, the greatest obstacle to his personal salvation. And since a primary 
motive of the Confessions was to attest to its narrator’s unwavering belief in Catholic 
doctrine, the text devotes much attention to the moment Augustine overcame his 
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Manichean doubts by seeing the divine “Father” in everything that exists.30 But, if we 
grant that Andrew’s vision involves a similar kind of perception, there is in Oxherding 
Tale no comparable motivation for it—at least in terms of the narrative’s “theological” 
orientation. What I mean is that the Allmuseri worldview that Andrew very clearly 
assumes at the end of the novel does not prioritize a paternalistic idea of God in the same 
way that Catholic theology does. Nothing in what readers learn about Reb’s belief-system 
nor about his concept of the Absolute prepares us for the significant role that Andrew’s 
own father plays in his final revelation. Indeed, the position-less-ness which Reb 
advocates as an Allmuseri is premised on the total renunciation of all personal 
attachments, paternal or otherwise. Because the Allmuseri believe in a supreme being 
who does not differentiate between people according to their relationships with one 
another (“in Allmuseri, all is A. One person was A1, the next A2” and so on [97]), they 
assign no special meaning to the rank of father. This explains why Reb seems less 
affected by the death of his son, Patrick, than Andrew had expected him to be. Although 
he clearly loved the boy, Reb had long ago abdicated responsibility for Patrick’s life or 
his protection. Paternal feelings implicitly contradict what he learned from the Allmuseri 
elders about disavowing private possessions and the will to control one’s “belongings.”31 
Therefore, Reb refuses to assign blame for the brutal loss of his son or even to mourn him 
in any traditional way, telling Andrew that he sees no reason to dwell on it: “‘I put his 
casket in the ground a month ago. You the one still carryin’ it around’” (61). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 On Augustine’s contemporary reasons for writing the Confessions, see Stump and 
Meconi, 6. See also Henry Chadwick’s introduction to his translation on the text, xii-xiii. 
31 For a discussion of the Allmuseri philosophy of ownership and personal possessions, 
see Rushdy 199. 
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 In this exchange, Reb makes clear that, within the Allmuseri cosmology, 
fatherhood does not grant him the right to expect his children’s wellbeing nor to be 
affected personally by their pain. As I have been suggesting, these sentiments run counter 
to how Andrew comes to see George at the end of Oxherding Tale and the significance he 
places on finding the eternal love of his father. Even more important to my mind, though, 
is that Reb’s words contain a pointed critique of the narrator’s need for absolution. Better 
than anyone else at Leviathan, the Coffinmaker knows Andrew indirectly caused his 
son’s suicide when he showed up there with Master Polkinghorne’s permission to work 
for Flo Hatfield, rendering Patrick redundant. Reb had warned Andrew that his plan to 
earn money for his manumission would result in death, and he scoffed at his yearning for 
selfhood. Yet, despite the narrator’s disregard for these admonitions, Reb pronounces him 
blameless for what happened to Patrick, indicating that his gravest mistake has been 
“carryin’…around” for more than a month the hope of being absolved from culpability. 
To the Coffinmaker, guilt and forgiveness are always irrelevant constructs. Given his 
spiritual predisposition towards suffering, he deems it foolish for Andrew to be grasping 
after his—or anyone else’s—mercy. Reb’s pedagogical function in novel, in fact, 
revolves around helping the narrator embrace the futility of chasing after redemption. For 
that, Andrew learns just before his final revelation, is the way he became free. Reb 
ultimately eluded capture and completed his journey North, Bannon explains, precisely 
because he “didn’t want nothing’” and “’didn’t care ‘bout merit or evil’” (174). The 
Coffinmaker’s freedom thus confirms the meaninglessness of the search that Andrew had 
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been pursuing; it demonstrates how misguided he had been to seek “merit” in a world 
where worthiness, like evil, is not something that can be granted or taken away but just is.    
 All of the lessons Reb taught him contribute to the narrator’s enlightenment by 
revealing that liberation happens when one stops seeking, when one simply accepts what 
the universe offers without expectation of anything more. And, of course, there is a sense 
in which Andrew’s vision of paternal love at the end of the novel signifies his newfound 
openness to this Allmuseri ideal, because he learns to receive—freely and 
unequivocally—the gift being given to him at the present instant by all the world’s 
creatures. But I would submit that this explanation alone does not account for George’s 
presence in Andrew’s revelation, nor for the way that presence fulfills the narrator’s 
desire for reconciliation. It is, after all, in response to a series of desperate questions 
about George that Bannon bids Andrew to examine the “necropolis” inscribed on his 
chest, saying “He’s heah…Ask him yoself.” So in addition to facilitating his break with 
his father’s essentialism, the final revelatory moment of the text also serves to absolve the 
narrator of the guilt which has haunted him ever since he started passing; it serves as his 
answer to whether George “died feeling I despised him, or if he…died hating me” for 
pretending to be white (175). The last promise Andrew made to his father, when he said 
goodbye to him at the gates of Leviathan, was that he would be himself—that he would 
never deny his blackness because doing so would be, as George said that day, “’like 
turnin’ your back on me and everythin’ I believes in’” (21). Thus, much of the anguish he 
feels upon hearing about George’s murder is due to his failure to uphold this promise 
and—quite literally—the “sin” of denying his father. That anguish, however, dissolves as 
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a result of his vision, which culminates in the reconciliatory image of the two men joined 
eternally to one another in mutual understanding (“I was my father’s father, and he my 
child”). Since Reb’s beliefs do not sustain either Andrew’s feelings of remorse over his 
relationship with George or his hope of being forgiven by him, it appears the narrator’s 
liberation cannot be explained by Allmuseri logic alone.     
 Indeed, insofar as it offers the narrator a means of reconciling with George over 
the sin of denying him, I argue that Andrew’s final revelation is structured by the 
economy of forgiveness laid out in the Confessions. To be saved from transgression and 
set free, Augustine wrote that the sinner must cleave himself to the Father through the 
principle of the Holy Spirit, which unites all persons timelessly within the body of his 
“coeternal Son” (7.21.27). The emphasis Augustinian theology places on “cleaving”—on 
being conformed to the likeness of God on earth—informs the culminating image of 
Andrew’s vision and helps to explain why he imagines reconciliation with George as an 
eternal transformation into him, wherein father and child are forever one, 
indistinguishable from each other for eternity. On the level of the narrator’s temporal 
experience in the text, this fantasy of paternal unification cannot be justified in any way, 
for Andrew currently lives as a white man and will continue to pass for white (the novel 
implies) even after his formal emancipation from slavery. Therefore, he is not really 
anything like his father, given how radically his existence differs from the life George 
lived himself and made Andrew promise to live. It seems erroneous to believe, then, that 
the narrator’s father would ever actually absolve him of guilt, since passing 
fundamentally contradicts the “world-historical mission” of black revolutionaries, which 
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George had fervently upheld and, in fact, died trying to protect. As George saw it, even 
the smallest act of denial threatens the future of the race, and so he could not forgive 
something that undermines the very idea of history he had been “fightin” for all these 
years (21). 
 However, when we think about the culminating image of Andrew’s vision in 
atemporal terms—as a kind of reconciliation with the father/Father that transcends 
“vicissitudes of time”—then the historical consequences of his passing become irrelevant 
to him. This kind of reconciliation is exactly what, I am suggesting, the Augustinian 
supplement provides the narrator of Oxherding Tale. It gives Andrew a way to 
imaginatively circumvent the racial structures that determine history, suggesting that 
George’s love for him (like Augustine’s idea of God’s) is eternally present and not 
subject to the temporal order. According to Augustine, there exists “a sublime created 
realm cleaving with such pure love to the true and truly eternal God,” wherein man 
“never detaches” from the Father nor “slips away into the changes and successiveness of 
time” (12.15.19). It is an idealized space like this one, constituted by “pure love,” that I 
argue Andrew envisions in his final revelation, at the moment he discovers George’s face 
in his own. For him, as for Augustine, liberation occurs when the transcendent love of 
father interrupts the temporal horizon, changing how one relates to the standard 
chronology of lived experience. Thus, just before referring to himself as a “freeman” for 
the first time in the novel, the narrator seems to be glimpsing a new order of existence, 
outside of human temporality, in which he is timelessly cleaved to George, as his eternal 
son and father. Reconciling with George in these (Augustinian) terms therefore has the 
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curious, and deeply problematic, effect of divesting Andrew from the historical impact of 
his actions—of passing—at the same time that it legitimates his ultimate decision to stay 
with his wife and to raise their daughter together, fully immersed in the white world.  
I indicated earlier that the domestic turn Andrew takes at the end of the novel has 
proved problematic for critics, who point out its inherent inconsistency with his final 
revelatory vision of George. They rightly ask why, if the narrator had in fact reconciled 
himself to his father as the final image suggests, would he not feel compelled to honor 
that revolutionary legacy by striking out against the very structures that enslaved him in 
the first place? How can Andrew possibly square George’s revolutionary agenda with the 
tone on which his own narrative concludes—in apparent acceptance of and assimilation 
to the way things are? My answer is that Augustinian theology enables this controversial 
choice, by offering an imaginative means to bypass the political and social implications 
of his marriage as well as justifying the faith he puts in love. In other words, the priority 
the narrator places in the last sentences of the text on his domestic responsibilities—on 
“rebuilding the world” together with his wife and his daughter, whom he named after his 
white mistress/mother—does contradict every aspect of George’s ideology, making it 
irresolvable with the vision of paternal reconciliation he describes in the preceding 
paragraph (176). But it is, I argue, perfectly consistent with how Augustine imagines 
loving his “Father” in the Confessions. In Augustine’s view, the Father’s transcendent 
love is expressed on earth through the purity of the love one shares with others. This 
principle, integral to the Catholic sacrament of marriage, means that people who are 
joined appropriately in their reverence for God and for each other abide eternally in that 
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“sublime created realm,” which Augustine maintains is independent of historical 
experience.32 Based on Andrew’s depiction of marrying Peggy from earlier in the novel, 
it seems clear that he envisions his relationship with her as a timeless union capable of 
transcending the racial structures specific to his—or any other—moment in history. In 
fact, their entire wedding ceremony is imbued with strange Catholic overtones that 
reflect, I think, the Augustinian tenor of the love that unites them. 
Nominally, of course, their wedding ceremony is Protestant—presided over by a 
minister instead of a priest, whose “Pelagian” beliefs bespeak an anti-Catholic orientation 
(138). Yet the decadence of the church in which they exchange vows (Peggy calls it “the 
gaudiest thing since the carnival came to town”) and the stained glass windows that 
“awash” the couple in “ever richer” light are suggestive of Catholicism, rather than the 
unadorned style commonly found in Protestant chapels. Even more suggestively, Andrew 
refers to the act of taking his vows in sacramental terms that correspond to how Catholics 
define marriage. To him, it is a “nearly mystical” event that “gave the abstract form 
flesh” and “glorified” all witnesses “through a ceremony that suspended Time.” He 
writes further, 
The heart knew nothing of hours. Minutes. It moved on a plane 
above history, error. […] We stood, I felt, translated, lifted a few 
feet off the ground, exchanging replies in old old voices in a 
different tongue we borrowed from our better selves—the people 
we were intended to be—in some parallel world, where the 
absences of this life were presences, the failures here triumphs 
there, a realm of changeless meaning for which the only portal was 
surrender. (140) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For more on how Augustine defines love between persons, see Meconi 221-223 and 
Ayres 71-76. 
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Apart from his final revelatory vision, this is the only other occasion in Oxherding Tale 
where the narrator experiences temporal disjuncture, and I would contend that for that 
reason alone the two passages inform each other. Moreover, the out-of-place Catholic 
resonances of the scene and Andrew’s reference to a “changeless” space “above history, 
error” implicitly connects what is happening here—in this instant of timeless presence—
to the revelation he has at the end of the novel. The connection is significant, because it 
implies that the narrator’s marriage and the love he shares with Peggy transform him in a 
similar way to the love he shares with his father. Both “unions” have a transcendent 
effect that propels the narrator outside of time, granting him eternal distance from the 
reality of his historical situation and the troubling political implications of his decision to 
pass.  
 In the case of the wedding ceremony, these implications are immediately apparent 
to Andrew. For, right after he and Peggy “fell back into clock time” from their 
transformative vow-taking, the narrator and his new wife go to a reception filled with 
“well-wishers,” some of whom wear the uniform “of the Confederacy.” The couple is 
then treated to a barrage of racist and sexist diatribes from their guests, including an 
“argument for the necessity of Negro slavery [drawing] from the most recent studies in 
breeding, from the Old Testament, from history, and from the subordination of one 
creature by another in the natural world” (141). Quite plainly, therefore, the text 
demonstrates that their marriage has not really transported Andrew and Peggy to an 
atemporal realm, where love turns all historical “failures” into “triumphs.” They remain 
at this point in the novel very much subject to the racial ideologies of their time—a fact 
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that Andrew laments through an imagined conversation with his father, in which the two 
men discuss his bride. He knows that George “would reject me” for marrying a white 
woman, “claiming I had rejected him, and this was partly true.” Yet, the narrator holds 
out hope for his eventual approval, since: 
I loved my father. What would I not have given for him to be at the 
wedding? Proud of me. To know he approved of Peggy. Was what I’d 
done so wrong? So contrary to his cracked vision that, if George lived, he 
would not forgive me? (142) 
 
According to my reading of his final revelation, Andrew gets what he admits to missing 
on the day of he marries Peggy: he gets George to sanction—indeed, to bless—the union 
retroactively. And, as I have been claiming, that paternal blessing signifies the last hurdle 
he believes he must overcome before becoming free.  
 My point, then, is that the Augustinian supplement “saves” the narrator’s 
marriage by offering him a means of imaginatively fulfilling the desire for forgiveness 
from his father. But it is vital to recognize that the salvation being offered is also 
inexorably linked in the text to Andrew’s racial compromise—to his problematic 
assimilation to the entrenched structures of power. That is because the father’s 
forgiveness, as Augustine characterized it in the Confessions, does not take place in time; 
it happens on a plane above temporality, independent of history. While this atemporal 
view of reconciliation might absolve the narrator of the guilt he feels about marrying 
Peggy, a woman he seems truly to love, it creates irresolvable tension with regard to what 
their union signifies in the real-time of the novel. In the end, we should not ignore that 
Andrew’s actual liberation, from slavery as well as from the debilitating racist attitudes 
that followed in its wake, is made possible by his marriage and his persistent ability to 
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pass for white. Without the protection that his domestic situation provides, he would not 
really be free. And so, the danger of the Augustinian supplement—the danger of 
bracketing off one’s self from the vicissitudes of time and history—is manifest in the 
ambivalence with which the narrative concludes.  
 It is possible, of course, that Johnson did not intend the conclusion of his novel to 
be ambiguous and, rather, that he perceives Andrew’s “surrender” to domesticity in a 
wholly affirmative way. For, despite the widespread criticism surrounding the last 
paragraph, there is nothing in it to suggest the narrator’s—or even Johnson’s—
dissatisfaction with the life he chooses to live after slavery. That dissatisfaction has been 
placed on Oxherding Tale entirely from without, by critics arguing (correctly, I think) 
that Andrew’s liberation does not transcend race but merely reinscribes its social and 
political strictures within the historical context of the narrative. A close look at the 
language Johnson uses here, though, reveals that these concerns matter very little to the 
writer of this tale: a man who, it seems, has reconciled himself fully to the 
meaninglessness of all designations of personal identity. In fact, the narrator appears in 
the final sentences of the text to have become the literary embodiment of what Johnson 
meant when he wrote in Being and Race that “great writers are sexless, raceless, and have 
no historical moment circumscribing their imagination and curiosity” (45).  
+++ 
 In the preceding pages, I have been attempting to demonstrate that the novel’s 
recourse to Augustinian theology is responsible for its irresolvable ending—because the 
construct of salvation it supports is atemporal, outside of history. Yet it must be noted 
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that Johnson’s text at least gestures towards a historical resolution, implying that the 
entrenched racial structures in which Andrew is still mired when his narrative ends will at 
some point in time be overcome. Indeed, as suggested by the specificity of the date the 
narrator gives for his daughter’s birth (April 23, 1861), the final paragraph prepares us for 
a real future moment when race means nothing and integration is achieved. Andrew’s 
daughter, whose very existence signals a kind of racial reconciliation, represents the hope 
for that integrationist possibility. This, in combination with the novel’s only footnote, 
amounts to how Johnson imagines a resolution to the racial tension with which the novel 
concludes. The footnote interrupts the narratological exposition of Andrew’s escape from 
Leviathan, flashing forward to describe what happens to a white guard he meets along the 
way, a young man full of racist vitriol. After recounting the guard’s distasteful remarks, 
the narrator walks back his negative characterization of him, saying “I’m hardly being 
fair to this fellow: he was not a bad sort, given the day.” Then comes the footnote: 
He is fifteen in my account. In two years this boy—James Travis, 
Jr.—will be wounded at Fort Sumter, fighting with Major Robert 
Anderson: his nurse will be a black girl, Zelphy Thomes, and 
James, finding her with child on August 3, 1861, will choose love 
over bigotry, moving his new family to southern Illinois, where his 
great-granddaughter, Ellen, an early NAACP activist, will integrate 
a lunch counter on April 23, 1935. She will die five years later, on 
the Northeast Side of Carbondale, surrounded by admirers, white 
and black. (110) 
 
The hopeful tone of this passage points to a future beyond the one depicted in the final 
paragraph of the novel—a future in which racist structures actually begin to be 
destabilized, rather than simply by-passed by people like Andrew, who can live as white. 
For most readers, though, this kind of forward-looking hopefulness will ring false, given 
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what we know about the bleak state of race relations in the United States in the years 
since 1935, when James’s great-granddaughter supposedly integrated a lunch counter. 
And so, I would submit that these small attempts to resolve what I have called the danger 
of the Augustinian supplement, only further implicate Johnson’s text in the troubling 
political consequences of an atemporal view of salvation. 
+++ 
 The next and final chapter of my dissertation examines a novel that “fast 
forwards” to the future in a similar way. Yet, as I will demonstrate, the forward-looking 
temporal disjuncture in Edward P. Jones’s The Known World does not bring (or attempt 
to bring) historical resolution to the narrative. Rather, it underscores the transformative 
power of art to make meaning out of history. 
	  	   	  
233	  
Chapter Four 
 
Catholicism and Narrative Time, Continued: 
Divine Prescience in Edward P. Jones’s The Known World 
 The final chapter of my study focuses on temporal disjuncture as well, but in this 
case I consider manipulations of futurity—rather than of the past or present, as in 
Stigmata and Oxherding Tale. In fact, I examine here a novel that makes frequent use of 
the flash-forward technique Johnson deploys only once in his. Edward P. Jones’s The 
Known World is a highly acclaimed and Pulitzer-prize-winning portrayal of the little 
known history of black slaveholders in the United States. Since its publication in 2003, it 
has been heralded as a “classic” of African American literature and considered “one of 
the best American novels of the past twenty years” (Eggers). Part of the reason for its 
success has been attributed to how realistically it depicts a facet of the slave system that 
has gone largely unremarked upon in the sociological and historical analysis of slavery. 
But, as I will discuss here, the novel’s realism is also a point of contention for critics, 
many of whom have debated whether or not it should be appropriately labeled “realist,” 
given the patently antirealist and often disorienting way it disrupts chronological time by 
flashing to a future beyond the limits of the story being told. In what follows, I offer a 
new perspective on that debate, suggesting that instead of thinking about the novel’s 
temporal structure in terms of realism versus antirealism, we would do better to 
understand the value that the novel attaches to narrative foreknowledge. I argue that 
Jones’s use of the flash-forward technique is informed to a significant extent by the 
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concept of divine prescience that Augustine developed in his analysis of the biblical story 
of creation.  
 As we shall see, the novel engages with Augustinian theology in multiple ways, 
most directly by challenging (through its depiction of a character named Augustus) the 
view of slavery advanced in The City of God Against the Pagans. Jones’s engagement 
with Augustine, I suggest, reveals itself throughout The Known World, especially with 
regard to the way it represents art and artists. Moreover, the Augustinian subtext of the 
novel accounts, I will demonstrate, for the surprising presence of Catholic characters and 
Catholic themes in the narrative. While not Catholic himself, Jones came into contact 
with Catholicism at several pivotal junctures in his life. As a child, he attended parochial 
school until his mother (who encouraged him to become a priest) could no longer afford 
it. Then later, as related in the book Fraternity by journalist Diane Brady, he was offered 
a scholarship to attend the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts, where he became 
part of the first cohort of African American students at that institution. Thus Jones would 
have encountered, in various forms, the Catholic interpretation of Augustine’s theology 
that I contend he deploys in The Known World in order to imaginatively disrupt the 
temporal structures of slavery. 
+++ 
 The flash-forwards in Jones’s novel follow a parallel trajectory to that of the 
footnote about James Travis, Jr. in Johnson’s Oxherding Tale. They propel the reader out 
of the chronological—and exceedingly realistic—framework of the text to offer a 
telescoping glimpse of what happens in the lives of marginal characters and their 
	  	   	  
235	  
descendants decades after Emancipation. In some cases, the stories they tell reflect an 
affirmative view of the future, like Travis’s, documenting small triumphs over racial 
injustice and adversity. For example, readers learn that one of the slaves on the Virginia 
plantation where Jones’s novel takes place will in 1987 have a street in Richmond named 
after him, commemorating the “Home for Colored Orphans” that he founded with his 
wife during Reconstruction. The petition to rename the street, we learn further, was led 
by the couple’s great-granddaughter, who successfully appealed to the “white people who 
ran the government” to recognize in “official” terms the significant historical contribution 
made by these former slaves (205). Other instances of this flashing-forward technique in 
The Known World, however, point towards a dramatically different futurity, in which the 
racist logic of slavery does not in fact ever get undermined or overthrown. For every case 
of personal redemption, there are dozens of stories about enslaved characters that do not 
end by affirming their freedom (such as Ralph, who chooses to remain loyal to his white 
mistress even once he is emancipated [162]), along with a number of peripheral 
references to the interminability of structural racism, which persists far past the 
conclusion of the novel. At one point, the narrator of Jones’s novel—an omniscient, 
third-person speaker—interrupts the description of the county sheriff, John Skiffington, 
to discuss a scholarly history that would be produced in 1979 of his term in office. The 
scholar responsible for that account, our narrator tells us, will stake her academic career 
on portraying Skiffington as a “godsend” for slaveholders, because he ushered in “years 
and years” of “peace and prosperity” by way of the night patrols he organized to capture 
runaway slaves (43-4). 
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 The fact that an historian will receive tenure from a prestigious university 
(Washington and Lee) over a century after slavery, and in the wake of the civil rights 
movements, for writing a favorable—if uninspired—portrayal of a man who protected the 
interests of the slaveholding elite is, of course, an affront to the idea of racial “progress.” 
Moreover, the historian’s portrayal of Skiffington, which so baldly contradicts how 
Jones’s narrator portrays the sheriff’s influence, exposes a deep fissure between the so-
called authoritative historiography of this period and what was actually experienced by 
those who lived it. For these reasons, critics frequently interpret the temporal disjuncture 
in The Known World as antagonistic to claims of historical accuracy more generally. 
Madhu Dubey, for one, points out that the “disorienting” flash-forwards disrupt “the 
notion of self-contained time periods,” implying that “slavery should not be seen as a 
closed chapter of US history” but rather as institution whose injustices persist still (“Neo-
Slave” 344). Likewise, Carolyn Vellenga Berman argues that the narrator’s “broad 
foreknowledge” about the characters’ futures and about the cultural space their 
descendants will inhabit fosters a sense of connection between “the private lives of an 
antebellum plantation” and “a twenty-first-century reading public,” suggesting that both 
communities are “part of the same world” (235). Arguments such as these, which 
highlight the novel’s compression of spatiotemporal distinctions, are at the center of the 
debate surrounding how to classify The Known World: as realist, “pseudorealist,” or 
postmodern fiction.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The label “pseduorealist” is argued for by Maria Seger, who contends that the novel 
both accedes to and resists the “norms of realism” (1182). 
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 Indeed, nearly all the scholarship on the novel since its publication in 2003 makes 
at least some mention of the way the flash-forwarding technique confounds the otherwise 
realistic quality of Jones’s prose. But whether the temporal shifts merely expand “the 
parameters of historical realism by manipulating the existing conventions of the genre,” 
or whether they reject those conventions altogether —in a manner usually associated with 
postmodernism—is a question not easily settled (Spaulding 126). As a recent article in 
Callaloo explains, the critical disagreement over classification comes down to how 
seriously one takes the omniscience of the narrator.2 In other words: if we believe that the 
narrator’s knowledge really does exceed what has been written in the official record of 
slavery, then it is possible to read the narrative as a corrective for prior inaccuracies and 
omissions. This would mean, as Spaulding contends, that its expansive view of history 
notwithstanding, The Known World still fits rather comfortably inside the limits of realist 
fiction, since it adds to—rather than “re-forms”—our “understanding of slavery” by 
broadening the historical scope of the narrative to account for the “passage of time as a 
continuum” (126). Alternatively, though, if we regard the narrator’s knowledge as 
intentionally ironic, focusing on those moments that the third-person speaker “falls short 
of total omniscience” and “overrelies on documents” about slave history which were 
previously discredited by the novel’s version of events, then The Known World calls into 
question the very possibility of accurate representation (Seger 1190). According to Maria 
Seger, this is the function of all the examples of erroneous historical reporting that Jones 
involves in the telling: to parody any attempt to accurately represent the experience of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Seger, especially 1188-1191. 
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slavery, including his own, thereby cultivating “similar levels of skepticism” to what we 
find in classic works of postmodernism and historiographic metafiction (1191). 
 For many readers, the debate regarding the novel’s classification seems beside the 
point—something external to the story, which only literary critics would be interested in 
deliberating. Jones himself has intimated as much, insisting in interviews that at the time 
he was writing The Known World, he gave no consideration to the realist view of history 
that he is now being accused of (or celebrated for) violating. As he told Hilton Als in 
2013, the principles of historical realism could not have informed the construction of his 
narrative, since he was not even cognizant of their implications: “I did things in that 
novel that I never learned you’re not supposed to do. In one paragraph you leap forward 
ninety years, things like that.” Though Jones surely overplays his ignorance of realist 
conventions, it is clear he wants to deflect scholarly attention away from the issue of 
representational accuracy. He has repeatedly denied doing extensive research for the The 
Known World, growing “obviously tired”—as Katherine Clay Bassard puts it—in the 
years following its publication of inquiries into his knowledge of the subject matter. 
Some of his earliest interviews reveal that he spent over a decade studying “books about 
slavery” before starting to write his own (int. by Fleming 254). Yet, by 2005, he was 
rejecting the premise that he read anything at all on the topic: “There was no research. 
No. I didn’t do any research….Forget the research. It’s overrated” (qtd. in Bassard 409). 
So what was it that inclined him against acknowledging his familiarity with slave history 
and historiography? 
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 In partial answer to this question, Bassard reminds us that we should understand 
“Jones’s de-emphasizing of historical research in the context of the tendency to focus too 
heavily on the ‘historical’ accuracy or authentication of African American literature as 
autobiography, sociology, and lived experience and an under-appreciation for the genius 
of the black imaginary” (409). The reminder is an important one. Undoubtedly, Jones 
would have sensed a tone of condescension from audiences who asked him—over and 
over again—how his novel compares to the “reality” of slavery. Because of the 
controversial and largely unknown history of African American slaveholders to which 
The Known World refers, there were multiple calls to justify its account, specifically 
concerning the statistical information presented in the opening pages. There, the narrator 
says that of the thirty-four free black families presiding in Manchester County, Virginia 
prior to the Civil War, “eight of those free families owned slaves,” and one black family 
in particular (Henry Townsend’s) owned more slaves than most white residents (7). 
Readers will want to know, a prominent historian wrote in 2006, the “general 
plausibility” of these fictional statistics and, in wider terms, about Jones’s faithfulness to 
the historical record  (Pressly 81). Thus, the novel motivated scholars of history and 
sociology to reexamine census information from the period, checking whether the 
narrator’s numbers hold up against comparable data. 
 Thomas J. Pressly probably believed he was giving Jones a vote of confidence 
when he determined, after analyzing the relevant scholarship, that his book “meets major 
tests of statistical plausibility for its historical period—whatever may be its degree of 
success or failure in satisfying the various other literary or aesthetic criteria by which its 
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readers may evaluate it” (86, my emphasis). But, as the italicized clause makes plain, 
Pressly’s verification does not amount to an endorsement of the work’s artistic value. In 
fact, he suggests that its accuracy—its realism—might even minimize the approval The 
Known World receives on “various other” scales of analysis, including creativity and 
authorial vision. By implicitly corroborating Bassard’s concerns, then, this and other 
likeminded attempts to verify the history represented in the novel can negatively affect its 
reception as literature, as fiction. Perhaps that explains why Jones started backing away 
from his initial statements regarding historical research and began to stress in interviews 
instead the significant role the “creative part of the brain” played in the book’s genesis. 
The narrative that has emerged since then about how The Known World came to be 
confirms the extraordinary power of his imagination. Jones says that after “avoiding 
doing research” for “over ten years” and simply thinking through story “in his head,” he 
finally sat down to write it “in the final days of December 2001,” when he was laid off 
from his job (int. by Als). A draft of the manuscript was ready a short time later, in 
March—which signifies a remarkable feat of productivity for any novelist, especially one 
writing on such a massive scale. The Known World is not only long (the longest by far of 
any of the texts examined in this study), but also intricately woven and complex. So 
many individual stories pervade its pages that readers often remark on the difficulty of 
keeping track of all the characters.3 Yet Jones maintains that he wrote the entire novel in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anecdotally, the customer reviews for The Known World on Amazon.com reveal that 
readers often struggle to keep up with the sheer number of names (of people, of places) in 
the book and to understand the relevance of some minor characters to the larger narrative. 
I will admit to using a list to track their appearances myself, as it can be overwhelming to 
remember when characters have been mentioned previously by the narrator and in what 
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two and a half months, because he had spent a decade imagining these people and the 
lives they lived.  
 His imaginative vision of the characters was responsible too, he says, for the 
temporal disruptions that have fascinated critics and spurred the debate over how to 
categorize his work. When asked to explain his use of the flash-forward technique, Jones 
resists the suggestion that the conventions of historical realism determined—in any 
way—his representation of time. He did not adhere to a standard chronological approach, 
he admits; but neither did he set out purposefully to undermine it or to prove a point 
about slave historiography. Rather, he quite strikingly ascribes the structure of the 
narrative to a mythology of creation, in which the artist—the “creator”—sees beyond the 
human experience of temporality: 
I always thought I had a linear story. Something happened between the 
time I began… taking it all out of my head and when I finished months 
later. It might be that because I, as the “god” of the people in the book, 
could see their first days and their last days and all that was in between, 
and those people did not have linear lives as I saw all that they had lived. 
What Tessie the child did one day in 1855 would have some meaning for 
her 50, 75 years later. She might not be able to look back and see that 
moment, but her creator could. That, perhaps, is why she says something 
about the doll her father made for her to Caldonia and Fern in September 
1855 that she will repeat on her deathbed, some 90 years later; she might 
not even remember the first time she uttered those words, but I can’t 
afford to forget if I’m trying to tell the truth. (HarperCollins) 
 
Emerging here, in Jones’s characterization of authorial knowledge, is a take on narrative 
omniscience that frustrates both the realist and the postmodernist readings of his novel. In 
referring to himself “as the ‘god’ of the people in the book,” Jones cannily sidesteps the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
context. The effort it takes to read the novel with any hope of remembering “who did 
what and when” makes it all the more astonishing that Jones was able to write their 
stories so quickly, and with so much detail, in less than three months’ time. 
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question of representational accuracy, harkening back to a pre-modern conception of art, 
where “meaning” is revealed from without by an author/narrator not subject to the 
vagaries of temporal existence. To put this another way: for Jones, telling “the truth” 
about slavery necessitates a perspective independent of time and history, from which he 
can document—and make a kind of sense of—even those events that seemed meaningless 
or impossible to understand in their own historical context. Notably, the work involves 
more than just remembering what happened in the past from some future moment in the 
continuum of human experience. For, as the above example shows, memories change and 
are forgotten over the span of a person’s lifetime. Thus it is possible that the character 
Tessie will die not knowing, not realizing what it meant to be able to tell the woman who 
owned her in 1855 that the beautiful doll she held in her hands was carved for her by her 
father, Elias. The memory of that exchange, as well as its significance, “might not even” 
occur to her on her deathbed, when she looks back at her life “90 years later” and repeats 
the words she spoke to her mistress almost a century before. Moreover, she will never be 
aware of the great effort Elias put into carving the doll in the her likeness, since it did not 
turn out to resemble her all that closely. So Tessie lives and dies believing, as her father 
falsely told her (out of embarrassment for failing to make it look like her), that the doll 
has the face of his mother—a woman whose features he has no actual recollection of, 
after being forcibly separated from her thirty years earlier. These lost and 
misremembered “histories” would be all that remains of Tessie, and Elias too for that 
matter, if their stories were related linearly, Jones suggests. To meaningfully recall that 
which cannot be known or will soon be forgotten therefore requires the knowledge 
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possessed by a remote narrator, who stands outside of the temporal world his characters 
inhabit and sees “all that they had lived” all at once, from a point of view absolutely 
unimaginable to them.  
 And so, according to Jones, the flash-forwards in the text should not be measured 
in terms of historical realism, because the transcendent vision they reflect exists 
independently of lived experience. Neither, though, do these temporal interruptions 
indicate a postmodern skepticism about the representation of history, given that they 
affirm, rather than subvert, the creator’s authority. Indeed, the way Jones mythologizes 
his own creative process constitutes an ideal rejoinder to critics inclined to underestimate 
what Bassard calls “the genius of the black imaginary.” As he describes it, the distinctive 
temporality of The Known World comes exclusively from his imagination and the God-
like perspective he exercises over the “people” he creates. Whether or not Jones was 
thinking about the criticism focused on the accuracy of the novel when he made these 
remarks, it is apparent that, to him, the value of art has remarkably little to do with how 
realistically it depicts time—for he regards the temporal disjuncture in his narrative as 
evidence of “some meaning” which transcends linear chronology. Meaning and “truth” in 
fact reside in those disorientating textual moments, he claims, that pose the greatest 
challenge to our ordered view of human existence and force us to see the world 
differently.  
 To readers who find the flash-forward technique distracting or worse (Alan 
Cheuse called it “annoying, sometimes even irritating” in his review for the San 
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Francisco Chronicle4), Jones’s interpretation of the novel’s temporality offers a pointed 
response, gesturing towards a totalizing rationale that cannot be explained by the 
categories of “realism” or “postmodernism” alone—that significantly deviates, in fact, 
from both categorizations. In the following pages, I will explore the terms of the logic 
Jones uses to defend the narratological flash-forwards, because I contend that logic has 
profound implications for not only how The Known World is structured, but also how it 
represents the many artists and works of art that appear within. The novel cultivates a 
view of aesthetic production that sustains the way its author mythologizes his own 
creative process. This holds true for a range of imaginative “creations” portrayed in the 
book: from the widely celebrated, large-scale masterpieces by Augustus Townsend and 
Alice Night to those destined for far smaller audiences, such as the doll Elias carves for 
Tessie or even the fantastic stories which the slaves of Manchester County make up for 
each other to explain the horrors of slavery. Throughout The Known World, Jones 
incorporates into the description of these artworks a mythology similar to the one that has 
developed around his personal experience of writing the manuscript, especially with 
regard to the genesis of its temporal landscape. By considering what unites all of these 
diverse “texts” and their respective representations of time, I discover they are informed 
to a surprising extent by the theory of divine prescience that Augustine developed 
throughout his works—but primarily in The City of God—to explain the biblical myth of 
creation. Indeed, as I will show, Augustinian theology figures prominently in the novel, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I am indebted to Tim A. Ryan for drawing my attention to Cheuse’s review of The 
Known World. Ryan quotes from the review at length in the chapter devoted to Jones 
(205). 
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informing the great authority its artists wield, as well as the transformative power of their 
aesthetic imaginations. Furthermore, I argue that an examination of the terms Augustine 
uses to describe God’s creative power yields important insight regarding the strange and 
seemingly incongruous presence of Catholicism in the narrative—a point I will address in 
the final section of this chapter. 
+ + + 
 Admittedly, Augustinian theology might seem at first glance an unlikely source 
for Jones’s aesthetic perspective. His novel, after all, plainly criticizes the justification for 
slavery that Augustine proposes in The City of God, offering countless examples to refute 
the idea of enslavement as a divinely sanctioned and ordained remedy for sin. Within the 
various matrices of human bondage portrayed in The Known World, mastery over another 
individual—however well intentioned or benign—is always destructive. None of the 
fictionalized slaveowners ever achieves, or comes close to achieving, the idealized 
version of servitude that Augustine calls “that order of peace which prevails among men 
when some are placed under others” (19.15). Quite to the contrary, the novel teems with 
stories of “peace” dangerously interrupted by a cadre of shortsighted masters and 
miserable slaves, whose collective experience underscores the depravity of all forms of 
slavery. The case of Henry Townsend provides the primary evidence for this point. A 
former slave himself, Henry at one time vowed, “he would be a master different from any 
other, the kind of shepherd master God had intended.” His plan to rule ethically over a 
plantation of “happy,” well-fed slaves—on whom he will look down from a position of 
charitable goodwill, “like God on his throne looked down on him”—recalls, with striking 
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similarity, the model of ethical mastery elaborated in The City of God (180).5 But, of 
course, instead of advocating that model as Augustine does, Jones chronicles its 
inevitable failure, emphasizing the many times Henry left the men and women in his care 
without enough to eat and had them whipped or disfigured on charges of insubordination. 
The fact that he does not enjoy and is actually deeply disturbed by these kinds of 
punishments has no bearing on their outcome. Again and again, the text demonstrates that 
even the most kind-hearted masters commit grievous acts of injustice, as a necessary 
condition of the status that slave ownership affords them.  
 The corrupting effects of bondage on masters and slaves alike have been well 
documented in the literature of slavery. From the sketches of “humane” and “pious” 
women debauched by “an atmosphere of licentiousness and fear” in Harriet Jacob’s 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl to Toni Morrison’s A Mercy, which recounts the 
moral degradation of the reluctant slaveowner Jacob Vaark, there are in our popular 
imagination numerous accounts of otherwise compassionate individuals compromised by 
their affiliation (direct or indirect) with such a depraved institution.6 Yet what makes The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In his discussion of slavery in Book 19 of The City of God, wherein he lays out the ideal 
of benevolent mastery, Augustine reminds readers “the first just men were established as 
shepherds of flocks, rather than as kings of men. This was done so that in this way also 
God might indicate what the order of nature requires, and what the desert of sinners 
demands” (19.15, my italics). Augustine’s point—that slaveholders should rule over their 
slaves and all those in their care with humility and a sense of justice—resounds in 
Henry’s (doomed) plan to practice a “different” kind of slavery and is especially resonant 
in his use of the term “shepherd master.”  
6 The quotes from Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl come from that book’s famous 
chapter “Sketches of Neighboring Slaveholders,” wherein Jacobs recounts a number of 
stories of the “all-pervading corruption produced by slavery” (51). One of most shocking 
accounts is that of a slaveholder’s daughter, who “selected one of the meanest slaves on 
his plantation to be the father of his first grandchild. She did not make her advances to 
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Known World unique and sets it apart from other texts that destabilize the notion of 
ethical mastery that Augustine promotes in The City of God are its free black characters, 
who appear as vulnerable as whites to the corrosive influence of owning slaves. In the 
words of one critic: Jones’s novel deconstructs the “historical dialectic between 
benevolent and commercial black slaveowning,” suggesting that everyone involved in the 
purchase of slaves—including those participating for purely philanthropic reasons—
contributes to the system’s immorality and corruption (Bassard 412). Sadly, this means 
that even Augustus Townsend, whose carpentry work allowed him to buy himself and 
then his family out of bondage, is not immune to the consequences. Although he sought 
only to free Mildred and Henry from their master, William Robbins, the narrative implies 
that Augustus unwittingly fortifies slavery in Manchester County in two ways: first, by 
increasing the wealth of its largest proponent (Robbins, who benefits financially from 
both sales, and Henry’s in particular); and, second, by not legally manumitting his son. 
For reasons of convenience and political expediency, Augustus chooses to assume 
ownership of Henry himself, rather than seeking his formal manumission. This was a 
common practice at the time, which allowed the families of freed slaves to live together 
when they would otherwise have been forced to leave the state.7 But despite how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
her equals,” Jacobs explains, “nor ever to her father’s more intelligent servants. She 
selected the most brutalized, over whom her authority could be exercised with less fear of 
exposure” (52). In slave society, this sketch and the many others like it suggest that men 
and women of all ranks—masters as well as slaves—are subject to “the unclean 
influences every where around them” (51). 
7 As the narrator explains early in the novel, at the time Augustus bought his own 
freedom from Robbins, there was a law stating “that any freed person who had not left 
Virginia after one year could be bought back into slavery.” Because he wanted to remain 
close to his family and eventually purchase them out of bondage, Augustus petitioned the 
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reasonable his decision seems in context, as Bassard astutely points out, by becoming 
Henry’s master, Augustus ironically “replicates the social hierarchy” that he had intended 
to transcend, thereby confirming for his son the inexorability of the slave system to which 
their family remains subject (415).  
 In one sense, then, the character of Augustus is a vehicle for Jones to explore and 
ultimately critique the notion, articulated in The City of God, that “the father of a family 
should draw his own precepts from the law of the city, and rule his household in such a 
way that it is brought into harmony with the city’s peace” (19.16). When Augustus does 
exactly this—effectively letting the “law” of the plantation determine his relationship 
with his wife and son—he makes them all complicit in slavery’s expansion. Not only will 
being his father’s slave help Henry justify his own slaveholding interests one day (he tells 
his parents that they never taught him owning another human being was “wrong” [137]), 
but it also forces Henry to look elsewhere for paternal companionship and support, 
bringing him ever closer to William Robbins, who encourages his lust for mastery. Thus 
the novel implicates Augustus and the Augustinian theology that his name evokes in 
Henry’s meteoric rise to power as well as in his mistreatment of slaves. In one revealing 
scene, which occurs just after Henry confesses to buying his first bondsman, Augustus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
state to be allowed to stay in Manchester County—a petition that was granted, due in 
large part to his skills as a carpenter. Yet, after buying his wife, we learn that “Augustus 
did not seek a petition for Mildred…because the law allowed freed slaves to stay on in 
the state in cases where they lived as someone’s property, and relatives and friends often 
took advantage of the law to keep loved ones close by. Augustus would also not seek a 
petition for Henry, his son, and over time, because of how well William Robbins, their 
former owner, treated Henry, people in Manchester County just failed to remember that 
Henry, in fact, was listed forever in the records of Manchester as his father’s property” 
(15-16).  
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banishes his son from his land, telling him he “would never suffer a slaveowner to set 
foot on it”; then, when the younger man refuses to heed his father’s warning, Augustus 
hits him across the back, saying “‘Thas how a slave feel!...Thas just how every slave 
every day be feelin’” (138). Ostensibly this physical response was meant to awaken 
Henry’s empathy for the person he had recently purchased (Moses) and to encourage him 
to set that man free. Augustus’s violence therefore satisfies The City of God’s criteria for 
a father’s justifiable use of force. “If anyone in the household is an enemy to domestic 
peace because of disobedience,” Augustine writes, “he is corrected by a word, or by a 
blow, of by whatever other kind of punishment is just and lawful…but this is for the 
benefit of the person corrected, so that he may be readmitted to the peace from which he 
has sundered himself” (19.16). Augustus (who is far from a violent character8) likely 
viewed his own outburst in similar terms: as a means of correcting Henry’s grievous 
error and reminding him of his moral obligation to the black community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 At only one other place in the text do we see Augustus raise his hand in anger. Then, 
too, the violence is directed against Henry: he shakes his son and pushes him to the 
ground after the boy was repeatedly—and unapologetically—late for visits with his 
parents, during the years William Robbins still owned him. In both instances, then, 
Augustus uses physical force in a manner consistent with Augustinian theology. He is 
exercising his “duty” as a father: punishing Henry’s disobedience and reminding him of 
his filial obligations to “domestic rule.” But, notably, here (as well as in the scene 
discussed above) his violence has an effect other than what he intended. It ends up 
confirming Robbins’s power and the ethics of plantation life, rather than his own parental 
authority. Indeed, upon hearing that Augustus “did something” to Henry, Robbins tells 
him and Mildred, “I won’t have you touching my boy, my property” and prohibits them 
from visiting him for a month (19). Since they are defenseless against him, Augustus and 
Mildred have no choice but to abide by Robbins’s decree. Therefore, although it does not 
happen the way he wanted, Augustus’s show of force accomplishes exactly what The City 
of God says it should: it bolsters “the integrity of the whole of which it is a part,” 
bringing into “harmony” the law of the household with the law of the land (19.16). 
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 The problem, though, is that as a slaveowner himself—legally, if not in practice—
Augustus possesses neither the authority nor the moral capital to convince his son of the 
“wrong” of what he has done. In fact, by referring to Henry as “slave” and breaking his 
shoulder, he merely reveals his own hypocrisy in the matter, further compromising 
whatever parental influence he once had. So it could be argued that Augustus’s recourse 
to violence is not consistent with the aims laid out in The City of God, because it limits 
(rather than extends) the father’s “domestic rule” (19.16). And yet, we find upon 
examination of the scene’s aftermath that it actually accords perfectly with Augustinian 
logic, perversely confirming the “harmony” between Henry Townsend’s household and 
the wider civic organization. In other words, even though the blow Augustus strikes does 
not reestablish Henry’s obedience to his biological “master,” it does—in full accordance 
with Augustine’s principle of righteous mastery—bring the younger man’s personal 
values in line with the presiding laws of land. For immediately after being hit by his 
father, Henry seeks refuge with his original owner, William Robbins, where he resolves 
once and for all to participate as fully as possibly in the plantation economy. Indeed, it is 
there, sitting on Robbins’s porch the day Augustus banishes him from his childhood 
home, when Henry first realizes “how much he wanted” to lord over a whole empire of 
slaves, governing them according to the example that Robbins and the other “Caesars”9 
of Manchester County set (141). In this way, therefore, Jones exposes the dark underside 
of Augustinian theology, highlighting the various means by which the discussion of just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although Henry does not use the term “Caesars” to refer to Robbins and other wealthy 
slaveowners in Manchester County, other characters do—most notably, Sheriff 
Skiffington throughout the novel.  
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rule from The City of God could be used—and, in fact, was used—to sanction slavery in 
general and the physical abuse of slaves in particular. Much like Toni Morrison’s critique 
of the Pauline epistles in Beloved (which I discuss in Chapter One), The Known World 
relentlessly undermines any suggestion of the divinely ordained nature of servitude, 
showing that enslavement can never be benevolent or redemptive, regardless of its 
context. 
 To be sure, Morrison and Jones engage comparable justifications for slavery in 
their novels, since Augustine’s theological position on this matter derives largely from 
Paul’s letters. In the chapters of The City of God that concern the condition of servitude, 
Augustine refers directly to 1 Corinthians and Ephesians, where he reminds readers, “the 
apostle admonishes servants to be obedient to their masters…so that, if they cannot be 
freed by their masters, they can at least make their own slavery to some extent free” 
(19.15). Here and throughout Book 19, Augustine bases his interpretation of divine 
enslavement upon the very same—conservative—pole of Pauline theology that I claim 
Morrison condemns in her fiction (via Baby Suggs’s sermon, for example). Thus, by 
calling attention to the inherent inconsistencies of the Augustinian concept of ethical 
mastery, The Known World is, by extension, incriminating Paul’s teachings on slavery as 
well, in a manner analogous to Beloved. But just as Morrison’s novel stops short of a total 
repudiation of Pauline Christianity (and ultimately privileges through the construct of 
rememory those aspects of Paul’s epistles that emphasize communal sharing and 
redemption), I want to argue that Jones’s engagement with Augustine is more ambivalent 
than a surface-level reading would suggest. On this point, it is important to note, I am not 
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alone. Political scientist Stephen Marshall makes the case in a brilliant article that The 
Known World both “contests” and “embraces” the account of servitude put forth in The 
City of God. Specifically, he contends that while Jones’s text remains intensely critical of 
the defense of violence from Book 19, it simultaneously proposes an Augustinian 
solution (i.e. his notion of “exilic virtue”10) for the “problem of slavery” that it depicts. 
Marshall even goes so far as to say that the “heroic” slaves whom the novel celebrates for 
confronting violence with “an indomitable self-discipline, which simply refuses the 
master/slave relation as such” are “exemplary” of “the model” of “personal cultivation” 
that Augustine advances in The City of God.  
 As the only extant scholarship on The Known World to focus explicitly on the 
novel’s Augustinian subtext, Marshall’s article establishes a useful framework for 
exploring the ambivalence at its core and runs parallel to my own. I will be suggesting 
that precisely because Jones mounts such a rigorous challenge to Augustine’s analysis of 
slavery, The City of God informs every aspect of his characters’ defiance of enslavement. 
Moreover, I view the art produced by slaves in The Known World as “a philosophically 
profound critique” of “the order of servitude” which Augustine defends (Marshall). Near 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 According to Marshall, Augustine’s notion of “exilic virtue” is a “defense against” the 
“temptations” of mastery, which suggests that “to live the best life possible in a political 
system whose corrosive values justify extreme domination, one should live as a 
‘pilgrim’—that is, one who is in a state of exile. In practice, this means willfully 
submitting oneself to the order of servitude as a means of cultivating the self.” In 
Marshall’s reading of Jones’s novel, the model of exilic virtue inspires “three outstanding 
examples of slaves repudiating the lust for mastery.” The examples he gives are: Celeste 
and Elias, “who establish relations of familial intimacy under condition of natal 
alienation”; Augustus, who in the last moments of his life chooses to walk peaceably 
towards death having “seen the folly of his own decline into the lust for mastery when he 
attempted to coerce his son through violence”; and Alice Night, who makes art which 
“transcends the lust for mastery by transcending the lust for servitude.”   
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the end of his essay, Marshall offers the compelling proposition that one of the novel’s 
artists, Alice Night, successfully “transcends” the condition of slavery altogether through 
songs and material productions that “repudiate” the human “lust for mastery” and (in the 
words of W.E.B. Du Bois) “‘grope toward some unseen power’” instead.11 I agree with 
this assessment but want to expand it to include not only the artwork of other slaves 
represented in the text but also the text itself. However—and this marks my significant 
departure from Marshall—whereas he perceives Alice’s art in terms categorically 
opposed to “Augustine’s or any particular religion’s” theology, I argue that her aesthetic 
vision and the aesthetic vision prioritized by Jones more generally actually incorporates 
the theological stakes of The City of God, specifically with regard to the concept of divine 
prescience. 
+++ 
 What is it, then, that connects Alice’s artistry to the way Augustine describes 
God’s eternal “idea” of the world in The City of God? I begin with this question because 
of the central role her character plays in defining the novel’s broader approach to art. 
Alice is often said to represent “the author in the text” on account of “her knowledge” 
and “her capacity for invention” (Berman 237). Moreover, multiple critics have cited the 
two mixed media pieces she creates along with the enigmatic songs she writes as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The internal quote is from Du Bois’s “pioneering” analysis of slaves’ sorrow songs, 
which Marshall says, led future commentators to interpret “the music and art of slaves as 
profound and articulate protest against the experience of enslavement.” Because Marshall 
is particularly concerned with the way Alice Night’s artwork critiques mastery—as 
opposed to the condition of servitude—he extrapolates from Du Bois’s interpretation of 
the sorrow songs to suggest that The Known World “poignantly insists that rather than, or 
perhaps in addition to, protesting slavery, the art of slaves articulates a philosophically 
profound critique of the problem of mastery.”  
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indicative of the “transformative” or “transcendent”—some have even suggested 
salvific—power Jones assigns to aesthetic creation.12 And The Known World provides 
much to support these kinds of interpretations. For we discover in the final pages of the 
novel that the confounding lyrics Alice could always be heard singing around Master 
Henry’s property were not unintelligible ramblings, as everyone believed; rather they 
were part of an extensive code she developed to map out the geography of the plantation. 
Therefore, in a very real sense, her lyrical verses can be said to transcend the order of 
slavery, since they are what deliver Alice and the two other slaves she eventually runs 
away with to freedom. Along similar lines, the “grand” wall hangings, which are 
displayed for patrons of the restaurant/safe house she operates in Washington D.C., effect 
life-altering experiences. Calvin explains in a letter home to his sister Caldonia, Alice’s 
former mistress, that when he happened upon the “massive miracle” she had produced, he 
“sank” to his knees and began for the first time ever to confront an unacknowledged part 
of his past: “that I, no matter what I had always said to the contrary, owned people of our 
Race” (385-6). As a direct result of the personal revelation brought about by the artwork, 
Calvin postpones, possibly forever, his lifelong “need to be in New-York” and commits 
himself to the service of fugitive slaves, helping them find safety in the North (383).   
 Given the transformations it facilitates and the miraculous—almost 
inexplicable—nature of its content, Alice’s art has a mystical quality that the scholarship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Regarding the various scholarly interpretations of Alice’s artwork: Seger discusses its 
ability to elicit “a positive emotional and visceral reaction” in viewers which, in turn, 
transforms their worldview (1189-90); Bassard refers to her wall hanging as “immanent 
and transcendent” (418, my italics); and Donaldson writes that in her sculpture/tapestry 
“lies salvation” (281, my italics).  
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overwhelmingly associates with an “alternative” (i.e. non-Western) spirituality. In 
addition to Marshall, who ascribes her aesthetic vision to an “openness to diverse sources 
of religious insight” and a polytheistic conception of the universe (he refers to “her gods’ 
divinity”—plural), many scholars also have emphasized what differentiates Alice from 
the dominant Western paradigms explored elsewhere in the novel.13 Clearly, she 
conforms to neither the worldview of the slaves nor of the slaveholding class: a fact that 
everyone in Manchester County blames on the injury she suffered when kicked in the 
head by a mule. Due to the story she tells of that incident, which “people” point to in 
order to explain how she “lost her mind,” Alice is held to a different standard than those 
she lives among (3). No one expects her to be able to communicate rationally or to adhere 
to the normalizing rules of plantation culture. This means that as long as she completes 
her fieldwork efficiently, Alice has leave to do what she pleases. Henry and Moses, his 
overseer, permit her to wander freely at night, and she suffers no penalty for “doing 
things that sometimes made the hair on the backs of the slave patrollers’ necks stand up” 
(12). All of her antics—including the chants she sends up “to the rafters of heaven” and 
the nonsensical predictions she makes about the future—are deemed products of an 
addled brain and thus not quashed with the same force that nonconformist actions 
typically were by masters wary of insubordination (75).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 These types of readings—which emphasize Alice’s divergence from “traditionalist,” 
“white,” or “European” conceptions of the world—are so common, in fact, that one critic, 
Tim A. Ryan, felt compelled to challenge an interpretation of her character that is 
“organized around such simple oppositions” (Ryan 206). However, even Ryan’s 
deconstructivist analysis does not take into account, as mine will, the way her artwork is 
informed by Western Christianity. He focuses instead on how her tapestries “echo,” in 
their representation of specific and local stories, “the project of contemporary 
historiography” (207).  
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 But, as the narrator establishes early on, Alice’s insanity is simply a façade, a 
performance she stages to excuse behavior that would have resulted in severe punishment 
for any other slave. Three pages into the novel, for example, we learn that there were no 
mules on the farm Alice lived prior to Henry’s, where she supposedly sustained the 
wound that “sent all common sense flying out of her.” On that plantation, “in a faraway 
country whose name only she remembered,” Alice could not have been injured, at least 
not in the way she describes, because her owner at the time “was terrified of mules” and 
would not have allowed one on his property (4). Then, a bit later in the narrative, it is 
revealed that “a day before the mule kicked her in the head, an African woman who 
spoke very little English had told her that some angels were hard of hearing, that it was 
best to speak real loud when talking to them” (76). Implicitly, these fragments about 
Alice’s past link her to a cosmology and a mode of truth-telling that run counter to the 
realist, rationalist strain of the text. Not only does the account she gives of her personal 
history appear to be fictional, but it seems she was also influenced by a set of beliefs 
which fall outside the bounds of Western religious traditions (as suggested by the 
reference to the “faraway country” she once lived in as well as her companionship with 
“an African woman”). And so, Jones gives critics like Marshall credible evidence to 
support an argument for reading Alice against the grain of “dogmatic” Christianity 
because her perspective so radically diverges from nearly everyone else we meet in The 
Known World—and certainly all those individuals identifying in the novel as Christian.14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 With the exception of a few Catholics whose presence in the novel I will try to account 
for in turn, the vast majority of characters in The Known World are Protestant, as we 
would expect from a novel set in Virginia in the years following the Second Great 
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Indeed, the sole character who has been shown to complement Alice’s unconventional 
approach to religion and spiritual insight is the narrator him/herself.15 Yet if we consider 
what really connects the two figures, their resemblance, I argue, has much more to do 
with traditional, Western Christianity—and, specifically, the tenets of Augustinian 
theology—than the criticism thus far has acknowledged. 
 Beyond the fairly obvious comparisons that can be made on the level of artistic 
representation (e.g. they both confuse truth and fiction; they both blend genres and modes 
of articulation; they both incorporate supernatural elements), Alice and Jones’s narrator 
take a similar, God’s-eye view of Manchester Country, which in turn determines the 
temporal scope of their respective narrations. Earlier I discussed how The Known World 
flashes forward at odd intervals to reveal what happens to marginal characters at the hour 
of their death. Likewise, we read that one of the ways Alice terrorizes the slave patrollers 
who guard the perimeters of Henry’s plantation is by “giving them the day and time God 
would take them to heaven, would drag each and every member of their families across 
the sky and toss them into hell with no more thought than a woman dropping strawberries 
into a cup of cream” (12). Although the patrollers dismiss these ramblings as “mad,” her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Awakening. In fact, in a private correspondance with me, Jones indicated that the slaves 
and slaveholders depicted in the novel “were, no doubt, all Protestants.” What is more, 
everyone on Henry Townsend’s plantation attends regular Sunday services officiated by 
Reverend Moffett, whose preaching, the narrator remarks, “had but one theme—that 
heaven was nearer than anyone realized and that one step away from the righteous path 
could take heaven away for ever. […] His ending words were that [the slaves] should 
obey their masters and mistresses, for heaven would not be theirs if they disobeyed” (87). 
Thus we discover in the particular brand of Protestantism proffered by Moffett a striking 
similarity to the conservative pole of Pauline theology that I discussed in Chapter One 
terms of fundamentalist Christianity. 
15 Among the critics who draw comparisons between Alice and the narrator of The 
Known World are Seger, Berman, and, of course, Marshall. 
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prophecies are analogous in their specificity and the telescoping detail they provide to the 
novel’s own forward-looking glances. Just as Alice claims to know when exactly and 
how the people around her will die, so too does the narrator describe with remarkable 
precision the circumstances surrounding each future event. For instance, in referring to 
the slave child, Patrick, the narrative notes not just that he would be killed some day by 
his girlfriend’s jealous husband, but that his murder will occur “when he was forty-
seven” years old, during the same week he gambled away “$53 and owed one evil man 
$11 more” (68-9). This kind of particularization indicates foreknowledge that is, like 
Alice’s, simultaneously sweeping and intimate. It reflects a vision of the world that does 
not conform easily to the human experience of temporality. For that reason, in both cases, 
audiences tend to receive these temporal disruptions skeptically, because omniscience of 
any sort exceeds the limits of lived reality. (Think of the reviewer, Alan Cheuse, who 
objected to the novel’s flash-forward technique on the grounds that it distracts from the 
narrator’s realist pretense. His complaint recalls the slave patrollers’ about Alice, in the 
sense that he also finds the “interjected references to all the tomorrows that follow” the 
temporal borders of the narrative defamiliarizing and “annoying.”) 
 Despite the negative reactions it can conjure, however, The Known World 
ultimately validates Alice’s omniscience—as well as its own—by means of the letter 
Calvin writes to Caldonia. The document, which is afforded a privileged place at the end 
of the novel, serves to honor and to confirm the value of art that represents “what God 
sees when He looks down on Manchester” (384). It is, after all, due to the startling 
aesthetic experience of witnessing the entire County and its people represented from 
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above that Calvin says he was inspired to transform his life. In particular, he notes how 
affected he was by the one piece depicting “every single person” who ever lived on his 
brother-in-law’s plantation: all of them, including long-dead slaves that “have risen” from 
their grave, standing together as they never could have in reality, outside the cabins they 
once occupied with faces “raised up as though to look in the very eyes of God” (385). 
Something about this tapestry and its capacity for compressing so many distinct historical 
moments, so many distinct stories of life and death, on the same narrative plane awaken, 
Calvin tells his sister, “matters in my memory that I did not know were there until I saw 
them on that wall” (386). Thus he becomes incapable of denying any longer his 
complicity in the fate of each individual, living and dead, enslaved by a system that 
benefitted him. Seeing those individuals portrayed according to Alice’s expansive vision 
of them—and without regard for linear continuity or history—disrupts whatever 
provisional reason Calvin had used previously to justify slavery (the obligation he felt to 
maintain his mother’s property until her death, for example). As a number of critics have 
observed, then, his reaction to the wall hangings legitimizes the “indulgence” required by 
any work that stakes claims about its characters “from a distance” and “across 
discontinuities” of space and time (Berman 237). And, by extension, Calvin’s letter 
tacitly endorses the disruptive temporality of Jones’s writing too, by emphasizing the 
transformative potential of art that transcends temporal existence and takes an omniscient 
view of the world.  
 Notably, even the words Calvin uses to describe Alice’s artistry—he dubs her a 
“Creator” (with a capital c) and refers to each of her productions as a “massive 
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miracle”—resonate with the way the author himself has mythologized the production of 
his novel. In the long passage I quoted above from his interview with HarperCollins, 
Jones also makes clear that he prefers the term “creator” to artist or writer and, quite 
strikingly, defends the non-linearity of his text by likening his authorship to being “the 
‘god’ of the people in the book.” Jones’s tendency to associate aesthetic vision with the 
divine comes through so powerfully, in fact, that when reviewing the author’s most 
recent story collection for the New York Times, Dave Eggers remarked, “Jones is at his 
best when he plays God. As an omniscient narrator, he has a most assured grasp of the 
world he writes about.” The same could be said for Alice Night, whose “grasp of the 
world” and vast knowledge of her environs quite literally determines the fate of the 
people she saves from slavery. While surely countless factors influence how authors 
speak about their writing publically (and we know that Jones has had to work harder than 
most to be recognized for the powers of his imagination), the confluence of his public 
statements on the novel with Calvin’s epistolary celebration of Alice is conspicuous. 
Both draw upon the language of the Bible—and the creation myth from the Book of 
Genesis, specifically—to answer for lapses in realism, as well as to explain narrative 
omniscience. Indeed, and more specifically still, I want to suggest that what emerges in 
these two accounts of aesthetic creativity is an idea of the artist that compliments (and 
mines considerable influence from) the Augustinian reading of Genesis, in particular, 
wherein Augustine defines God’s “perfect” and “eternal” knowledge of the world.  
 The Book of Genesis, of course, makes frequent appearances in Jones’s novel, 
and other critics have noticed that Calvin’s letter plainly alludes to the biblical story of 
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creation. It seems that everyone who inhabits the fictional space of Manchester County 
draws inspiration in one form or another from that master text—or from one of its many 
interpretations, such as Paradise Lost. An early scene depicts Caldonia offering to read 
Henry, just before he dies, “A bit of Milton? Or the Bible?” (5-6). These are, she implies, 
the sole books they own, since when he confesses to being tired of both, her only other 
option is to sing to him. In fact, we learn later via the recollections of his former teacher, 
Fern Elston, that Henry was deeply sympathetic to Milton’s revisionary portrait of the 
Devil and particularly to that character’s proclamation “that he would rather rule in hell 
than serve in heaven.” As Fern recalls, Henry “thought only a man who knew himself 
well could say such a thing, could turn his back on God with such just finality” (134-5). 
This rather simplistic understanding of Satan’s choice clearly inspires Henry’s own 
approach to slavery, as does his belief—also motivated by a misreading of Genesis—that 
“God gave” the created world to him alone, to do with as he pleases (6). In addition to 
Henry, many other residents of Manchester look to Genesis for guidance on how to 
manage their slaveholding interests. For instance, Reverend Valtims Moffett advises his 
property-owning congregants to avoid overtaxing themselves with anxiety about unhappy 
slaves because those sorts of worries would not be warranted by the Lord, especially on 
the Sabbath. As justification for his words, Moffett refers to the “emphasis” placed on 
God’s “resting” in the first book of the Bible (89). Sheriff Skiffington, too, vows to rest 
every Sunday according to the example set by the Lord, and he likewise uses passages 
from Genesis to help him contend with the guilt he feels about working to support 
slaveowners and owning a slave himself (though he does not regard Minerva as such). 
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The story of Lot, especially, reminds him that “all” things—even those he finds 
“disturbing,” like slavery—are “part of God’s plan” and not to be questioned by man 
(162). 
 Through the allusions to Genesis that I have just described, and others as well, 
Jones thus conveys the malleability of the Bible’s first book, revealing how readily its 
contents could be manipulated by supposedly pious individuals, seeking divine 
justification for deplorable acts. But when Calvin alludes to the story of creation as a way 
of communicating to his sister the miracle of the artwork he views in Washington, his 
reference to Genesis takes another form entirely. Instead of using the biblical text to 
justify Alice’s actions or to suggest that God sanctioned her escape from slavery (two 
gestures one would think he might make, given that Caldonia was still lawfully her owner 
and could travel north at any point to reclaim that stolen property), Calvin portrays the 
runaway as a Creator-God herself: someone whose knowledge of the land is so complete 
that she need not fear legal retribution from aggrieved slaveholders or anyone else with 
the law on their side. In fact, his letter makes no mention of Alice’s fugitive status at all, 
nor does he attempt to disguise her location or to shield her in any manner from the threat 
of his sister’s vengeance. His singular concern about writing to Caldonia is that their 
correspondence will expose him and his past associations with slavery. Consequently, 
Calvin closes the document by asking that when she replies to him by mail, care of the 
hotel owned by Alice, she “recall my fear of being cast out and please write my name on 
the envelope as humbly as you possibly can” (386, my italics). What his request implies 
is that Alice has created a new order of existence—a new world—in Washington that 
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operates independent of the antebellum justice system and according to a set of “laws” 
totally of her own design. Calvin considers himself fortunate to have access to everything 
she has built (“I am happy when I get up in the morning,” he says, “and I am happy when 
I lay my head down at night”) and yet views his inclusion in this paradise as temporary, 
since it is contingent on remaining in Alice’s good graces. Thus, with language 
reminiscent of the Fall of Man from Genesis, he agonizes over the possibility that she 
will “cast” him “out” for his sins, like Adam and Eve from the Garden. 
 To Calvin, then, Alice’s creative vision comprises not just the art she produces 
but also the many lives she has given form and meaning to through her work. As he sees 
it, this renders her as powerful as a deity—the reason why, I think, he refers to her with 
the kind of awe and reverence that the Bible reserves for God alone. The power Alice 
wields is indeed “miraculous” in Calvin’s estimation, because of the sheer magnitude of 
all she was able to accomplish in the short time after leading Priscilla and Jamie out of 
slavery. In just a few years, she became well known and respected throughout the city as 
an artist as well as the visionary owner of a hotel where “Senators and Congressmen 
lodged” but that was also “hospitable” to fugitive slaves (384). For people who knew her 
on the Townsend plantation, when she was deemed a mad woman, the totality of what 
she created would have seemed impossible. But, as Calvin discovers the moment he reads 
the words “Alice Night” at the bottom right-hand corner of the wall hanging, her 
“exquisite” aesthetic masterpieces as well as the boardinghouse she runs were part of the 
plan from the beginning: the end result of an all-encompassing idea that was hatched long 
before, with the story she made up and told to anyone who would listen about a fictional 
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mule that kicked her in the head. Therefore, just as Jones says he spent nearly decade 
walking around thinking about the characters in The Known World prior to putting 
anything on paper, Alice also devoted large portions of her life to imaginatively mapping 
out the “Creation” she would one day make real.  
 Significantly, the foreknowledge that both artists gained about their respective 
projects during these long periods of solitary planning informs the temporal structure of 
the art they turn out. Alice’s wall hanging, as I have said, brings together each person and 
every inch of the land she came to know while slaving on—and preparing her route off 
of—Henry’s plantation. All the information she collected over the years is represented 
from a single sweeping perspective that compresses the passage of time. Similarly, Jones 
ascribes the telescoping feature of The Known World and the narrator’s omniscience to 
all he learned about his characters’ lives (their “first days and their last days”) as the 
design for the novel developed in his head. Having a protracted period of planning, when 
he was able to picture in his mind the entirety of the plot, explains too, Jones says, the 
relative speed with which he produced the manuscript, once he sat down to attend to it. 
Indeed, even the impetus to finally start writing was, like the impetus for Alice to strike 
out from the plantation, sudden—yet also completely arbitrary. Jones has made clear that 
being laid off from his job gave him an excuse to write without any distraction but that 
the book would have been written anyway, given how rigorously he had thought it 
through. (Talking to Maryemma Graham in 2008, he was quick to insist on this point: 
“The world should not think, ‘Oh he lost his job and that spurred him on to write a 
novel’” (426].) And, likewise, although Alice left when she did to help Priscilla and 
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Jamie, her escape route had been prepared for a while and she was ready to leave at a 
moment’s notice, whenever a reason for leaving presented itself. Thus she could respond 
to Moses’s request the day after he made it, knowing exactly where to lead his wife and 
his son so that they would remain safe. Whether that request came months earlier, months 
later, or not at all, though, Alice obviously had already amassed all the knowledge 
necessary to bring her plan to fruition—knowledge which she then uses to create her 
“wondrous” art. 
 My purpose then in highlighting the similarities between the author’s own 
creative process and that of his character Alice, is to pinpoint Jones’s obvious and 
abiding concern with the way artists relate to time. In the interviews he has given about 
The Known World as well as in the text itself, Jones places special emphasis on how long 
various works of art take to construct, as though to signal the temporal contingencies of 
aesthetic production. For example, at one point early in the novel, his narrator tallies the 
length of time Augustus spends building each piece of furniture in his collection: “he 
could make a four-poster bed of oak in three weeks, chairs he could do in two days, 
chiffoniers in seventeen days,” and so on (14). Recalling the precision with which Jones 
describes the period of drafting his manuscript (he tells nearly every interviewer the date 
he started writing and when the first draft was complete), Augustus’s wood carvings are 
measured in chronological terms, according to the number of days or weeks required for 
their construction. Not only do details such as these underscore the material processes 
involved in creating masterpieces, but they also reinforce the mythology that Jones tends 
to associate with art making more generally—reminding readers, once again, of the 
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biblical story of creation. In the same manner that the miracle of Genesis is compounded 
by the astonishing speed with which God created the universe, so too does Jones invoke 
temporality to stress the miraculousness of artistic enterprise. (Carving in just two days, 
as Augustus can, a chair whose beauty brings “sinners to tears” is indeed a miraculous 
feat, comparable perhaps to producing a Pulitzer Prize-winning novel in only two and a 
half months or to, say, making earth and all its multitude in just under a week.) And yet, 
despite Jones’s interest in establishing a timeline for each of the projects represented in 
the narrative, there emerges a very clear—and seemingly contradictory—sense that the 
individuals responsible for those projects are themselves entirely unaffected by the hours 
or days or weeks it takes to produce them: that their vision of the work resists temporal 
limits and thus cannot be accounted for by any standard measure of time.  
 Unlike other characters who rigidly attend to the clock, letting it dictate every 
facet of their lives, the artists of The Known World are not beholden to temporality in the 
same way. They evince a capacity for looking beyond the immediate context of daily 
existence, from a perspective far removed from time’s vicissitudes. This is what 
distinguishes them from someone such as Moses whose overseer responsibilities require 
him to track, meticulously, the passing hours in the day in order to optimize the 
productivity of the growing season. While Moses berates Elias for staying up late to 
carve the doll for Tessie and is constantly after Alice to return to her cabin at night (so 
they will both be ready to work in the morning), these two are always too consumed by 
whittling or by singing to heed his warning about the fast approaching dawn. Along 
similar lines, the narrator says at one point of Augustus that “as usual” he repeatedly 
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judged incorrectly how long it would take to deliver his furniture to clients in other 
counties, and as a result often returned a day or more after he told his wife he would be 
home (211). Their inability—or unwillingness—to abide by chronological time and the 
temporal logic of the plantation puts all three of these artists at risk of dangerous 
consequences: Elias and Alice because of what Moses will do to them if they are “but 
two minutes off” from the morning bell and Augustus because his habitual lateness 
inclined Mildred not to contact the authorities to report his absence as early as she should 
have (8). However much they might suffer, though, for being out of sync with the 
chronology that everyone else in Manchester County adheres to, the novel never supports 
the suggestion, made by some in the community, that this indicates a cognitive deficiency 
or some lack of mental acuity on their parts. Quite to the contrary, Jones implies that the 
artist’s tendency to perceive time differently only increases his/her authority, rendering 
him/her ever more like the Creator-God of Genesis. For, as I discussed above, it is 
Alice’s unique viewpoint—her ability to transcend temporal conventions and to represent 
distinct historical moments in one sweeping vision—that gives her art its transformative 
power and, according to Calvin’s letter, signifies the “miracle” of her “Creation.” 
 Indeed, I want to suggest that the way Alice and other artists in the text 
experience time corresponds not just in broad terms to the Old Testament myth of a 
divine creator but actually, and with remarkable specificity, to Augustine’s influential 
reading of Genesis, which argues that God cannot be measured by any existing temporal 
standard. As John Cavadini has explained, Augustine devoted so much attention in his 
theological writings to the biblical story of creation because of his commitment to 
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demonstrating “the uniqueness and the superiority of God’s mind” as well as its inherent 
incomprehensibility (37). In contradistinction to the philosophers of the period who 
sought to articulate precisely why and for what reason God created the world when he 
did, Augustinian theology is premised on the impossibility of ever being able to reconcile 
“His eternal knowledge” with human temporality.16 Thus a point Augustine stresses 
throughout The City of God is the difference between how the Lord regards time and how 
the rest of “us” do: 
It is not with God as it is with us. He does not look ahead to the 
future, look directly at the present, look back to the past. He sees in 
some other manner, utterly remote from anything we experience or 
could imagine…He sees all without any kind of change.17 (11.21) 
 
Here, and elsewhere in the treatise, Augustine maintains that attempts to understand 
God’s vision and the creative act willed by it in terms of our linear, mutable lives are 
futile, since the creator “sees all” at once, from an omniscient perspective impervious to 
temporal changes. This argument, like the one he makes about temporality in Book 11 of 
Confessions, hinges on the absolute inadequacy of human ways of seeing, relative to the 
Lord’s. One of Augustine’s primary goals, then, in The City of God is to establish the 
supremacy of God’s sight—its timeless and immutable prescience. With regard to the 
Genesis story, in particular, he does that by arguing that, at the instant of creation (and 
eternally before), God foresaw every individual creature who inhabits the earth—past, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Cavadini demonstrates that one of Augustine’s main purposes in writing The City of 
God is to reveal “the insufficiency even of philosophy to provide an adequate account of 
what seems to be an almost uniquely philosophical topic, God’s eternal knowledge” (37). 
17 Here, instead of the Dyson translation of The City of God elsewhere used in this 
chapter, I am quoting from the translation that Cavadini uses in his essay, which he notes 
is an adjusted version of Henry Bettison’s 1972 edition.  
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present, and future. Therefore, Augustine claims, no part of this infinite multitude was 
ever outside the Lord’s purview: “He has not produced them without order or foresight; 
nor has he foreseen them only at the last moment, but by His eternal knowledge” (12.19). 
 The Augustinian reading of Genesis—and his claims regarding God’s 
timelessness, specifically—were, of course, highly significant for Christian theology, 
informing, among other things, how different strands of Western Christianity have 
interpreted the providential design of creation. Indeed, Augustine’s contention that God 
“sees all” helped to shape both the Catholic and the Protestant doctrines of predestination, 
which (though divergent in some important ways I will consider below) mutually affirm 
the divine prescience of historical events. For the idea that the world’s creator “does not 
occupy time” and, in fact, could foresee the sum of human existence prior even to the 
making of the first man means that history in all its particularity was intended by God and 
contained within his plan (11.21). Hence, in The City of God, Augustine takes pains to 
show that God’s intentionality encompasses the most disastrous or seemingly irrational 
happenings—such as the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410, which was the immediate 
catalyst for his book. (Letters from the period confirm that Augustine undertook the 
writing to dispute the charge that God had abandoned Rome or been otherwise powerless 
to prevent the tribulations that the empire endured.18) Christians, he argues, must have 
faith that their temporal experience has been divinely ordered and that the meaning of 
their suffering as well as their triumphs will be revealed at their deaths. In line with this 
theological position, The City of God took the controversial stance that the emperors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a discussion of the political impetus for The City of God, see Dyson’s introduction, 
especially xi-xv. 
	  	   	  
270	  
ruling Rome at any given moment—the “godly and ungodly alike”—were each granted 
their authority by the Lord. As Augustine puts it: “He Who gave power to Marius also 
gave it to Gaius Caesar…He Who gave it to Vespasii, father and son, the gentlest of 
emperors, also gave it to Domitian, the cruelest,” and “all these things” please “the one 
true God” equally, insofar as they were foreseen in earth’s creation (5.21). Thus 
Augustine uses Genesis to advocate for history’s ultimate goodness and he tells his 
fellow Christians to wait, as piously and patiently as possible, for the coming revelation.  
 Clearly, this is not a view of history that Jones’s novel endorses in any tangible, 
political sense. Again and again, readers witness the dangers of accepting without 
question the intentionality of the created world in the way that Augustine counsels. The 
character most closely associated with Augustine’s analysis of Genesis, Sheriff 
Skiffington, gets exposed at the end of the narrative as a religious hypocrite of the worst 
kind: the type of Christian so convinced by the righteousness of God’s eternal vision that 
he refuses to challenge any part of the established order, even when the slaveholders 
(whom he tellingly calls “Caesars”) force him to commit acts of injustice. Skiffington’s 
final act, the murder of Mildred, underscores the stark moral and ethical consequences of 
an Augustinian theology of creation. This would suggest that Jones rejects out of hand 
the principle of divine prescience on which that theology is based. Yet, at the same time, 
I am tracing through my examination of Alice and the other artists in the novel what 
amounts to a mythology of aesthetic production that—paradoxically—affirms how The 
City of God depicts creative enterprise. Like Augustine’s Creator-God, Jones’s art-
makers approach their work with an intention and a knowledge that transcends all forms 
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of temporality. We find this not only in the omniscient perspective of Alice’s wall 
hangings, but also in her extraordinary ability to account for the unique life of each 
individual, human and otherwise, that lived on the Townsend property—an ability, which 
evokes the infinite scope of God’s sight as Augustine defines it. (Calvin says of her 
representation of the plantation: “There is nothing missing…I suspect that if I were to 
count the blades of grass, the number would be correct” [385].) What is more, Jones 
correlates the mysterious and apparently nonsensical behavior she exhibits during slavery 
to the absolute supremacy of her mind. Just as Augustine teaches that only God can 
foreknow the purpose of every historical event that occurs in time, even those which 
resist rational explanation, Jones’s text implies that Alice alone foresees the ultimate 
purpose of her own mystifying actions; they were all, as it turns out, part of her all-
encompassing design, revealed at the conclusion of the novel. 
  Therefore, it is possible, I am arguing, to read the narratological structure of The 
Known World and the history it represents in terms consistent with Augustine’s historical 
theology, since the plot reveals in its completion the fullness of the creator’s prescience. 
And, notably, by “creator” here, I refer to Alice as well as to Jones. For in the same way 
that Alice’s God’s-eye perspective on creation gives meaning to her supposedly irrational 
past (including the story she tells about being kicked by a mule which did not exist), so 
too does the omniscience of Jones’s narrator reveal the intentionality behind the more 
confounding aspects of his text. So I would submit that when Jones imagines the artist as 
God, who creates with timeless purpose, he is calling upon the very same concept of 
providential design that he critiques relentlessly elsewhere in the novel—via characters 
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like Sheriff Skiffington and even Augustus, both of whom are reticent to disrupt the 
authority of the created order. But rather than quietly accepting things as they are and 
waiting for the revelation of divine justice (in the fashion counseled by The City of God), 
Jones’s artists use their atemporal perception to transcend slavery in the here and now. In 
the final section of this chapter, I will consider a few more of the ways they do this, 
attempting to account for the Catholic imagery associated with their eternal vision of the 
world. 
+++ 
 Undoubtedly, Alice’s wall hangings produce the most tangible changes in the 
social order of the novel—effecting Calvin’s decision to take up the antislavery cause and 
transforming the way audiences regard the agency of slaves. Other artworks, though, 
have a transformative effect as well, albeit not always with such spectacular results. We 
might think of the doll Elias carves for Tessie, for example: a modest and deeply personal 
expression of his paternal affection, which does not necessarily turn out how he wanted it 
to look. In spite of its perceived limitations, however, the doll affords his daughter the 
opportunity to challenge in a small yet meaningful exchange with her mistress the 
assumption that slaves cannot possess property or be cared for by anyone except their 
owners. When Tessie proclaims to Caldonia and the other slaveholders within earshot 
that “My daddy made it for me,” she is thus tacitly diminishing their authority over her, 
to an extent that even she is not cognizant of at the moment (350). The fact that a piece of 
artwork is what enables this gesture of defiance implies something significant, I am 
suggesting, about not just the value of the piece itself but also of the vision of the artist 
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who created it. In other words, the narrative attributes the doll’s worth to the effort and 
love Elias put into carving it—and, specifically, to his attempt to accomplish what Alice 
advises him to do with his art: “just make it good, make it to last” (78). This bit of advice 
counts as one of the few sensible phrases Alice speaks in the text, and it is certainly the 
only statement of any kind she offers about artistry. Not surprisingly, then, given the 
argument I have been making about her God-like prescience, Alice’s words indicate that 
artists should not be beholden to the limits of human temporality, and that they should 
strive instead for a lasting—eternal—purpose whose goodness surpasses the measure of 
linear time.  
 Glancing back at Jones’s own comments on the non-linearity of the novel (in the 
passage from the HarperCollins interview excerpted above), we perceive that he also, like 
Alice, locates the purpose of Elias’s artwork outside the bounds of temporal existence. 
That is why, Jones says, he needed to abandon the chronological approach of his 
narrative and flash forward to the instant of Tessie’s death in order to reveal it: because 
only by disrupting temporality in this way could he communicate the doll’s historical 
“meaning” for Tessie and for generations of her ancestors. It requires an omniscient 
perspective, unbounded by the vicissitudes of time, to see that the toy created by an 
enslaved man for his daughter will outlast them both, well into the twentieth century—
long enough to be passed down to her great-grandchildren, who recover it from the attic 
at Tessie’s bidding on the day she dies. The temporal disruptions in the novel thus affirm 
and give expression to the eternal vision Alice counsels Elias to bring to his art, 
demonstrating that the doll does indeed stand as a lasting symbol of goodness, unaffected 
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by the passage of time. On multiple levels, then, and across distinct periods of history, 
Jones associates the doll with a sense of timelessness, which—quite literally—transcends 
the order of slavery. From the moment of its inception (when Elias was too consumed 
with carving to heed Moses’s instructions about the growing lateness) until the hour of 
Tessie’s death (when she repeats the proclamation of ownership she made to Caldonia 
ninety years earlier), the doll constitutes an enduring threat to the slaveholders’ authority. 
And, significantly, the threat it presents is one that ultimately cannot be contained, since 
(in material form, at least) it lasts longer than slavery itself—far past the historical point 
at which the institution concluded and into the timeless space beyond.  
 To the slaveholders in The Known World, the idea of timelessness is destabilizing, 
even incapacitating. Throughout the novel, Jones makes a point of demonstrating that 
every aspect of plantation culture depends on a rigorous adherence to the clock’s steadily 
ticking “hour and minute hands” (46). Any deviation from linear chronology signals a 
serious problem for those in power. Thus William Robbins believes that losing “whole 
bits of time” to his mental “storms” makes him “vulnerable” to the abolitionists, while 
Clara Martin blames her slave’s perceived disobedience on the fact that time “has no 
meaning anymore” (25-6, 152). Without the certainty of chronological experience to rely 
on, Jones suggests, the slaveholders’ way of life becomes impossible to sustain. It is for 
that reason, I am arguing, that the artist’s atemporal perception figures so prominently in 
the narrative, both in form and in content. Because their sight is not limited by clock time 
and their attention turns persistently toward the eternal, Jones’s artists have the ability to 
imagine a realm in which the established structure of slavery no longer holds. The 
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creations they make are, in fact, materially linked to that realm, insofar as they upset the 
traditional balance of power and enable acts of resistance against the prevailing order. 
(Think of the way Alice’s wall hangings inspire Calvin to bring runaway slaves to 
freedom or how Tessie’s doll helps her defy her mistress’s authority.) Over and over 
again, in this manner, the novel correlates the artist’s timeless vision to the liberation of 
slaves, implying that grasping after the eternal can enable actual freedom. 
 This secular premise, of course, has a theological counterpart in Augustine’s 
writing. In The City of God, as in all his treatises, salvation necessitates one’s faith in an 
eternity beyond the temporal world. For that reason, Augustinian theology maintains that 
any person seeking to be liberated from suffering must be able to envision the possibility 
of lasting redemption, as a step on that journey. Although, in accordance with his views 
on divine prescience, he believed the ultimate fate of every individual was foreknown by 
God, he also held firmly to the position that God wills all human beings to be saved—
even though some of them are not, because they focus too much on “temporal things” 
(1.10). This apparent contradiction gave rise to a fundamental divergence in Protestant 
and Catholic doctrines of predestination, as I indicated earlier. While Protestants 
(following John Calvin) tend to stress Augustine’s claim that God alone predestines who 
will receive salvation and that humans cannot save themselves, Catholics historically 
have emphasized the portions of Augustine’s teaching that suggest humans can choose 
either to accept or reject God’s salvific promise according to their own free will.19 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Eleonore Stump provides an informative summary of Augustine’s teaching on the role 
human beings play in their own salvation as well as the “insoluble” contradictions that 
such teaching give rise to (171-181).  
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official stance of the Catholic Church on this matter (which Jones would have surely 
heard as a child in parochial school and while studying at Holy Cross) is that being saved 
requires both the grace of divine favor and the willing assent of individuals to participate 
in the eternal goodness of the Lord. In other words: as opposed to Calvinist strands of 
Protestantism, Catholicism upholds the part of the Augustinian logic of predestination 
that makes salvation contingent on a person’s willful decision to seek redemption. 
According to the Catholic interpretation of Augustine, people who direct their attention 
away from “fleeting temporal” experience and towards “an endless eternity” can be 
redeemed from suffering, through the grace of God (3.20). 
 A parallel logic, I am suggesting, informs the correlation Jones draws in his novel 
between an artist’s atemporal perspective and the possibility of real-life liberation from 
slavery. We find it operating, for example, in the story the narrator tells of the slave girl 
Ophelia, who “disappeared” from the home of her licentious master “without an 
explanation that satisfied anyone.” Most of the white people in Manchester County 
attribute the disappearance to “her jealous and possibly murderous mistress,” but the 
slaves in town have a different perspective. The alternative theory they whisper among 
themselves goes as follows: 
Ophelia had met Jesus’s mother one late afternoon on the main road 
people took to get to Louisa County and that Mary, hearing Ophelia sing, 
had decided right then that she didn’t want heaven if it came without 
Ophelia. Mary asked Ophelia about coming with her and eating peaches 
and cream in the sunlight until Judgment Day and Ophelia shrugged her 
shoulders and said, “That sounds fine. I ain’t got nothing better to do right 
at the moment. Ain’t got nothing to do till evenin time anyway.” (40) 
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When compared with the premise that Ophelia had been murdered by her owner out of 
jealousy over the transgressive (and most certainly unwanted) affair she had with the 
woman’s husband, the account above appears entirely unrealistic, to say the least. Yet 
realism, I would submit, serves no purpose in this case. Rather the implicit function of the 
tale the slaves tell one another is to sustain hope for Ophelia’s salvation. Refusing to 
believe that the life of this “very self-confident fourteen-year-old” girl ended in an utter 
lack of agency, they create an entirely fictitious narrative—a work of art—which 
imaginatively saves her from enslavement. And, importantly, this creation bears the 
hallmarks that I have attributed to the novel’s other artworks, in that it incorporates an 
atemporal perspective that challenges the structure of the slave system. Note that 
Ophelia’s decision to eat “peaches and cream in the sunlight until Judgment Day” gets 
figured as a conscious rejection of the linear chronology of the plantation. (She chooses a 
timeless future with Mary over whatever duties she has “right at the moment” as well as 
what she had to do later in the day, at “evenin time.”) Therefore, the story stands as 
testament to the ultimate meaninglessness of the plantation clock, further destabilizing—
with every retelling—the slaveholders’ authority. 
 In fact, what is so threatening about the story the slaves tells each other is that it 
contradicts, with strikingly similar language, the message of righteous obedience they 
received “Sunday after Sunday” from Reverend Moffett. A man paid by slaveholders to 
provide religious justification for the institution by which they live, Moffett closes each 
sermon by reminding the congregation “that they should obey their masters and 
mistresses, for heaven would not be theirs if they disobeyed,” and then he punctuates the 
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point with this image: “‘One day I want to sit with yall and eat peaches and cream in 
heaven. I don’t wanna have to lean over and look way way down and see yall burnin in 
them fires of hell” (87). The Ophelia narrative directly opposes Moffett’s view of 
salvation, suggesting that the privilege of eating peaches and cream in the eternal realm 
does not depend on how closely a slave adheres to the order of the plantation system, but 
rather on one’s willingness to see beyond the system’s fleeting temporal existence. As her 
fellow slaves imagine it, Ophelia’s fate resides in her willful decision to seek redemption 
on her own terms by turning away from temporality and accepting the salvific grace 
offered to her by Mary. I have been arguing that this way of thinking about salvation 
corresponds much more readily with the Catholic doctrine of predestination than it does 
with a traditional Protestant doctrine (such as the kind Moffett preaches), and this likely 
accounts for the strange role that Mary plays in the story. For it is strange indeed that 
slaves who live Manchester County, Virginia—where Protestantism is not just the 
majority religion but also the denomination of their only official preacher—would evoke 
the name of “Jesus’s mother” to explain the liberation of one of their own. The veneration 
of Mary as a heavenly figure capable of performing miracles and providing supernatural 
assistance to people in need is a distinctly Catholic phenomenon, not something that falls 
within the Protestant system of belief. And so, Mary’s presence in the story about 
Ophelia signals, I think, a departure from Protestantism’s traditional interpretation of 
predestination—particularly the idea that human beings are incapable of saving 
themselves. In other words, the Catholic overtones of the Ophelia narrative imply that a 
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slave has at least some agency in her own salvation, even if the ultimate power to save 
her resides in (Mary’s) divine nature.  
 An equivalent point is made in another scene of a slave’s liberation, where 
Catholicism again intrudes on the narrative in an unexpected way and structures how the 
narrative imagines freedom. I am referring to the story of Rita, whose harrowing journey 
the narrator relates shortly after recounting the different explanations for Ophelia’s 
disappearance. Like Ophelia, Rita is one of a number slaves who went missing around the 
same time, prompting widespread apprehension among slaveowners about “what Robbins 
had begun to call ‘a hemorrhaging’” of property (41). And, in Rita’s case at least, their 
fears were justified, since her escape realizes an ingenious—and eventually successful—
attempt to leave slavery behind. With Augustus’s help, the narrator explains, she 
absconded from Robbins’s plantation in broad daylight, on the same afternoon Henry was 
officially sold to his father. Then, a few days later, after hiding out with the Townsends, 
she is packed into a container of walking sticks and shipped without anyone else’s 
knowledge to Augustus’s merchant in the North, where she emerges travel weary and 
sore but alive—and presumably free. The tale is, as anyone familiar with fugitive slave 
narratives would surely notice, nearly identical to one told in The Life of Henry Box 
Brown, which also features a daring escape from slavery by way of the U.S. Postal 
Service. Even small details, such as the words scrawled onto the container that holds Rita 
(“THIS SIDE UP WITH EXTREME CARE”) and the handlers’ blatant disregard for 
those instructions at various stops along the way, bear a remarkable similarity to Box’s 
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famous account (52).20 Clearly, then, Jones had the Box story in mind when he imagined 
Rita’s salvation from slavery. 
 Rather than focusing on the similarities between these two narratives, though, I 
want to examine the changes Jones made to Brown’s story when he appropriated it for his 
novel. I have in mind, specifically, Jones’s choice to ship the box containing Rita to New 
York instead of Philadelphia (as in Brown). The change in venue results in the box being 
opened not by members of the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society but by an Irish 
immigrant named Mary, without any connection to the abolitionist cause. Because the 
vignette is otherwise so faithful, in ways both major and minor, to the details of Henry 
Brown’s escape, these two divergences call attention to themselves. Most obviously, they 
provide an opening for introducing the story of the Irish immigrant into Jones’s narrative: 
descriptions of Mary’s miserable emigration to the United States. The narrator devotes 
pages to Mary’s immigrant story—almost as many as those spent detailing Rita’s 
journey. One could even argue that Jones provides more information about Mary than 
about the slave whom she rescues. We learn, for example, that both her first husband and 
her infant daughter died on the ship out of Cork Harbor, and that they were given burials 
at sea, during which her older son performed multiple recitations of the Lord’s Prayers 
and Hail Mary’s. We also learn that Mary’s breast milk “stopped flowing” the day after 
her daughter’s death and that it never returned again, even after she had three more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The words on Brown’s container, which he repeats a number of time throughout his 
narrative, read “This side up with care”—almost exactly the same phrase inscribed on 
Rita’s container. 
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children and prayed to “Mary the mother of Jesus to intercede with God on her behalf” 
and to help her feed her babies (51).  
 As a means of answering for these seemingly unrelated and extraneous pieces of 
Mary’s personal history, critics have attributed this and other references to people from 
Ireland in The Known World to “the associations between slaves and the Irish in the 
popular imagination” (Giemza 41). In other words, they would contend that Jones uses 
the sad tale of her emigration experience in a general sense to express some fundamental 
commonality, perhaps, in how African Americans and Irish immigrants have been 
disenfranchised in the United States.21 But Mary’s character, to my mind, has more direct 
relevance to the way the novel imagines slavery than the criticism would suggest—that 
her background actually underscores how significantly Jones’s secular interpretation of 
salvation is informed by Catholicism’s doctrine of predestination. The fact that Rita’s 
freedom depends on the mercy of an Irish Catholic woman whose name and life story 
link her to “the mother of Jesus” is of central importance to the entire vignette, especially 
when we consider that Henry Brown’s rescuers were all men, and the one he credits with 
actually receiving him in Philadelphia, James Miller McKim, was a Presbyterian 
minister. Jones’s decision to change the gender and the religious orientation of the person 
responsible for opening the box demands interpretation. Not only does the 
characterization of Rita’s rescuer forge an imaginative connection to the Ophelia 
narrative (since both slaves are “saved” by women named Mary with strong ties to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Giemza compares The Known World with other novels by contemporary African 
American writers that, he says, portray blacks and Irish as “strange kin” in the United 
States. Examples he points to include The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman, 
Morrison’s Sula, as well as Richard Wright’s Black Boy and Native Son.  
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Catholicism), it also signals, once again, a turn away from the traditional Protestant view 
of salvation. 
 Attending to Jones’s revisionary incorporation of Catholicism, I am arguing, 
illuminates the role of the artist in the realization of a slave’s liberation. For, just as in the 
Ophelia narrative, when Mary determines “right then and there” on account of the young 
girl’s beautiful songs to take her away from slavery, it appears that Rita too will be saved 
by art. In fact, the art that likely secures her freedom is, like the other works in the text, a 
piece indicative of its creator’s eternal vision. The creator in this case, though, is not Rita, 
but Augustus—and it is his act of aesthetic creation that makes her liberation possible. 
For, however much he remains beholden to the order of slavery in his personal life, when 
it comes to his art, Augustus reveals a creative capacity for seeing beyond it. He not only 
invents the plan to send Rita by mail to his merchant in New York, he also carves the 
walking stick that Mary’s son “had been waiting for all along.” Notably, the stick which 
so captivates the boy is itself a symbol of both artistic and divine prescience: a figurative 
retelling of the Book of Genesis, which relates individuals from different historical 
periods to the first man and woman supposedly created by God, suggesting that they were 
all part of his providential design. It depicts Adam and Eve at its base, and they are 
“holding up” a long line of their descendents—“fourteen or more other figures,” from 
Cain and Abel to George Washington and even the artist’s idea of what the current “king 
and queen of England” look like—all of whom appear together in an atemporal view of 
human history (47). The piece thus recalls, with its sweeping perspective that transcends 
the passage of time, Alice Night’s “miraculous” wall hangings, and I am suggesting that 
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its ultimate effect is quite similar to those wall hangings as well. Both works, in the 
imaginative way they disrupt temporality, bring about the actual liberation of slaves, 
thereby confirming the transformative power of art. 
Coda 
 Whether or not one reads the temporal disjuncture in The Known World as 
“pessimistic” about the future of race relations in the U.S., it would be hard to deny that 
the novel privileges art as a means for transcending the suffering brought about by 
slavery. In this manner, like Stigmata and Oxherding Tale, Jones’s work suggests that 
disruptions in narratological time can have actual real-world consequences, transforming 
how audiences perceive their relationship to the existing order. That is, in effect, how all 
three contemporary slave narratives determine the value of aesthetic creation: in terms of 
the artwork’s ability to challenge the conventions of Western temporality by imagining a 
space unbeholden to the linear, progressive view of history on which the system of 
slavery was rationalized and sustained. In fact, given the way that the tropes of rememory 
and spirit possession also disrupt temporal conventions in the their representations of the 
slave experience, it could be said of these antirealist devices more broadly that they enact 
a collective and destabilizing critique of the ideologies undergirding the rationalizing 
impulse of the antebellum period. Altogether, then, as I have been contending throughout 
the preceding chapters, the effort to revise the traditional historiography of slavery is 
commensurate in these texts with a drive towards irrationality, which is often 
expressed—strangely enough—through the language of Catholicism. 
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 The Catholic margin of the novels I have considered thus emerges in the 
contemporary narrative of slavery as a site of oppositional discourse, wherein alternative 
ways of remembering the past are realized. And yet, the alternative historiography that 
Catholicism, in a sense, makes possible also implicates the religion and the institutions it 
gave rise to in the very structures these texts set out to undermine. For, as we saw in The 
Known World, at the same time a Catholic logic of salvation informs how slaves 
imaginatively transcend suffering, Catholic theology (following Augustine and, by 
extension, Saint Paul) is simultaneously responsible for the conditions that caused them 
to suffer in the first place. Therefore it would be erroneous to infer from my reading that 
Catholicism operates in this novel—or in any of the texts in this study—as an 
unproblematic or “pure” mode of dissent. Quite to the contrary, I have attempted here and 
throughout the dissertation to demonstrate the deeply conflicted way the contemporary 
narrative of slavery deploys its Catholic margin. 
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